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UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS, STATE POWER,
AND THE LIMITS OF CONSENT
Richard A. Epstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. A Ubiquitous Problem
T he Supreme Court's decision in Lyng v. International Union,
UAW,' decided during the 1987 Term, looks like a creature of
the modern activist state. Lyng asked the Court to resolve the con-
stitutional tension between the Food Stamp Program and the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Before the New Deal, the issues pre-
sented by the case would not, and probably could not, have arisen.
Politically, Congress did not have the will to pass either of these
programs. If passed, each would likely have been found to fall outside
Congress' commerce power.2 It was also unresolved whether the Food
Stamp Program could have been sustained under Congress' spending
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I would
like to thank Larry Alexander, Albert Alschuler, Douglas Baird, Gerhard Casper, David Currie,
Frank Easterbrook, Larry Kramer, Jonathan Macey, Michael McConnell, Frank Michelman,
Charles Smith, David Strauss, and Cass Sunstein for their exhaustive and informative comments
on portions of an earlier draft. I have tried to incorporate their insights and answer their
objections as best I could. Richard Craswell, David Friedman, Stephen Shiffrin, and Alan
Schwartz gave me valuable advice in working through some of the lines of argument developed
in this Foreword. I also benefitted from comments at the University of Chicago Work in
Progress Workshop, and from comments that I received in presenting the earlier draft at a
luncheon workshop of the clerks and staff of the Seventh Circuit. The errors that remain in
this Foreword are of my own invention.
1 xo8 S. Ct. 1184 (t988). For further discussion of the case, see pp. 96-102 below.
2 See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548-49 (1935) (holding
that regulation of time and hours does not fall within Congress' commerce clause power); Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308-09 (1936) (same); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., I56
U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (holding that regulation of manufacturing monopolies does not fall within
Congress' commerce clause power). The NLRA had indeed been held unconstitutional in the
three unanimous circuit court decisions to pass on the question. See Fruehauf Trailer Co. v.
NLRB, 85 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 301 U.S. 49 (i937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 85 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd, 301 U.S. 58 (I937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 83 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1936), rev'd, 301 U.S. i (1937). For my defense of E.C.
Knight, see Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1432-54
(1987). There had been some erosion of Knight in the pre-1937 period, but none that went
nearly as far as Jones & Laughlin. For example, the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-I88 (1982), was found to fall within the scope of the commerce power in Texas & New
Orleans Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 (293o), but that statute
was consciously limited to the instruments of interstate transportation, a proper subject of the
federal commerce power since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) i (2824).
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power. 3 For good measure, the NLRA might well have been held to
work an impermissible infringement of the liberty of contract of both
employer and employee. 4
The New Deal transformation and its aftermath have placed both
statutes beyond political controversy, just as they have immunized the
statutes from direct constitutional attack. When a 1981 amendment
to the Food Stamp Program provided that food stamps would not be
distributed to workers who go out on strike in a labor dispute other
than an employer lockout,5 however, the stage was set to examine
what first and fourteenth amendment principles apply to the interac-
tion of these two complex statutory systems. The respondent union
claimed that the statutory change "coerced" workers into sacrificing
their first amendment right to freedom of association in order to obtain
the food stamps that Congress provided to persons generally in need,
and even to nonstriking workers who had quit their jobs. 6 Its equal
protection claim covered much the same ground: although the Con-
gress need not have provided any food stamp benefits at all, once it
embarked upon such a program, it could not discriminate between
striking workers and other needy recipients.
Cast in this form, the respondent's case is a curious blend of old
and new. While its setting may be novel, Lyng raises the basic
structural issue that for over a hundred years has bedeviled courts
and commentators alike under the mysterious title of "unconstitutional
conditions." 7 In its canonical form, this doctrine holds that even if a
3 The spending power authorizes Congress "to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. x. Madison
read the clause to authorize Congress to spend only for those purposes that fell within the other
enumerated powers of article I, section 8. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. x, 65 (1936).
Butler, however, rejected the Madisonian view in favor of Hamilton's and Story's construction,
which allowed any expenditure that advanced the "general welfare of the United States" without
limitation to the enumerated powers. See id. at 65-66. The food stamp program could not
have survived if Madison's view had been adopted. The fate of a food stamp program under
Hamilton and Story's position is uncertain. The legislation is "general" in the sense that it
applies uniformly across the country, but it is not general in the sense of providing a public
good shared by all citizens alike. With the 1937 expansion of the commerce clause, the system
of enumerated powers collapsed and with it any concern over the contours of the spending
power. For a defense of the Madisonian view, see Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: The New Deal, 19J-1940, 54 U. CHi. L. Rav. 504, 529-36 (1987). For a discussion of
that view in connection with unconstitutional conditions, see pp. 40-44 below.
4 See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. i (i915); Adair v. United States, 2o8 U.S. 161
(igo8). The Court in 1929 distinguished those cases in the context of the Railway Labor Act.
See Texas & N.O.R.R., 281 U.S. at 570-71.
5 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of i98i, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1o9, 95 Stat. 361 (198i)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (1982)).
6 The statute provides that when a worker has voluntarily quit his employment, the period
of disqualification is only 90 days, and then only if the quitter is the head of a household as
defined under the statute. See 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(i) (1982).
7 The phrase, for example, appears in Justice Bradley's dissent in Doyle v. Continental
[VOL. 102:1
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state has absolute discretion to grant or deny a privilege or benefit, it
cannot grant the privilege subject to conditions that improperly
"coerce," "pressure," or "induce" the waiver of constitutional rights.
Thus, in the context of individual rights, the doctrine provides that
on at least some occasions receipt of a benefit to which someone has
no constitutional entitlement does not justify making that person aban-
don some right guaranteed under the Constitution.8 In other in-
stances, the doctrine prevents the government from asking the indi-
vidual to surrender by agreement rights that the government could
not take by direct action. Thus, although a state may absolutely
forbid foreign corporations from doing business within its borders, it
cannot allow them in on condition that they waive their right to
federal diversity jurisdiction, any more than it could divest them of
this right by statute. 9 In still other instances, the doctrine closely
resembles equal protection, barring the state from making certain
privileges available to individuals only if they consent to terms more
onerous than those demanded when the same privileges are made
available to others. Again, the state may prevent foreign corporations
from doing business in the state altogether, but it may not allow them
to do business only on condition that they pay higher taxes than their
local competitors.
The problem of unconstitutional conditions arises whenever a gov-
ernment seeks to achieve its desired result by obtaining bargained-for
consent of the party whose conduct is to be restricted. There is, for
example, an ordinary first amendment issue when the government
seeks to impose prior restraints on publication. That question is
transformed into an unconstitutional conditions issue when a govern-
ment benefit is conditioned upon acceptance of prior restraint. Simi-
larly, there is only a traditional equal protection claim when the
government imposes heavier criminal penalties on blacks than it does
Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876): "Though a State may have the power, if it sees fit to subject
its citizens to the inconvenience, of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business
within its jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon their doing
so." Id. at 543 (Bradley, J., dissenting). An earlier hint of the doctrine is found in Lafayette
Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856): "This consent [to do business as a
foreign corporation] may be accompanied by such conditions as Ohio may think fit to impose;
... provided they are not repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States ......
Id. at 407. The condition involved in French, to accept service of process in order to do
business in the state, was sustained.
8 See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 8I HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1445-49 (1968).
9 At the time of Doyle, states were allowed to impose such conditions. Doyle was significantly
restricted, however, by Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186 (1887), which returned to the earlier
position of Home Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445 (1874), by striking down a
similar condition. Doyle was definitively overruled, and the position of Morse and Barron
reaffirmed, in Terral v. Burke Construction Co., 257 U.S. 529, 533 (1922). See infra p. 38.
1988]
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on whites or vice versa. The unconstitutional conditions overlay
comes into play only when the government sells goods or services to
blacks on more onerous contract terms and conditions than those it
offers to whites.
There is a special conceptual problem with the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions, however, that does not arise in connection with
ordinary constitutional limits on government powers. Why does the
doctrine exist at all? Why should there be any limitation at all on a
system of government power that rests on the actual consent of the
individuals whose rights are thereby abridged? To be sure, even the
system of free markets recognizes some limitations upon the principle
of consent in ordinary contracts between private individuals. Duress,
force, misrepresentation, undue influence, and incompetence may be
used to set aside contracts that otherwise meet the normal require-
ments of offer, acceptance, consideration, and consent. But none of
these conventional grounds accounts for the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions, which comes into play only after all these conven-
tional hurdles to consensual union have been overcome.
The analogies to ordinary contract law thus give rise to a persistent
puzzle that can be formulated in both conceptual and practical terms.
To revert to the foreign corporation cases, if a state can exclude a
foreign corporation, why can it not admit the corporation subject to
whatever conditions it wishes to impose? 10 Sometimes the puzzle is
stated in terms of a greater and a lesser power. The greater power
to exclude might be said to include the lesser power to admit on
condition. "'
The objection to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can
also be stated in functional terms. How can striking workers complain
that they have not received benefits to which they have no absolute
entitlement? The state has made an offer that any worker may choose
to accept or reject. There has been no use or threat of force. As long
as individuals know what is best for themselves, they can enter into
only those bargains that leave them better off after than before. Some
10 Justice Holmes dismissed the entire doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as a logical and
conceptual error: "Even in the law the whole generally includes its parts. If the State may
prohibit, it may prohibit with the privilege of avoiding the prohibition in a certain way."
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. i, 53 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
11 Cf. Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 345-47 (1986) (holding
that "greater" power to ban gambling includes "lesser" power to ban advertising promoting
gambling). The formulation is somewhat misleading, however, because greater/lesser problems
can arise even when the issue of consent or the form of a conditional grant is far removed from
a case. For example, any case of selective enforcement of criminal or civil sanctions might be
said to give rise to a greater/lesser problem: if the state has the greater power to punish both
blacks and whites, then it has the lesser power to punish only blacks or only whites. Although
such cases do not give rise to an unconstitutional conditions problem as that term is used here,
the greater/lesser language is still applicable.
[VOL. 1023
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workers have taken the bargain and others have cast it aside. All
workers are free to make whatever decisions they choose, but must
live with the consequences of their decisions once made.12 The same
point could be made about the case of race. Blacks cannot complain,
because they are better off with the bargains they made than they
were before the state contracted with either blacks or whites.
These examples appear to justify the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions as a half-conscious adaptation of the classical Pareto su-
periority test used in modern welfare economics to evaluate alternative
social states. As originally developed, the Pareto criterion attempted
to make social judgments about alternative states of the world without
resorting to problematic interpersonal comparisons of utility. It
avoided the necessity and awkwardness of such comparisons by pre-
scribing a test that allowed each person to compare his own private
welfare before and after the legal change. Thus if no person in state
A is worse off than he was in state B, and at least one person is
better off in state A than he was in state B, then state A must be
judged as superior to state B. The criterion of judgment is social in
the sense that the welfare of every individual is taken into account,
yet the stringent condition that no person be worse off in state A than
in state B obviates the need for any comparison of welfare across
separate persons.
The Pareto formula has often been attacked for being too restric-
tive of the type of social changes that it allows.' 3 Nonetheless, where
the relevant universe involves only two self-interested parties, any
voluntary agreement or grant satisfies the test, for the agreement is
formed only if it makes both sides better off than before, given that
each is the best judge of his own welfare. The use of this Pareto
formula presupposes that the status quo, ante is the baseline against
which shifts in individual welfare are measured. Thus when people
reject a bargain or grant offered by the state, they are no worse off
than they were before. When they accept the bargain or grant on
condition, they are better off. Either way, they are not in a position
to complain. The state for its part is treated (and this assumption
will become controversial) as though it were a single person that
knows its own preferences, measured against the same baseline of the
status quo ante. If its bargain or grant is rejected, then it will be no
worse off than before; if that grant or condition is accepted, then it
will be better off. Either way the stringent Pareto conditions are
12 For a celebration of this bargain theory, see Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U.
PA. L. REV. 879 (1929).
There are shades of the same position in the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823-27 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
.-f13 See, e.g., Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
509 (198).
1988]
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satisfied so that there is no reason to worry about the terms and
conditions that the government attaches to its bargain or grant. No
matter what its outcome, the proposed transaction appears unassail-
able.
The implications of this reasoning for Lyng are clear: if Congress
could grant or withhold food stamps at will, then it can do so on
condition. Before the 1981 Amendments to the Food Stamp Program,
Congress could have repealed the statute in its entirety, much the way
a settlor can take back at will the property that he has placed in a
revocable inter vivos trust. The baseline against which the conduct
of individual union members must be measured, therefore, is not one
in which they are entitled to food stamps as of right. Relative to the
proper baseline, no worker can complain. A worker who bargains
away his right to strike for food stamps does so because he values the
latter more than the former; a worker who rejects that offer is no
worse off than he would have been in the baseline situation. The
situation is thus radically distinct from one in which the state uses
force against any individual, for in that case one person is left worse
off because of the application of state power and, at the very least,
has a strong case to demand that the state justify its action.
At first blush, then, a categorical rejection of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions seems to square with both traditional con-
ceptions of sovereign power and modern tests of social welfare. A
position with so strong an apparent pedigree should be hard to dis-
lodge on any ground. Yet the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
tenaciously endures, notwithstanding charges by figures no less distin-
guished than Justice Holmes that it is both logically incoherent and
corrosive of sovereign power.14 Originating in the nineteenth century,
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is no new judicial concoc-
tion in the post-New Deal welfare state. Nor is the doctrine anchored
to any single clause of the Constitution. Like the police power, it is
a creature of judicial implication. It roams about constitutional law
14 Holmes' most famous statement of his position is found in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New
Bedford, '55 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892):
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in which the servant does
not agree to suspend his constitutional right of free speech, as well as of idleness, by the
implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment
on the terms which are offered him.
Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-i8.
A similar freedom of contract rationale is found in some of Holmes' tort opinions. See, e.g.,
Lamson v. American Axe & Tool Co., 177 Mass. 144, 145, 58 N.E. 585, 585-86 (igoo) ("[The
workman] complained, and was notified that he could go if he would not face the chance. He
stayed, and took the risk. He did so none the less that the fear of losing his place was one of
his motives." (citations omitted)). Justice Holmes reiterated these principles in the context of
unconstitutional conditions in Western Union Telephone. See supra note io.
[VOL 102:1
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like Banquo's ghost, invoked in some cases, but not in others. It has
been used as an aid in construing the scope of Congress' spending
power' 5 and of the states' police power.16 It has been engrafted onto
substantive protections afforded to speech, 17 religion,' 8 and prop-
erty. 19 It also has found expression in decisions under the equal
protection 20 and due process2 1 clauses. About a dozen cases in the
past two terms testify eloquently to the diverse and thorny issues that
the doctrine raises.
The importance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has
brought forth an extensive array of academic literature to explain andjustify it.22 The received writing sensibly recognizes the essential
place that the doctrine occupies in modern constitutional law, but it
makes far less sense when it attempts to explain how the doctrine
arises or what it does. In part, the difficulties arise from the persistent
efforts to make unconstitutional conditions cases resemble duress or
coercion cases, 23 as is made evident by the discussion of differences
between "penalties" or "fines" on the one hand, and "subsidies" or
"benefits" on the other. 24 Yet if common law duress were present in
these cases, the recipient of the grant would be able to attack the
offending condition without resorting to any special doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions. As long as the condition is obtained by
coercion or duress, it can be set aside as a matter of right, regardless
of its content. In contrast, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
Is See Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793
(1987); infra pp. 40-47.
16 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); infra pp. 58-67.
17 See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 1o8 S. Ct. 2138 (1988);
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (x987). For discussions of these
cases, see pp. 55-58 and pp. 76-77 below, respectively.
18 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (ig8i); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963); see also infra pp. 79-89.
19 See, e.g., Nollan, 107 S. Ct. 3141; infra pp. 60-64.
20 See, e.g., Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 (i91o); see also infra note 65.
21 See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (2926); Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. i (iyio); infra pp. 47-54.
22 See, e.g., Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565
(i98o); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Admin-
istrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977); Van Alstyne, supra note 8, at 1-445-49.
23 See, e.g., Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1922); Van Alstyne, supra note 8,
at 1445-49.
24 See infra pp. 41-44 (discussing the Child Labor Tax Case); infra pp. 79-87 (discussing
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)); infra pp. 94-96 (discussing Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574 (2983)); infra pp. 96-2o2 (discussing Lyng v. International Union, UAW,
2o8 S. Ct. 1184 (1988)).
1988]
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is directed toward the substance of various conditions, regardless of
the course of negotiations between the individual recipient and the
state.
The balancing tests commonly suggested by commentators show
that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions cannot be explained
by analogy to common law coercion. 25 This balancing is not eviden-
tiary, as courts are not asked to weigh different sorts of evidence that
might indicate whether a certain gesture is an implied threat of the
use of force. Rather, its close involvement with the substantive terms
and conditions of the statute - for example, whether the use of state
highways is conditioned upon agreeing to service of process in all
cases, or only in those arising out of use of the highways - distances
us from the process-oriented issues that dominate ordinary duress
cases. But without a strong substantive theory that explains both the
use and the limits of individual consent, the use of balancing tests in
this context leaves far too much room to the legal imagination. Bal-
ancing must be in service of a general theory. It cannot be a substitute
for one.
Efforts to explain the doctrine on the basis of "dignitary" interests26
are also unsatisfactory, running into the same difficulties in this con-
text that they do in all others. First, it is unclear how individual
dignity is advanced when restrictions are placed upon the individual
right to contract. Can one respect the dignity of the individual, and
at the same time hold that a person, although of full age and com-
petence, cannot make the decisions of greatest importance to his or
her life prospects? How does one enhance dignity by restricting
choice? Theories of dignity are often used to support notions of
individual autonomy, yet here they are invoked to limit the ability of
the individual to enter into desired agreements with the state. Second,
the dignitary theories are undermined by their exclusive focus on the
individual upon whom the condition is imposed. As far back as
Hohfeld, if not before, it has been understood that the creation and
recognition of a right or privilege in one person will impose correlative
obligations on others. 27 The art (or science) of government is to
develop some social criterion, such as the Pareto test, that helps decide
which interests, including dignitary interests, should be protected, and
which not. In this inquiry, of course, it is useful from the individual's
perspective to identify the benefits of having certain conditions re-
moved from state bargains or grants. But the analysis is incomplete
25 See Kreimer, supra note 22, at 1349-51 (criticizing attempts by Van Alstyne and others
to defend this balancing approach).
26 See, e.g., Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61
B.U.L. REv. 885 (1g8i).
27 See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 6 (1913).
[VOL. 102:1
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unless the correlative costs to other persons of their removal are taken
into account as well. So long as resources are scarce, individual rights,
even constitutional rights, must have some correlative duties. Thus,
any complete analysis must take both sides of the same problem into
account, but dignitary theories generally fail to do so.
The most ambitious effort to organize the unruly law of unconsti-
tutional conditions is that of Professor Kreimer, who recognizes that
standard notions of coercion are unable to account for the doctrine. 28
In Professor Kreimer's view, the greatest difficulty with the coercion
question is to identify the appropriate baseline against which the
possibly coercive effects of government action may be evaluated.
When the baseline gives a right to the government, government may
condition the benefits that it imposes. When it gives the right to the
individual, then the government's extraction of a concession amounts
to impermissible coercion. 29 Kreimer proposes three baselines against
which the constitutionality of any government bargain can be mea-
sured: history, equality, and prediction. 30 Although an account of
baselines is essential to any general analysis of unconstitutional con-
ditions, Kreimer's inability to offer a single baseline for assessing
conditional government benefits renders his account problematic. For
example, the historical baseline may allow the states selectively to
grant access to the public highways in a way that the equality norm
prohibits. Consistent and determinate baselines can be generated only
with aid of a theory that links the substantive guarantees provided
under the Constitution to the set of government practices and pro-
cesses that can undermine them. The theory, moreover, has to be
functional, not intuitive: it must explain how some social improvement
28 Kreimer has also pointed out the limitations of simple contract models that focus exclu-
sively on force and fraud. See Kreimer, supra note 22, at 1318 ("While there is a contemporary
philosophical school that attaches unique status to rights of bodily integrity and freedom from
physical force, it is hard to imagine any modern constitutional theorist taking the position that
only a direct threat of violence would violate constitutional rights."). He attributes this model
to Robert Nozick, Charles Fried, and me. See id. at 1318 n.77. In part, this Foreword is my
effort to go beyond the simple libertarian model in the context of state grants and bargains.
For my own concerns with the libertarian model, published after Kreimer's observation, see R.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, 334-38 (z985), and Epstein, The Classical Legal Tradition, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 292, 298-99 (1988).
29 See, Kreimer, supra note 22, at 1352 ("My conclusion is that the distinction between
liberty-expanding offers and liberty-reducing threats turns on the establishment of an acceptable
baseline against which to measure a person's position after the imposition of an allocation.").
30 See id. at X359-74. History refers to the use of tradition and the status quo ante as a
baseline, so that coercion occurs when a previously enjoyed benefit is lost. See id. at 1359-63.
Equality refers to equal treatment under the law, and invokes equal protection ideals generally.
See id. at 1363-71. Prediction is the hardest baseline of all to grasp because it requires a
counterfactual judgment of what a government would have done had it been asked to adopt a
policy without reference to the constitutional rights that it is asking the individual citizen to
waive. See id. at 1371-74.
1988]
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is obtained by striking down the condition in question. So much at
least is demanded by any theory that treats the substance of bargains,
not the process of their formation, as its subject matter. What is
needed is a more systematic examination of the overall consequences
of certain bargaining strategies undertaken by government.
B. The Plan of Action
In this Foreword, I hope to explain why the divisions and confu-
sions in judicial and academic opinion on the subject of unconstitu-
tional conditions do not rest upon simple error or naive misconception
of the legal doctrine, but upon deep structural problems associated
with both constitutional theory and the larger questions of proper
political governance. There are no shortcuts to this form of analysis.
In order to understand unconstitutional conditions, it is first necessary
to understand the function and limitations of consent, and the bar-
gaining processes by which it comes about.
Part II of this' Foreword develops such a conceptual framework.
Its inquiry is overtly functional and utilitarian. Bargains are inter-
actions thought to advance some overall measure of social welfare.
They are not regarded as absolutes in themselves. Essentially, we
want to enforce bargains when and only when they satisfy two criteria.
First, does the bargain create joint gains for the contracting parties?
Second, does the bargain respect the interests of third persons who
are not parties to the bargain? Within a libertarian framework, the
first criterion is satisfied by refusing to enforce bargains induced by
force and fraud. Similarly, the second criterion is met by refusing to
enforce bargains that contemplate the use or threat of coercion or
fraud against third parties. As stated, these criteria account for many
of the necessary limitations on the common law regime of contractual
freedom. Although this model addresses some of the possible exter-
nalities that are created by contractual agreements, it ignores monop-
oly and collective action problems, which also induce individuals to
take actions that benefit their private, but not the social interest. 31
Each of these phenomena offers compelling reasons why certain pri-
vate bargains are not enforced. The problems each pose arise with
equal or greater intensity in the context of state bargains. The reasons
that lead us not to enforce some private bargains can thus explain
why certain bargains between the government and the individual are
not enforced. Once those reasons are explicated, we can provide a
31 The closest example of the general approach I am proposing is found in Easterbrook,
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, xg8i
Sup. CT. REv. 309, 349. Judge Easterbrook presents a view of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions as part of an elaborate effort "to control cases of externalities and monopoly." See
id.
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more systematic consequentialist argument for why the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions limits the ability of individuals to consent
to the surrender of constitutional rights.
With this framework in view, the remainder of the Foreword
shows how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does, and
should, function in a variety of contexts as a check against the political
perils of monopoly, collective action problems, and externalities. In
principle there are two ways to organize the discussion. The first is
to examine how the doctrine works with respect to its distinct limi-
tations upon the "prices" people have to pay in order to obtain benefits
from the government. Thus there could be a discussion of the first
amendment protections of speech and religion, the takings clause, the
due process clause, and the like. I have chosen not to follow that
course, at least not fully. Instead, I have adopted an approach that
first identifies the different heads of government power and then shows
how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions plays itself out with
respect to their exercise. By beginning with the powers and not the
limitations, it is easier, I think, to follow both the doctrine's historical
development and its institutional framework.
Given this orientation, I begin with those areas in which the
preservation of competitive markets has been regarded as an impor-
tant social function. Part III thus concerns the use of the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions in the area of its birth, the nineteenth-
century cases in which states sought to impose discriminatory taxes
or regulations upon out-of-state corporations that sought to do business
within their borders. Part IV pursues a question of federalism of great
importance in the pre-1937 cases: how the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions might be used to ensure that the United States does not
invade the area of powers reserved to the states. Part V then examines
the role of the doctrine in limiting the power of the state to control
access to public roads and highways. Part VI addresses the relation-
ship between the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and the police
power, as it relates to the regulation of both property and commercial
speech. Part VII then discusses the use of the doctrine in modern
areas of tax benefits and welfare rights. It covers the receipt of
conditioned exemptions for real estate and sales taxes, and the receipt
of unemployment benefits, medical benefits, or, as was the case in
Lyng, food stamp benefits for striking union workers. A brief conclu-
sion follows.
IH. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In order to understand the limitations on bargaining, it is best first
to sketch how bargains can lead to optimal social results. I thus begin
with a brief discussion of perfect competition, and then move on to
discuss monopoly, collective action, and externality problems as they
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occur in private law contexts. Thereafter I shall show how these
problems arise in the context of state power.
A. Private Transactions
.r. Perfect Competition. - We begin with an idealized spot market
that contains many buyers and many sellers. Fraud and duress are
rendered illegal, as is the power of either sellers or buyers to contract
among themselves over output or price. In this type of market an
optimal social equilibrium emerges in the sense that all the possible
gains from trade are exhausted by voluntary exchanges. Within the
ideal competitive equilibrium, there will be a unique price at which
all goods will be traded, and that price will be set equal to the
marginal cost of the marginal producer. 32 Accordingly, no seller and
no buyer have any discretion over price. The seller who tries to raise
his price above the market will find no takers. The seller who tries
to lower his price below the market will find that he cannot make a
profit on the sales that are concluded. A system of perfect economic
freedom yields a set of rules in which no player finds it to his advan-
tage to engage in any bargaining tactics at all. The ideal competitive
market yields a situation in which all the gains from bargains are
captured at zero bargaining costs.
2. Monopoly. - The polar opposite to perfect competition is mo-
nopoly. 33 Here the market has a single seller who can set terms for
sale that maximize his own profits. In general the monopolist will
seek to maximize his own profits by selling a smaller quantity of goods
at a higher price than is found in the competitive market. This private
strategy yields lower total social output than is achievable under pure
competition. The social losses in question arise from three distinct
sources. First, when the monopolist raises his price, he prevents some
mutually beneficial exchanges. Thus, if the competitive price of a
good is eight and the monopoly price is ten, any consumer who values
that good at more than eight units but less than ten will no longer
purchase it. The benefits of that foregone exchange are thus one form
of loss created by monopoly.
32 In real markets, nonprice terms introduce additional complexity that must be taken into
account. These terms - such as warranties and delivery provisions - usually are accounted
for by adjustments in the price term. Also, in practice, firms seek supracompetitive returns by
finding new "niches" for their products that, in the short run at least, give them some discretion
over prices. The resulting monopoly gains are typically subject to erosion in the long run by
new entry, a phenomenon generally inapplicable to political markets.
a3 For an excellent general discussion of the differences between competitive and noncom-
petitive markets, see D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 215-6i (1986).
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There is a second source of loss as well. With respect to trans-
actions that do occur, the price increase of two units seems to result
in a pure transfer of wealth from consumers to producers without any
attendant social loss. Nonetheless, this transfer itself is not costless
to achieve. Monopolies do not come down from heaven, but are
acquired by purposive and costly human action. The prospect of
obtaining increased prices is a private gain for which any prospective
monopolist will pay. The costs of acquiring a monopoly, whether by
buying out a competitor or obtaining government protection from
competition, are real costs incurred to obtain simple wealth transfers.
The result is that some fraction, and perhaps all, of the potential
social gain from the transaction is always wiped out, creating a second
form of loss.
Finally, there is a third source of loss associated with monopolies.
Outside a regime of pure competition, there is no unique price at
which goods can be bought and sold. The advent of a bargaining
range - a series of prices at which both buyer and seller are willing
to transact - gives rise to a problem of "strategic bargaining," or
more generally, "strategic behavior." Parties now have a tendency to
"act strategically," to conceal preferences, to lie, to haggle, to holdout,
to dicker, to build coalitions, and to price discriminate, all of which
cost money but which produce no real gain.
The losses that arise from strategic behavior can perhaps best be
seen if we take an extreme situation, the bilateral monopoly, in which
there is a single buyer and single seller. The buyer might be willing
to pay 200 units to purchase, and the seller to accept ioo units to
sell. A costless bargain at any price in the interval generates ioo
units of total gain. If the price is 15o, each side obtains 50 units of
that gain. But io does not offer a stable resting point. The seller,
for example, may be to tempted to spend, say, io, to sell at 170,
while the buyer may be tempted to spend io to purchase at 130.
Both strategies cannot be successful. If each side's efforts cancel each
other out, then the sale is still at iso, but bargaining behavior reduces
the total gain by 20 units, or io per person. Nor is the overall result
changed by any shift in the contract price from the even division at
15o. The total gain is still reduced by the level of bargaining costs,
which could exhaust much of the ioo units of potential gain. There-
fore, any set of institutions that could reduce the bargaining costs
without defeating the bargain would generate important social benefits
that could be shared by both parties to the transaction.
The dangers of monopoly have led to powerful legal restraints
against freedom of contract. Thus, an aggrieved consumer may bring
a private antitrust monopoly action. Such a consumer is better off
having made a purchase from a monopolist than he would have been
if he had done without the good. In the example above, he might
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have valued at eleven units a good for which the monopolist charged
ten, but for which the competitive price was eight. Nonetheless the
antitrust damage action for two units (ignoring trebling of damages)
is permitted, notwithstanding the consumer's consent to pay ten. The
baseline norm is not the state of affairs before any contract, but the
achievable state of affairs under the competitive equilibrium that is
the social optimum. In effect, the plaintiff is regarded as a suitable
private attorney general and can sue, notwithstanding his position as
a willing party to the contract. Yet by the same token, the purchaser
is not free of all obligations under the contract. He must, for example,
treat goods with proper maintenance in order to maintain an action
for breach of express warranty, just as he would in the competitive
situation.
Similar limitations on consent are often found in cases of bilateral
monopoly. A good illustration of the process is the common law
response to private necessity, as it relates to the law of both tort and
contract. For example, when a ship is caught in a storm and the
crew can save itself only by docking at a single dock, there is a
powerful bilateral monopoly problem that invites the use of strategic
bargaining. The dockowner may be able to make a gain if he allows
the use of his dock for any sum greater than io units, while the ship's
crew may be willing and able to pay iooo just for the temporary use
of the dock. If the matter were resolved by a voluntary bargain, the
price settled upon might be anywhere within the total range of io to
iooo, leaving both sides better off. Worse still there might be no
bargain at all, if the dockowner, who has so little to lose by holding
out for a high price, refuses to accept a more reasonable offer.
The doctrines of "conditional privilege," developed at common law,
are a response to bargaining problems created by the necessity situa-
tion. 34 In essence they allow the shipowner to use the dock upon
payment of compensation equal to the rental value of the dock, plus
damages for any loss inflicted during the storm. The right to exclude,
a normal incident of property, is suspended under conditions of ne-
cessity.
Modifications of the law of contract parallel those in the law of
property. For example, it has long been the law in admiralty that a
salvor is not allowed to take advantage of the position of a ship in
distress at sea by driving a hard bargain. Even if such a bargain has
34 See Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (igo8) (recognizing a privilege to enter the
land of another when acting under private necessity); Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 1o9
Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (I9IO) (requiring compensation to be paid for damage caused when
using another's property under conditions of necessity). See generally Bohlen, Incomplete Priv-
ilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property and Personality, 39 HARv. L. REV.
307 (1926).
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already been concluded, it will not be enforced, and compensation
will be set in accordance with a formula that takes into account both
the risk to the salvor and the gain to the rescued ship35 - a principle
easily extended to contracts made in the dock case. What goes for
price terms applies equally to conditions that might otherwise be set.
Thus a contract that said, "I will rescue you only if you agree not to
enter into competition with me in the real estate market and to vote
Republican" would not be enforced either.
These limitations on contractual freedom could not be justified if
the only reason to invalidate contracts were to counteract force and
fraud, both of which are absent in the situations just described.
Rather, the rules are a judicial effort to maximize the overall value
of the dock or of salvage activities by preventing the gameplaying
that parties might otherwise engage in, given the large bargaining
range. The rules impose a single price at which the dock must be
rented, or ships salvaged, which is set roughly to allow the rescuer a
competitive return on his costs, while preserving the remainder of the
cooperative surplus for the party subject to the external necessity.
The legal rules are set in a way that best imitates the outcome that a
competitive market would generate. The moment the crisis is over,
the ordinary rules of property and contract are restored. The dock
can be used by the shipowner only with the owner's consent; the
salvage crew keeps full control over its equipment. Calm seas and
safe journeys bring with them a return to the ordinary property rights
regime.3 6 Monopoly and necessity thus offer powerful reasons for
limiting a regime of private freedom of contract.
3. Collective Action Problems. - The problem of monopoly is
closely associated with the so-called collective action problem that has
now been studied in many private law areas. A bankruptcy situation
35 The Supreme Court has stated the rule as follows:
Courts of admiralty will enforce contracts made for salvage service and salvage compen-
sation, where the salvor has not taken advantage of his power to make an unreasonable
bargain; but they will not tolerate the doctrine that a salvor can take the advantage of
his situation, and avail himself of the calamities of others to drive a bargain; nor will
they permit the performance of a public duty to be turned into a traffic of profit. The
general interests of commerce will be much better promoted by requiring the salvor to
trust for compensation to the liberal recompense usually awarded by courts for such
services.
Post v. Jones, 6o U.S. (ig How.) iSo, 16o (1856) (citations omitted). For the determinants of
salvage price, see Landes & Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers:
An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978).
36 In Calabresi's terms, the necessity situation reduces the dockowner's protection to that
afforded by "liability rules" - a damage action against loss. "Property protection" means that
control over the asset can only be lost by consent, the normal situation. See Calabresi &
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REv. O89, 1105-o6 (1972).
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illustrates the problem as well as any other.37 Suppose that there is
a single common debtor with a large number of independent general
creditors. Assume further that the debtor's business has a positive
"going concern" value that could not be captured if its assets were
sold off piecemeal in order to satisfy creditors' claims. If the business
should become insolvent, the way to maximize the total return to the
creditors would be to keep the business intact, and to provide each
creditor with a portion of the earnings it generates prorated to his
share of the debt. Nonetheless, any debtor has powerful incentives
to take individual action that would defeat this ideal collective solu-
tion. Thus, creditor A may prod the debtor for full payment of his
obligation by threatening suit. To stave off disaster, the debtor may
agree to make this payment, even at the cost of the piecemeal sale of
assets. Once any given creditor takes this course of action, other
creditors will also move to protect their assets. Each creditor will
therefore race for early payment and seek a "preference" from the
debtor. The debtor, who might have survived if the creditors stayed
their hand, can be brought down by the onslaught. Acting individ-
ually, the creditors will manage to destroy the going concern value of
the business, probably ensuring that many creditors will receive only
partial payment, and some none at all. Moreover, all of the jockeying
consumes enormous resources, which could be spared if the creditors
acted as a unit from the outset.
The difficulties of this collective action problem have long been
understood to require some form of legal modification of the simple
common law rules of property, contract, and tort. Because the debt-
or's property is a common pool asset, certain individual contracts or
transfers between any single creditor and the debtor can be set aside
to preserve the value of the whole. In essence, therefore, much of
the bankruptcy law is designed to force otherwise independent actors
to act together in a cooperative manner. Groups do not act in their
collective interests in quite the same way that individuals act in their
individual interests. The so-called problem of the prisoner's dilemma
is a standard example of the problem of collective choice. 38 The legal
37 See, e.g., D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY
31-35 (1985); T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10-13 (1986).
38 The prisoner's dilemma arises when each of two prisoners acting alone finds himself driven
to confess, even though both prisoners would be better off if they could coordinate their efforts
and remain silent. To see how this situation might arise, assume the following sentences await
each prisoner: if both confess, each gets a five-year sentence; if prisoner A confesses but prisoner
B does not, A gets a one-year sentence and B gets a ten-year sentence; if B confesses but A
does not, B gets the one-year sentence and A gets the ten-year sentence; if neither prisoner
confesses, each gets a two-year sentence. If A and B could coordinate their behavior, both
would remain silent, and each would escape with a light two-year sentence. Acting separately,
however, each will confess and therefore receive a five-year sentence. Consider A's situation.
If B confesses, A should confess in order to receive a five-year sentence instead of a ten-year
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doctrines addressing this problem provide yet another powerful limi-
tation on consent even in the absence of force and fraud that cannot
be ignored in the constitutional context.
4. Externalities.39 - The last of the social problems that lead to
limitations on freedom of contract is the need to protect strangers to
the agreement. It is here that the libertarian prohibition against the
use of force shows its greatest strength. Assume that A is not entitled
to take the property of B without B's consent. Any contract between
A and C that allowed A to take B's property would not be enforced,
at least as against B. The prohibition is necessary in order to forestall
destructive behavior that would otherwise undermine any stable sys-
tem of social organization. If A and C could bargain away the rights
of B, why would B and D not bargain away the rights of A? And
so on ad infinitum. An unending series of costly bargains could be
used to secure the transfer of wealth, but little would be done to
secure the creation of wealth in the first instance. The legal rule
allowing persons to exchange only those resources that they own
creates powerful incentives for the creation of wealth, and with it the
satisfaction of human desires. The rule that allows them to buy, sell,
or consume resources owned by others only leads to the dissipation of
wealth. Private law must therefore protect all individuals against the
contractual machinations of strangers. The rights that A and B each
have against C cannot be enlarged by an agreement between A and
B alone. The temptations for strategic contracting would be too great.
B. The Political Context
The dangers inherent in a system of private contracting often carry
over into the political arena. Thus, despite the traditional Hobbesian
sentence. If B remains silent, A should confess in order to receive a one-year sentence instead
of a two-year sentence. No matter what B does, therefore, A is better off confessing. Parallel
arguments apply to B, so both A and B confess. A chart of the payoffs looks as follows, where




Keep Silent .0,i 2,2
The prisoner's dilemma set out here is one that seems socially beneficial because it tends to
forestall crime. But sometimes, as in the bankruptcy case, each creditor finds himself in a
prisoner's dilemma game with his co-creditors that leads to a negative social outcome, namely
the destruction of the going-concern value of the business. For various articles discussing the
prisoner's dilemma, see RATIONAL CHOICE 34-107 (J. Elster ed. 1986).
39 The seminal discussion of this issue is found in Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. I (ig6o). I have stated my own views more fully in Epstein, Causation - In Context:
An Afterword, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 653, 653-57 (1987).
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insistence that the state must exercise a monopoly of force within its
jurisdiction in order to prevent the war of all against all, the creation
of that monopoly power in the hands of a few public officials itself
poses a great danger of abuse. The major task of constitutionalism,
therefore, has been to forge a system in which these government
excesses are curtailed while leaving the state sufficient power to dis-
charge the necessary tasks of governance. A system of unrestrained
political power does a poor job in setting the right balance. In some
markets the government has a high degree of monopoly power. It
may be the only party that can operate the public roads, issue building
permits, or allow firms to do business in corporate form. Unlike the
private monopolist, its power cannot be eroded by the entry of new
firms, but is perpetuated by a legal prohibition against entry by new
rivals. The risks of resource misallocation identified in private trans-
actions carry over to the political area as well. There is an obvious
need for limitations on the direct use of coercion. By the same token,
if the monopoly and necessity cases are any guide, there are obvious
reasons to limit the capacity of the government to bargain with its
individual citizens. Just as the dockowner in the private necessity
case is limited to a fixed rate of return when the dock is used by
others and forbidden from imposing collateral or unrelated conditions
on that use, so too the state, when it provides resources of which it
is the sole supplier, should be limited both in the concessions that it
may exact from private owners and in the conditions it may impose
on them.
Similarly, government action often creates the risk of collective
action problems. As a single unified entity, the state may be able to
make offers to widely dispersed individuals who find themselves faced
with a prisoner's dilemma game. Each person acting alone may think
it in his interest to waive some constitutional right, even though a
group, if it could act collectively, would reach the opposite conclusion.
By barring some waivers of constitutional rights, the doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions allows disorganized citizens to escape from
what would otherwise be a socially destructive prisoner's dilemma
game.
Finally, the problem of externalities as it arises from majority rule
must be taken into account. The state is an association of a large
number of individuals with diverse interests and inconsistent desires.
Yet it must make decisions that bind them all. In principle it would
be ideal if all collective decisions could be made by unanimous con-
sent, which would forestall the problem of the majority exploiting the
minority. But any unanimous consent requirement would lead to
government paralysis, because any single individual would be in a
position to bargain strategically by holding out for a lion's share of
the gain from social action. For better or for worse, some system of
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majority rule is a necessary evil, and one that forces us to confront
explicitly the expropriation problem in the political context.
Left unregulated by constitutional limitations, a majority could use
a system of taxation and transfers to secure systematic expropriation
of property. Taxes could be used to purchase property, which could
then be conveyed to some preferred groups-via "bargain sales," at a
fraction of its true value. There would be no exploitation of the
happy buyer, but there would be a risk that the state as trustee would
have abused its power in relation to the other citizens it represents,
all of whom received less than fair value in exchange for the property
transferred. This pattern of abuse would result not only in a system-
atic deprivation of the interests of some citizens but also in an overall
efficiency loss, as the controlling group will not only expend resources
to obtain the transfer, but will be willing to acquire the property even
when they value it less than the state did. 40 The legal system tries
to combat this problem through the use of the public trust doctrine. 41
Standing alone, the problem is not one of unconstitutional conditions
because there is no effort to take advantage of the happy parties who
prosper from doing business with the state.
Externalities, however, become entwined with the problem of un-
constitutional conditions when the state seeks to grant benefits or make
contracts subject to conditions that some individuals find far more
onerous than others. To be sure, conditions will not be imposed if
everyone is hurt equally by them, but they may become part of a
system of contracts or grants if they work to the benefit of a dominant
40 To take a simple case, assume that there are five persons in the society at large, and that
a majority faction of three arranges to buy a public asset worth $5oo for $300. In a static
analysis, the wealth of each of the two' minority shareholders decreases by $40 (one-fifth of the
state's $200 loss in the transaction), assuming that the asset has equal value for all concerned.
The wealth of each of the three dominant shareholders, ignoring assets not involved in the
transaction, increases from $2oo before the transaction ($ioo in cash, plus $ioo for his interest
in the public asset) to $227 after the transaction ($6o, or one-fifth of the publicly held cash,
plus $167, or one-third of the $5oo asset). As a first approximation there is only a redistribution,
not substantially different from that of an ordinary takings case. In dynamic terms, however,
there will be not only a simple shift of wealth, but a total reduction as well. Not only are
transaction costs incurred in making the shift, but the winning coalition may be able to profit
from the public sale if they value the asset at more than $300, even if they value it at less than
$5oo. Hence there is a systematic divergence between private and social costs, analogous to the
one found in the monopoly case. The winning coalition forces the transaction even when the
property is worth less in private hands than it was in public hands. The insistence that full
value be paid for any transfer of property from the state is necessary to stop this problem. See
Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411 (1987).
41 See Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Illinois Central does not locate
the public trust doctrine in any particular clause of the Constitution. On the public trust
generally, see Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986), and Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
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faction and against the interests of others. Assume, for example, that
before the introduction of a government benefit program - say, the
construction of a public highway - each of two factions has a welfare
of 50 units. Construction of the highway can improve the position of
each group from 5o units to ioo, and thus advance aggregate welfare
from ioo to 2oo. Thus far it seems that going forward with the
project is entirely unproblematic.
Once use of the highway may be conditioned, however, the anal-
ysis becomes far more complicated. Consider two polar scenarios.
Under the first, building the highway and conditioning its use ad-
vances total utility from ioo to 250 units, while that of each faction
increases from 5o to 125. Here both sides are unambiguously better
off with the imposition of the condition than they were without it, so
that courts should accept the condition even if they could not compel
its adoption.
The second scenario, however, is far more problematic. Suppose
that the total welfare involved increases from 100 to i75 units, but
that the position of the dominant faction moves from 5o to 120, while
that of the weaker faction moves only from 5o to 55. In essence the
imposition of the condition is designed to secure factional gains, which
are costly to obtain, shrinking the total size of the pie even while the
size of the slice enjoyed by the dominant faction increases. A third
scenario is possible, but unlikely: a one-sided condition might advance
the welfare of one group from 5o to iio units, and that of the other
from 5o to 120. In this case, the only inquiry is whether it is worth-
while to equalize the expanded gains from benevolent collective action.
The first two scenarios, then, are the ones that require closer
attention. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is necessary to
prevent the second alternative (unequal shares and smaller total gain)
from prevailing over the first. Thus if the dominant faction cannot
be prevented from conditioning use of the highway in the second
scenario, other citizens will take the bitter with the sweet, and consent
to the total package. Clearly, the world with the project and the
condition is better than the world without any project at all. But, to
use Kreimer's language, we have selected the wrong baseline, for the
world of the project without the condition is better than either of
these two alternatives. In the case given, there is social loss in that
the total size of the surplus produced by government action is reduced
from 200 units, if the latter condition is not allowed, to 175 units, if
the condition is allowed. If the legal system focuses only on the
consent of the individual citizen, it will not distinguish between these
very different kinds of conditions and their very different allocative
effects. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions offers a way to
pierce the consent by using as the baseline, not the status quo ante,
but an achievable state of affairs in which the program is put forward
without the conditions attached.
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At this point, it becomes difficult to use a simple Pareto test to
make the applicable distinction, for the dominant faction is left worse
off when the condition is rejected than when the condition is imposed.
Now the object of the inquiry is to maximize the total cooperative
surplus from the government action. Some effort must be made to
compare the size of the gains obtained by each of the rival groups,
and for this task one convenient approach is to accept only conditions
that tend to advance the welfare of all groups pro rata, as opposed
to those having a differential effect.
Given this complex inquiry, the trick is to fashion a test that can
distinguish good conditions from bad ones. A rule that all persons on
the highway must agree to answer for their torts seems to be the
benevolent kind of condition. 42 In imposing it the state acts as a
mutual agent of all citizens in a way that advances their ex ante
welfare. Alternatively, a condition stipulating that all commercial
haulers who use the highway must agree to accept the restrictions of
common carriers looks like the type of condition that reduces the total
size of the social surplus, by allowing it to be redistributed through
factional intrigue. 43 A strong unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
which like a strong equal protection argument insists that all parties
be treated equally, is one effective way to control this public abuse
and to ensure full preservation of the social surplus created from the
use of highways.
In dealing with unconstitutional conditions, the stakes are not
limited only to dollars and cents, or even to property and economic
liberties. Conditions might impinge upon individuals' political and
religious liberties as well. It is therefore necessary carefully to examine
the soundness of conditions for which consent has been obtained.
Doing so once again requires the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions.
C. Citizen Misconduct
Thus far, all attention has been directed toward potential miscon-
duct by government officials. But there is no reason to assume that
government officials are any more self-interested than are the citizens
with whom they do business. Thus the risk of strategic behavior is
bilateral. In private dealings, any party to a complex transaction can
engage in strategic behavior, and so too in the area of political action.
Just as the government may seek to exploit the individual, so too a
citizen may try to exploit the government. The flip-side, therefore, to
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is the idea of "compelling
42 See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
41 See infra pp. 47-54 (discussing Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 27,
U.S. 583 (1926)).
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state interest," which appears throughout all constitutional analysis.
Typically the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not interfere
with government bargains designed to prevent individual exploitation
of some common pool assets. To revert to the above example, a user
of the public highways can be required to abide by the rules of the
road as a condition of entry. The control of public nuisance is an end
that the government can seek not only by direct regulation of private
property, but as a condition on the use of public property as well.
D. Judicial Implementation of the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine
i. First Principles. - The analysis of any unconstitutional con-
ditions problem requires an assessment of the relative strength of the
three risks of abuse that can arise when the state bargains with its
citizens. But even after the relevant factors are set out, several pieces
of the puzzle must still be put in place.
The first piece concerns the extent to which the Supreme Court
will undertake this review of government behavior. Here, as in other
contexts, the answer is heavily dependent upon its attitude toward
the behavior of government officials. The private law response to
monopoly, collective action problems, and externalities reflects the
assumption that individuals will seek to makimize their own private
returns, given the external constraints under which they labor. Its
legal rules therefore have been set to minimize the likelihood that they
will be able to achieve some private gain at some net social cost. To
be sure these assumptions are overdrawn. There are many individuals
who will come to the aid of those who are in trouble, without so
much as the thought of payment to themselves. Many people would
never think of abusing their partnership control to cheat their part-
ners. These cases are important for any overall assessment of human
nature, but they are not the cases against which the legal rules are
directed. Honest and honorable people do behave well regardless of
the legal framework in which they act. The law must be directed
against that fraction of the total population for whom self-interest is
the sole beacon of conduct. For such people, the assumptions of the
law fit all too well with the behavior that the law seeks to control.
The question what to make of human nature carries over to the
constitutional context with equal significance. If it is assumed that
government officials and the private parties who influence them are
prone to the corrosive influence of self-interest, then the legal rules
should strictly scrutinize whatever behavior they undertake. If the
direct use of government coercion is subject to serious constitutional
scrutiny, then government bargains should be subject to a similar
level of scrutiny. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions thus
becomes an inseparable part of constitutional law, attendant to any
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and all exercises of government power. Alternatively, if government
officials are assumed to act with benevolent motives when they reg-
ulate, then they should be assumed to act with similar motives when
they contract. The low level of scrutiny found under rational basis
review would carry over from regulation to bargains, and the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions would play only a marginal role in our
legal firmament.
There are today many competing general constitutional visions,
which bear on the question of how courts should regard government
figures. Some theories stress the virtues of republican self-govern-
ment;44 others the satisfaction of "dignitary" interests;45 still others the
protection of economic liberty or the niceties of utilitarian calculation.
Other constitutional theories rest upon the sanctity of private property
and the fear of the democratic excesses of the populist masses. 46 For
present purposes, the correctness of the basic orientations is not the
critical point. The various theories only direct attention to those areas
in which the political process is viewed with distrust. It is precisely
in those areas that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions will take
root and flourish.
In this connection, the constitutional fault line of the post-1937
period poses the same problem for the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions that it does for direct forms of government regulation. The
weak protection of property and contract is juxtaposed with a strong
suspicion of government regulation of preferred freedoms, such as
speech and religion, and the government use of suspect classifications,
such as those based upon religious and political views. Today there
remains, to a lesser degree than before, an erratic fear of political
aggrandizement by one state at the expense of another, or of the states
at the expense of the federal government.
This hierarchy of legal rights makes the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions especially difficult to apply to complex modern sta-
tutory schemes that implement explicit or implicit transfers of wealth
for purposes now regarded as unquestionably legitimate - for ex-
ample, to regulate land use, or to help the needy or unemployed. Yet
these programs, whether by regulation or taxation, often effect such
transfers along forbidden lines, such as political or religious affiliation.
Frequently, the question arises how to disentangle these two distinct
strands of a single statutory scheme, subjecting each to its appropriate
44 See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, z985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, ioo HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986). For a more recent discussion, see Symposium:
Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. (forthcoming i988).
45 See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 26.
46 The Framers' concerns in this regard are set out in McConnell, Contract Rights and
Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Consti-
tutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 267, 270-71 (1988).
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level of review - minimal scrutiny for ordinary rights, strict scrutiny
for fundamental rights and suspect classifications. The coerced trans-
fer of property from A to B may be allowed today in general economic
areas, but it will not be tolerated along (say) religious or political lines.
Where the state seeks those forbidden objectives through contracting,
its actions will be met with the same hostility as when it proceeds
through direct regulation or taxation. In such contexts, we find the
continued, indeed expanded, vitality of the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions in modern times.
2. Second Best. - The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is
also beset with the serious problem of being a "second best" approach
to controlling government discretion. In many cases, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress or the states have absolute discretion
with regard to matters such as allowing foreign corporations to do
business within the state or allowing commercial vehicles to use public
highways. This discretion increases the risks associated with monop-
oly, collective action problems, and externalities in a wide variety of
bargaining contexts. In some cases, the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions is used to "take back" some of the power which had been
conferred upon government officials in the first instance. In principle,
the doctrine's application would be unnecessary if the Court had
restricted the scope of the government power in the first instance.
Often the unsatisfactory nature of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions arises from its status as a mop-up doctrine where other
forms of constitutional restraint have been abandoned. Within these
contexts, it is often very difficult to decide whether the doctrine does
more harm than good. When the government is told that it cannot
bargain with individuals, the empirical question arises whether gov-
ernment will deny them a useful benefit altogether, or grant them the
benefit without the obnoxious condition.
III. THE STATE INCORPORATION POWER
A. Nineteenth-Century Special Charters
One of the most important powers of the state is to grant charters
to those firms that wish to be incorporated within the state. Often
since Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncements in Trustees of Dart-
mouth College v. Woodward,47 the corporation has been said, some-
what misleadingly, to be an "artifical being" that owes its existence to
the state. But behind the corporate form lie the desires of ordinary
47 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) S18, 636 (i819) ("A corporation is an artifical being, invisible, intan-
gible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence.").
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human beings. Who receives the certificate, and on what terms, can
raise all the potential for abuse associated with government discretion.
Consider what happens in a regime in which the state has complete
discretion in awarding charters. First, state legislators will be able to
extract enormous payments (including bribes) from the private parties
who wish to obtain the benefits of incorporation. Second, granting a
certificate of incorporation to one firm while denying one to its com-
petitors creates enormous externalities. The public at large is denied
the benefits of competitive product markets, while the rival firms are
relegated to doing business in the inferior partnership form, with
unlimited liability for members.
These two concerns are not simply hypothetical. One of the major
political issues in the nineteenth century revolved around the once
common practice of issuing individual, special charters of incorpora-
tion, the abuses of which have been well documented. 48 The situation
was corrected largely through competition between states in the chart-
ering market, rather than through application of any constitutional
principle. The result was a regime of general incorporation that es-
sentially allows any group of individuals the benefit of the corporate
form as long as they can meet certain minimum requirements designed
to protect the public at large from abuse: minimum assets or insurance
to protect tort creditors, and a willingness to accept service of process
in the corporate name. 49
Although not prompted by application of the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions, the shift in the method of chartering corpora-
48 For a judicial account, see Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557-64 (I933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). For an explicit public choice analysis of the abuses under the special
charter system, see Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of
Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 138-52 (i985).
49 Even within this framework there are opportunities for abuse. Thus, in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts
criminal statute that prohibited corporations from making contributions or expenditures "for the
purpose of ... influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other
than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corporation." MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977). The statute also provided that matters
concerning the general taxation of income or property shall be "deemed" not to affect the
corporation. Here the restriction was struck down on first amendment grounds over the dissent
of Justice Rehnquist, who argued, relying on Dartmouth College, that because the corporation
is a creation of state law, the state can legitimately withhold from the corporation those liberties
not "incidental" to the corporation's state-defined purpose. See 435 U.S. at 822-28 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
In a sense this restriction applies evenhandedly to all corporations. But it is selective among
business entities as a larger class, exacting an implicit tax on speech by corporations that reduces
the gains from incorporation that private parties otherwise would obtain. The statute is not
designed to prevent any abuse of the corporate form. In my view it could be struck downnot
only on first amendment grounds, but as a differential tax that violates the takings clause. See
R. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 283-305. The first amendment analysis in Bellotti is similar to
that applicable in the highway cases, discussed below at pp. 47-58.
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tions shows the social utility of limiting the state's discretion. It does
make sense to say that the state may choose not to grant any individ-
uals a charter of incorporation, or may choose to grant it to all comers
on equal terms, but cannot use the ostensibly lesser power of picking
and choosing among applicants. To see the point, consider a very
simple and stylized example. Assume two firms - firm A and firm
B - desire corporate charters. If neither firm A nor firm B gets a
charter, then each will have a value of $ioo. If firm A gets a charter
and firm B does not, then A will have a value of $12o and B a value
of $9o. If firm B gets a charter and firm A does not, then B will
have the value of $12o and A the value of $9o. If both firms get the
charter, then each will have a value of $115. These values do not
reflect the costs of getting a charter. The payoffs of the various
alternatives are put in tabular form in the notes.50
In a regime of selective incorporation firm A and firm B will both
bid for a charter, and each would be prepared to pay up to $20 to
the legislators to obtain an exclusive charter. If either party starts
down this road then the other will have to respond because one rival's
incorporation reduces its competitor's net worth from $oo to $9o.
There will be a complex political struggle, the outcome of which is
quite unclear. What is clear is that these bargaining costs reduce the
total gains from incorporation, both for the firms and the society at
large, even if the fourth outcome is achieved. In an extreme case,
dual incorporation with bargaining costs taken into account could
leave both firms with a value of only $zoo. Political intrigue can
wipe out the efficiency gains of incorporation for firm members, sup-
pliers, and customers.
We can now see the value of a rule rejecting the argument that
the greater power (to keep all firms from incorporating) includes the
lesser power (to keep some firms from incorporating). If the state is
forced to grant charters of incorporation to every firm if it grants a
charter to any, then the second and third possibilities are eliminated.
The state is forced to choose between scenarios one and four. The
so
Value
Structure A B Total
i. No incorporation $Ioo $oo $200
2. A only $120 $90 $210
3. B only $90 $120 $210
4. Both A and B $u15 $1i5 $230
This chart underestimates the value of alternative 4 because it does not include the gains
that the public achieves from general incorporation, including greater technical innovation and
more competition in product markets. This point does not affect the analysis; if anything, these
gains tend to show the greater social preference for alternative 4.
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two firms will no longer be in a position to compete with each other
for charters, so the level of intrigue will be diminished. In addition,
political dynamics will tend to force the outcome to scenario four, as
the legislators will be very hard-pressed to resist an outcome that
benefits both firms and the public at large. The upshot is that the
power of selective incorporation is the greater power, while the all-
or-nothing choice is the lesser power.5 1 Whatever the formal appear-
ances, selective incorporation gives political actors a greater oppor-
tunity to extract economic rents.5 2 The rule forcing the state to in-
corporate all firms or none is, as a first approximation, a better
protection against individual and public abuse.
There is still one piece to the puzzle missing, for some conditions
can and should be uniformly imposed upon all firms seeking incor-
poration, for example those requiring insurance or minimum capital-
ization to protect tort creditors, and those requiring firms to accept
service of process. These requirements can be stated in a general
form, however, so that public protection is possible without conferring
enormous discretion upon state authorities. 53 Within the context of
local incorporation, then, rejecting the greater/lesser dogma prevents
political abuse and advances the overall competitive situation.
B. Foreign Incorporation
Although the battle over general incorporation laws during the
middle of the nineteenth century showed the dangers of government
discretion, it did not squarely raise the question of unconstitutional
conditions. Rather, it was the conflict over whether a foreign corpo-
ration had a right to do business in a state under the same terms and
conditions as a domestic corporation that gave birth to unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine. A state's power to exclude foreign corpo-
rations creates a monopoly situation, for no matter where a firm is
incorporated, each state has the sole right to decide whether it can do
business within its territory. The opportunities for political maneu-
vering should be evident. Firms will compete to gain entrance for
themselves and to exclude rivals, just as they did when special charters
for incorporation within the home state were the general rule.
The best way to combat this problem is through a strong, cate-
gorical rule granting foreign corporations the same right to do business
S Kreimer makes this point explicitly: "Often it is only by ripping a problem from its
historical context that selective denial can be viewed as a lesser power. In reality, selective
deprivation may be the less controlled and hence the more dangerous power." Kreimer, supra
note 22, at 1313 (footnote omitted).
S2 See McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regula-
tion, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. IOI (1987).
S3 The conditions imposed in Bellotti do not address either of these concerns. See supra
note 49.
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in another state on the same terms and conditions available to its
local corporations. In effect, the power to select between domestic
and foreign corporations could be eliminated as long as no state would
be prepared to disenfranchise its local firms in order to keep out
foreign rivals. By forcing states to select between the first and fourth
alternatives stated above, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
applied in this interstate context, again would result in the state
choosing the fourth alternative.
The obvious - and correct - constitutional vehicle for reaching
this position is the privileges and immunities clause, which provides
that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States. '54 That line of attack,
however, was decisively foreclosed in Paul v. Virginia,55 which held
that corporations were not "citizens" within the meaning of that clause.
The position so adopted necessarily conferred a broad range of dis-
cretion upon the state, which Paul set out with extraordinary clarity:
Now a grant of corporate existence is a grant of special privileges to
the corporators, enabling them to act for certain designated purposes
as a single individual, and exempting them (unless otherwise specially
provided) from individual liability. The corporation being the mere
creation of local law, can have no legal existence beyond the limits of
the sovereignty where created. As said by this court in Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, "It must dwell in the place of its creation, and
cannot migrate to another sovereignty." The recognition of its exis-
tence even by other States, and the enforcement of its contracts made
therein, depend purely upon the comity of those States - a comity
which is never extended where the existence of the corporation or the
exercise of its powers are prejudicial to their interests or repugnant to
their policy. Having no absolute right of recognition in other States,
but depending for such recognition and the enforcement of its contracts
upon their assent, it follows, as a matter of course, that such assent
may be granted upon such terms and conditions as those States may
think proper to impose. They may exclude the foreign corporation
entirely; they may restrict its business to particular localities, or, they
may exact such security for the performance of its contracts with their
citizens as in their judgment will best promote the public interest.
The whole matter rests in their discretion.56
The Court thus took a very relaxed attitude toward the question
of governmental abuse. The implicit repudiation of any form of ju-
dicial scrutiny in Paul carried forward the original argument in Dart-
mouth College that corporate privileges are the subject of legislative
grace, and exposed the Achilles heel of that earlier decision which, in
S4 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
s5 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
s6 Id. at i8i.
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protecting existing charters, expanded the power of the state to reg-
ulate business affairs of new corporations. 57
Dartmouth College necessarily rejected the theory that the welfare
of a corporation is simply the welfare of its individual shareholders,
all of whom are collectively prejudiced by the inability to do business
in other states.58 The sharp disjunction between the right of individ-
ual traders to enter foreign states on equal terms with local citizens
and the inability of foreign corporations to do the same constitutes a
fundamental weakness in Paul that was not lost on the leading com-
mentators of the time, all of whom reverted to aggregate theories of
the corporation to conclude, in the words of Victor Morawetz:
[T]he rights and duties of an incorporated association are in reality
the rights and duties of the persons who compose it, and not of an
imaginary being.
[T]here is no reason of immediate justice to others, why a
number of individuals should not be permitted to form a corporation
of their own free will, and without first obtaining permission from the
legislature, just as they may form a partnership or enter into ordinary
contracts with each other.5 9
Even if a corporation is not a "citizen," its shareholders surely are,
and it is they who are denied legal protection against selective exclu-
sion.
Although Paul prevented the privileges and immunities clause from
ensuring nondiscrimination, other constitutional avenues that could
have constrained the level of state discretion conferred by Paul soon
opened up. 60 Most notably, the term "person" as used in the due
S7 The effects still linger. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637,
1649-5o (1987) (upholding state regulation of anti-takeover legislation, in part because corpo-
rations are the creature of state regulation). For a brief discussion of the point, see Comment,
The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441,
1442 n.3 (1988). It is also worth mentioning that one of the most horrible of the Supreme Court
decisions on race relations, Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (xgo8), which allowed states
to prohibit any incorporated educational institution from teaching black and white students
together, rested in large measure upon the fact that corporations are creatures of the state. See
id.; see also supra note 49 (discussing this analysis as applied in Bellotti).
S8 The implication of Dartmouth College was made explicit in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38
U.S. (x3 Pet.) 519 (1839), which held that the power of a corporation to act, within or beyond
its home state, is limited by the provisions of its charter.
59 V. MoRAwETz, A TREATISE ON THE LAV OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OTHER THAN
CHARITABLE § I, at 2 (1882); id. § 29, at 24. The development is outlined in Comment, cited
above in note 57, at 1457-58. Note the use of natural right rhetoric to support market structures
that can be justified on consequentialist grounds.
60 The contract clause line of argument had already been foreclosed, with Chief Justice
Marshall and Justice Story dissenting, by the earlier decision in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), which denied the clause any effect with respect to future contracts. I
have defended the prospective view of the contract clause in Epstein, Toward a Revitalization
of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703 (1984).
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process clause had been construed to cover the same corporations
deemed not to be "citizens" under the privileges and immunities
clause. 61 By the I89o's it had been held that the words "without due
process of law" were to be construed in some contexts to mean at
least "without just compensation, '62 so that takings jurisprudence,
which often uses a disproportionate impact test to determine whether
just compensation has been provided, 63 now applied to the states.
The disproportionate impact of a discriminatory tax seems clear
enough. if the tax is a taking, then its discriminatory impact is clear
evidence that the party so taxed has not received just compensation
for the moneys paid to the state. The same kind of argument could
be made in principle with respect to the equal protection clause. If
foreign shareholders are entitled to the same rights as domestic ones,
then any discrimination between them must be justified by the extra
costs that foreign corporations impose on local governments, of which
there seem to be none. Any sensible use of either due process or equal
protection doctrine would have resulted in an end run around Paul,
without recourse to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Under
this "strong rights" thesis, the state would not have the power either
to exclude foreign corporations from doing business within its borders
or to tax foreign corporations differently from local firms. The out-
sider comes in on equal terms, and nothing more need be said.
Because this position did not take hold in the late nineteenth or
early twentieth century, however, the stage was set for the Court's
use of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, under both the due
process 64  and equal protection 65  clauses of the fourteenth
61 See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (x886). Note that
Congress could not have limited state discretion during this period, because Paul had also held
that local insurance contracts were matters of local commerce (or more decisively that they were
not commercial transactions at all) and thus beyond the reach of the commerce clause. See 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) i68, at 182-85 (I869).
62 See Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, x66 U.S. 226, 235-4! (1897).
63 See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 204-09.
64 See Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 56 (IgIO); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 26
U.S. i (xgio).
65 See Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 2x6 U.S. 400 (1xo). Southern Railway acknowledged
that the equal protection analysis follows a path similar to the earlier due process analysis. See
id. at 413-18. There is good reason for the parallelism. Both the equal protection and due
process clauses essentially follow the same path as the takings clause, as it applies to general
taxation and regulation. In essence, it is virtually impossible to measure whether the benefits
of taxation exceed the costs of the tax imposed. Hence unequal treatment or disproportionate
impact should become the proxy by which to judge whether there is an illicit transfer of wealth
between groups. Cf. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (ig6o) (holding that the
takings clause was intended to prevent placing a disproportionate share of burdens on a few).
For an extensive discussion, see R. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 195-2i5. The equal protection
clause emphasizes equal treatment; the due process clause emphasizes the loss of property without
compensation. In essence, they both look at different ends of the same set of issues.
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amendment 66 as a "second best" means of controlling government
discretion. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas,67 for example,
the Court struck down a discriminatory tax Kansas sought to impose
upon Western Union, a New York corporation. The tax itself was
based on the corporation's entire capital stock, not only on its local
assets, and thus had a strong extra-territorial effect. Clearly, the due
process clause would have struck down the tax if the firm had done
no business in Kansas. The issue of unconstitutional conditions arose
because the state conditioned its willingness to allow Western Union
to engage in local commerce on its willingness to pay the discrimi-
natory tax.68 Without the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the
consent of the firm would have cured the defects in extraterritorial
treatment; with the doctrine in place, however, consent of the cor-
poration did not prevent it from challenging the disputed condition.
Important consequences flow from the choice of legal regimes. The
key difference between the unconstitutional conditions argument and
the strong rights argument set out above goes to the set of the choices
left to the state. Under unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the state
may choose either to exclude the foreign corporation altogether or to
let it in on equal terms with the local corporations. By rejecting the
greater/lesser analysis championed by Justice Holmes,6 9 the Court thus
barred the state from allowing consenting foreign corporations to do
business subject to a countless array of taxes or other burdens that
did not apply to domestic corporations, 70 although it did not prevent
the state from exercising the "greater" power of excluding foreign
corporations altogether.
The question arises how the state will behave under these two
legal regimes. In order to answer that question, it is necessary to
undertake a rough interest group analysis that takes into account three
disparate sets of interests: local consumers, local businesses, and for-
eign corporations. When the state has complete power to admit,
exclude, or admit subject to conditions, it is highly likely that the
state will often choose the third path, which Kansas adopted in West-
ern Union, even though it enjoys an absolute right to exclude under
Paul.
Start with local consumers. These individuals both gain and lose
from the admission of foreign corporations subject to the discrimina-
66 See Merrill, supra note I2, at 879-80; Oppenheim, Unconstitutional Conditions and State
Powers, 26 MICH. L. REv. 176, 176 (1927).
67 26 U.S. i (igi).
68 See id. at 4-8. The statutory decision excluding purely local business probably reflected
the judgment that Western Union was indispensable for the interstate business, but not for the
local markets, where other firms could compete. It fits in well with a public choice model of
regulation.
69 See supra notes ro & 14.
70 See supra pp. 34-35; infra pp. 37-38.
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tory tax, when measured against the alternative of admitting them
subject only to normal taxes. On the positive side of the ledger, more
taxes might be collected from the out-of-state firms, thus reducing the
local tax burden. (Either alternative is preferable on this measure to
exclusion, which would result in no tax revenue.) On the negative
side, the discriminatory tax imposes burdens on local consumers who
are forced to pay higher prices for some goods and services, and to
forego the benefits of other bargains the higher tax renders uneconom-
ical - the so-called excess burden imposed by the discriminatory
tax.71 (Again, either alternative is preferable to exclusion, which
would result in no consumers' surplus from business with foreign
corporations.) For local consumers as a group, it seems plausible that
these effects will tend to offset each other. Local competitors for their
part have far less ambivalence. They gain revenue and competitive
advantages from the discriminatory tax and should support it strongly.
While some might want total exclusion, the loss of both tax revenue
and the opportunities to do business with foreign suppliers and cus-
tomers make this an unlikely outcome. Given that political compro-
mise is always possible on the level of discrimination embedded in
the tax, discriminatory taxes such as found in Western Union should
emerge.
This calculus changes radically when the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions puts the state to an all-or-nothing choice. Now local
consumers must be asked to support a total exclusion of out-of-state
firms. Under this rule, these citizens receive no revenue offset from
the foreign tax, and they lose in addition the possibility of doing
business with efficient out-of-state firms who are able to overcome the
tax disadvantage. Consumer losses become very large, with no ob-
vious offsetting gains. We should thus expect that they would strongly
support a repeal of the special tax when the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions puts them to the choice of nondiscriminatory entry
or total exclusion of foreign firms.
For their part, rival sellers of goods and services may well like the
total exclusion, at least for their direct rivals, but they would not
desire a similar exclusion for out-of-state firms that supply inputs that
these firms purchase, or for firms that purchase their products. On
balance, therefore, it will likely be difficult to assemble a broad in-
state coalition of producers who will find it in their own self-interest
to keep the outsiders out permanently, or even to impose taxes so high
that most of them choose to stay out. The net result would be the
71 The term "excess burden" is applied to any tax in which the amount received from the
taxing authority is less than the private parties so taxed lose. The deadweight loss associated
with such excess burdens is analogous to that which occurs when the price set by a private
monopolist exceeds the competitive price. See generally J. GWARTNEY & R. STROUP, ECONOM-
ICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE IIO-iI (4th ed. 1987).
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desired one: out-of-state firms would be allowed to compete on even
terms.
Still to be considered are the interests of the out-of-state firms. In
principle they would always prefer the nondiscriminatory taxes to the
other two choices. But the prospect of supracompetitive profits may
induce them to pay a discriminatory tax for the privilege of doing
business. Thus the legal regime of Paul, before its demise in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,72 created an exten-
sive bargaining range between local governments and outside firms,
with ample opportunities for strategic behavior on both sides. If the
guess about local politics is correct, the use of unconstitutional con-
ditions in this context would force the states to the proper social
alternative - letting outsiders in on an equal basis - by precluding
the use of discriminatory taxes. The doctrine cuts out all intermediate
positions, leaving the state only the all-or-nothing alternatives of total
exclusion or nondiscriminatory admission. Forced to either of the two
edges of the bargaining range, the local interests are better off allowing
out-of-state firms in on equal terms than excluding them entirely. 73
The total exclusion option sanctioned by Paul is preserved, but as an
empirical matter factional intrigue is forestalled, and the correct out-
come of the ensuing political game is in most cases ensured. The
subsequent histories of the decisions in both Western Union Telephone
Co. v. Kansas74 and Southern Railway Co. v. Greene,75 both of which
struck down discriminatory taxes, bear out this hypothesis, insofar as
the modern versions of both statutes now apply nondiscriminatory
rules to foreign corporations. 76 It was simply not viable to exclude
either foreign railroad or foreign telegraph companies from doing any
portion of their business within any state.
This analysis applies not only to taxation of foreign corporations,
but also to other kinds of regulation as well. Consider the common
provisions that sought to restrict the ability of foreign corporations to
7 322 U.S. 533, 543-49 ('944). South-Eastern Underwriters held that fire insurance com-
panies were subject to prosecution under the Sherman Act, see id. at 553-62, and explicitly
rejected any argument that the business of insurance was not commerce, see id. at 539-43.
Congress responded to the decision by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Pub. L. No. § 79-
i5, 59 Stat. 33 (i945) (codified as amended at i5 U.S.C. 9 ioii-ioi5 (1982 & Supp I 1983)),
which returned regulation of the insurance industry to state control. The local patterns of
discrimination against foreign corporations are discussed in connection with Western & Southern
Life Insurance Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (ig8i). See infra pp. 38-40.
73 See supra notes 71-72.
74 216 U.S. i (i9io).
75 216 U.S. 400 (1910).
76 In the aftermath of Southern Railway, Alabama law provides that foreign corporations
are subject to the same "duties, restrictions, penalties, liabilities now or hereinafter imposed
upon a domestic corporation of like character." ALA. CODE § Io-2A-227 (1987). Kansas, in the
aftermath of Western Union, subjects domestic and foreign corporations to an identical franchise
tax. See KAN. STAT. ANN. 99 17-7503(c), 17-7505(c) (Supp. 1987).
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avail themselves of the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction. Terral v.
Burke Construction Co. 77 overruled several earlier cases 78 by holding
that:
a State may not, in imposing conditions upon the privilege of a foreign
corporation's doing business in the State, exact from it a waiver of
the exercise of its constitutional right to resort to the federal courts,
or thereafter withdraw the privilege of doing business because of its
exercise of such right, whether waived in advance or not.7
9
The justification for this result is identical to that in the tax cases.
Foreign corporations presumably want access to federal courts to
escape the local bias of state courts. To prevent them from exercising
this option is to subject them to a disguised differential tax equal to
their estimated additional burdens of litigating in a hostile forum. If
forced to choose between exclusion and admission on equal terms, the
states do the latter, as happened after Terral,80 which is as it should
be. As with taxes, the doctrine serves in this context as an effective
constraint on arbitrary power found in the absolute authority to ex-
clude foreign corporations. 8' Again the proposition is not a necessary
truth. The success of the doctrine rests solely on the empirical judg-
ment that a state, when faced with the all-or-nothing choice, will
choose to allow the outsider in on equal terms.
C. Overriding the Nondiscrimination Rule
Although use of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in state
taxation cases is now well established, its success depends on the
steadfastness with which it is applied. That level of resolve in turn
depends upon what justifications are found appropriate to displace its
underlying principle - an issue not raised in the earlier cases. In
this regard, the recent taxation cases are unsatisfactory.8 2 In Western
77 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
78 See, e.g., Security Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246 (i9o6); Doyle v.
Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 35 (876).
79 257 U.S. at 532.
8o See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-102 (1987). This statute, which corresponds to the Act of
May 13, 1907, No. 313, sec. i, 1907 Ark. Acts 744, is identical to the 1907 Act, save for the
elimination of the clause condemned in Terral.
81 The result in the case has also been supported on the ground that it protects the jurisdiction
of the federal courts from state encroachment, an argument invoked, but not explored at length,
in Terral, see 257 U.S. at 532-33, and endorsed in Merrill, cited above in note 12, at 892. It
was perhaps on this ground that Justice Holmes joined the decision notwithstanding his earlier
dissents in Western Union, 216 U.S. at 52 (Holmes, J., dissenting), and Southern Railway, 216
U.S. at 418 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
82 See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (2981) (holding a sever-
ance tax on the coal production to be nondiscriminatory even though 90% of the coal was
shipped under contracts shifting the tax burden to out-of-state utility companies). But see
Epstein, Taxation, Regulation and Confiscation, 20 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 433, 445-49 (1982)
(criticizing the result in Commonwealth Edison).
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& Southern Life Insurance Co. v. Board of Equalization,83 California
imposed an overtly discriminatory tax on some out-of-state insurance
companies. The tax was not a simple discriminatory tax like the one
invalidated in Western Union. Rather, it was styled as a "retaliatory"
tax that was imposed only when the state of incorporation of the
foreign company, here Ohio, charged California companies higher tax
rates for doing business in Ohio than the California companies paid
in California. Ohio did not impose any discriminatory tax on Cali-
fornia life insurance companies (which it could not do under Western
Union).84 But Ohio did tax all insurance companies doing business
in Ohio a premium tax at a higher rate (2.5%) than California charged
for its local companies (2.35%). Thus, California's retaliation provi-
sion, in effect, imposed a 2.5% premium tax on the California reve-
nues of Ohio corporations. The differential tax was justified as a way
to pressure Ohio corporations to use their influence to lower the
general premium tax in Ohio to California levels.
Despite the explicit discrimination revealed by these facts, Justice
Brennan upheld the tax. He first made clear his unwillingness to
reverse Paul's interpretation of the term "citizen" in the privileges and
immunities clause. But he did accept - heartily, though without
explanation - the unconstitutional conditions gloss used to mitigate
the absolutism of that decision. 85 The shift from the privilege and
immunities analysis to an equal protection analysis, however, allowed
Justice Brennan to place an elastic "rational basis" construction on the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, as permissive as the rational
basis review he had applied directly in equal protection cases. 86
Applying this standard, he found that California's tax was justified
as a device to induce other states to reduce the amount of taxes
imposed on California businesses, and that the life insurance industry
itself had supported the tax in question. In so doing, he left ajar the
door to politics that had been shut more tightly by the earlier and
more categorical versions of unconstitutional conditions doctrine. As
Justice Stevens' dissent pointed out, the decision allows California
politicians to seek influence over the general level of taxes in Ohio. 8 7
It is worth adding that the differential tax might be supported by
83 451 U.S. 648 (198i).
84 See id. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting); OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. § 5729.03 (Anderson
1973).
8s See 451 U.S. at 656-68, (endorsing the doctrine after reviewing the long line of confused
precedent in the area).
86 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (I981) (allowing the
state to ban use of plastic milk containers). I have criticized that decision strongly in TAKINGS,
cited above in note 28, at 143-44. Justice Brennan did not originate this line of analysis, which
had reached its present form in earlier decisions. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (i955).
87 See 45, U.S. at 677-78 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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insurance companies because of their determination to monopolize
local markets. California's retaliatory statute is hauntingly reminiscent
of New Jersey's effort, struck down in Gibbons v. Ogden,88 to get even
with New York's restrictive steamboat monopoly. Its motivation also
seems similar to the clearly protectionist sentiment underlying the
system of retaliation in the trade legislation that Congress has just
enacted.8 9 Ohio still keeps its old tax rate, 90 so that the Supreme
Court's decision allows discrimination to flourish across states in a
short-run that lengthens as the shadows of the evening. As elsewhere,
the rational basis test leads only to constitutional confusion and to the
release of political forces far better kept in check. It is often said that
the Constitution does not impose categorical restrictions upon ineffi-
cient or sneaky practices. But in hard cases, we can only make sense
of the substantive provisions that it does contain in light of the social
consequences generated by alternative interpretations of those provi-
sions. We know that the creation of one national economic market
was a major goal of the Framers, and it remains a goal worthy of
our support. The per se rule of Western Union and Southern Railroad
is superior to its watered-down modern alternatives.
IV. TAXING, SPENDING, AND FEDERALISM
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine also limits the scope of
government discretion under the federal taxing and spending power.
As is well known, taxation is an effective way for governments to
secure implicit transfers of both wealth and power. These transfers
can be implemented by imposing higher rates on some persons, grant-
ing exemptions to others, or by imposing conditions on the collection
of taxes or on the grants of exemptions. The potential abuses in the
taxing power are well captured by Chief Justice Marshall's famous
dictum that the "power to tax involves the power to destroy." 91 If
this tendency had been countered by a broad reading of the takings
clause, then all selective taxes, exemptions, preferences, and condi-
tions would be struck down as impermissible redistributions, unless
supported by a narrow police power justification. 92 But even before
the 1937 constitutional watershed, the Court had always taken a far
more relaxed view on matters of selective taxation than Chief Justice
88 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) i (1824).
89 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-48, x02 Stat.
1107 (x988).
90 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5725.I8(B) (Anderson x986).
9 91 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 427 (18i9).
92 See generally R. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 283-305 (applying takings analysis to taxa-
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Marshall's dictum might suggest is appropriate. 93 Only when taxation
has been intimately tied, not to individual rights, but to the distri-
bution of power within the federal system has this pattern of judicial
deference been broken. In the context of federalism, the inquiry takes
much the same form as it did with foreign corporations: does the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions operate as an effective "second-
best" backstop to enforce constitutional limitations on congressional
power? I shall address the use of the doctrine to limit Congress'
power to regulate the states under the taxing and spending powers,
both as they existed before 1937 and, in far less important form,
today. I shall postpone a discussion of unconstitutional conditions and
tax policy in the areas of individual liberties until Part VIII.
In the Child Labor Tax Case,94 Congress imposed a tax equal to
ten percent of the profits of any firm that employed child labor in
certain specified businesses. 95 The tax imposed in this case raises the
paradox of unconstitutional conditions in th following fashion: Con-
gress has the power to impose a general income tax equal to ten
percent of the profits of any business; why, then, does this greater
power not entail the lesser power to forgive that tax to anyone who
chooses not to employ certain forms of child labor?
The answer lies in concern over the distribution of power between
the state and federal governments. Before 1937, the commerce clause
was understood not to confer upon Congress the power to regulate
the "internal affairs" of the states. Hammer v. Dagenhart96 had struck
down a federal statute that forbade the shipment of goods in interstate
commerce from any plant that had used prohibited forms of child
labor, whether or not the labor was used on the goods so shipped.
Hammer treated the regulation as invading the reserved powers of the
states as delineated under the tenth amendment to the Constitution:9 7
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
93 See, e.g., McCray v. United States, i95 U.S. 27 (19o4) (upholding a tax that discriminated
against yellow margarine in favor of white margarine); Alaska Fish Salting & By-Products Co.
v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44 (1921) (upholding a tax on fish produce that discriminated against the
use of herrings); A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934) (upholding a tax on butter
substitutes alleged to discriminate against the oleo industry). The tendency continues apace
today. See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 (1983) (sustaining a windfall profit tax on
crude oil that contained a geographically defined exemption for certain Alaskan producers).
94 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
9S Persons under the age of i6 were not to be employed in mines and quarries. Persons
under 14 were not to be employed in mills, canneries, workshops, factories, or manufacturing
establishments. Persons between 14 and i6 could be employed in such outfits only if they
worked less than a prescribed number of hours. The statute also provided protections to
employers who hired underaged workers in good faith. See Title XII, Revenue Act of 1918,
ch. i8, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1138, 1138-39 (I919).
96 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
97 See id. at 274-76.
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nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people." 98
Although Hammer was explicitly overruled in United States v.
Darby,99 I believe that Hammer was correctly decided, 100 for reasons
that rest on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 101 The ability
to regulate the shipment of goods in interstate commerce is tantamount
to holding vast monopoly power over all the means of transportation
- highways, rails, sea, and, today, air. The analogy to the private
necessity cases' 0 2 is thus compelling. In essence the federal govern-
ment in Hammer tried to use its monopoly power to extract conces-
sions from private firms to conduct their manufacture and mining
operations in accordance with standards set by Congress, at a time
when it was conceded that Congress could not set standards for local
employment by direct regulation.' 03 The ability to close down all
modes of interstate transportation threatened to work an enormous
redistribution of wealth from firms that were unwilling to comply with
the restrictions to firms that were not. The statute in Hammer cer-
tainly had nothing to do with covering the costs of operating the
interstate transportation system. If a robust form of either the takings
or public trust'doctrine had been applied to highways, this restriction
itself would have been found invalid, wholly without regard to the
commerce clause, because of its disparate impact on the rights of
individual citizens: some would have gained enormously from the use
of public roads, while others would have had huge portions of their
gains stripped from them. But these individual rights arguments
would have failed even in 1918, because the prevailing account of the
police power gave broad latitude to the states to impose child labor
laws. ' 0 4
Nonetheless, because concerns of federalism were very much alive
at the time of Hammer, a transfer of power from the state to the
federal government was subject to far greater scrutiny. The effect of
the child-labor restriction on the interstate shipment of goods, a sub-
ject admittedly within the scope of the federal commerce power, was
to induce all private firms to abide by the federal regulation. The
98 U.S. CONST. amend. x.
99 312 U.S. oo, 116-17 (1941).
100 See generally Epstein, supra note 2, at 1427-32.
101 See id. at 1423-24 & 1429 n.io9.
102 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
103 For another case concerned with the balance of state and federal power, see United States
v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). I have defended that decision in Epstein, cited above
in note 2, at 1432-35.
104 Cf. New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 207 (1917) (recognizing state
authority under the police power to enact workmen's compensation laws). All states did have
child labor laws in 2917, so that the issue in Hammer was whether the more stringent federal
standard was preferable to the lower state standard applicable in North Carolina. See Epstein,
supra note 2, at 1430-33.
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gains that any firm achieved from the interstate sale of its goods were
far greater than the gains it could hope to achieve by hiring child
labor in violation of the federal statute, especially in light of the
applicable state restrictions. To enforce the statute, then, was nec-
essarily to bring about a "voluntary" acceptance of federal power.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is the necessary counter-
weight to the federal government's exercise of its monopoly power.
Congress has the greater power to regulate interstate commerce and
indeed to prohibit certain items from passing in interstate commerce
at all.' 05 But in this instance, the greater power should not include
the power to admit goods into interstate commerce subject to condi-
tions that drastically shift the distribution of power within the federal
system. Hammer reached the right result in striking down this statute
while leaving the federal government the power to regulate the in-
strumentalities of interstate commerce with regard to matters pertain-
ing directly to their use: the weight of certain shipments and the like,
which are designed to prevent abuse of common assets by private
users. 106
The Child Labor Tax Case10 7 raises the identical federalism issue
as did Hammer, as Chief Justice Taft well understood. The only
difference is that in the Child Labor Tax Case the federal government
sought to condition its coercive powers to tax instead of its coercive
power to regulate interstate commerce. The offer made was one that
no firm could refuse, given that the marginal gains from using child
labor in violation of the federal norm were no doubt far smaller than
the ten percent tax on profits imposed by the statute. If this tax could
have been applied, then similar taxes, with higher rates if necessary,
could have been used repeatedly, thus obliterating any limitation on
federal power. Chief Justice Taft tried to capture these concerns in
the proposition that the federal government had the power to impose
"taxes" but not "penalties" upon activities within the states.10 8 The
language of penalty is troublesome, however, because taxes are as
coercive as penalties, given that both are backed by the use of force.
The effort to distinguish between them is designed to cast the case
back into the familiar libertarian mode in which only force and fraud
can set aside bargains, a model that is inadequate because it does not
105 See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, x88 U.S. 321 (19o3) (lottery tickets); Hipolite Egg Co. v.
United States, 220 U.S. 45 (19i) (adulterated foods). It seems clear that the power to regulate
under the commerce clause allows Congress to prohibit the transfer of certain goods in interstate
commerce, such as infected foods that threaten interstate commerce itself. But it is far more
doubtful, even in these cases, that Congress can either regulate or prohibit the shipment of
goods in interstate commerce in an indirect effort to seize the police power within any given
state. See Epstein, supra note 2, at 1422-25.
106 Cf. infra pp. 51-52 (describing conditions intended to minimize abuse of public highways).
107 See 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
108 See id. at 38-39.
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take into account all of the risks associated with government discre-
tion. An account of the line between penalties and taxes might delve
into matters of motive - was the exaction designed to raise revenue,
or to discourage primary activity, or to do both? Generally, one may
conclude that a tax has some ulterior motive if its expected revenues
are zero, as was the case with the child labor tax. But whether we
call this exaction a tax or a penalty is quite beside the point. The
federal power to tax can be used to the same end as its monopoly
position over the public highways: to frame offers that extract a
disproportionate share of the gain from some firms engaged in inter-
state commerce. Because this was the case with the child labor tax,
it should have been struck down, even if someone could have argued
that the penalty characterization was somehow mistaken. 10 9 The
greater power to impose a ten percent tax on all profits does not
threaten the system of enumerated powers the way the "lesser" power
to tax selectively does.
Today, with the passing of Hammer, the issue in both child labor
cases is moot. Since 1937, Congress has been acknowledged to have
plenary powers of regulation over all aspects of the economy. Thus,
what Congress was barred from achieving by indirection in Hammer
and the Child Labor Tax Case, it can now achieve through direct
regulation without constitutional impediment.
One exception to Congress' plenary economic regulatory power,
however, concerns the powers given to the states under the twenty-
first amendment, which provides: "The transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for deliv-
ery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited." 0  On the plausible assumption that
this amendment reserves to the states the exclusive power over the
transportation and shipment of intoxicating liquors within their bor-
ders, there would remain, even after the revolution of i937, an area
of commerce within the exclusive power of the state.
Nonetheless, South Dakota v. Dole"' held, by a 7-2 vote, that
Congress could work a statutory end run around the twenty-first
amendment. At issue in the case was title 23, section 158 of the
United States Code, which allowed the Secretary of Transportation
109 The decision to strike down this tax lends support to Madison's construction of the
"spending power." See supra note 3. In the Child Labor Tax Case the government could have
argued that the power to tax for the "general welfare of the United States" covered more
territory than the commerce clause, and could certainly include the protection of young workers
across the United States. The failure of this argument makes sense only if the general welfare
is limited to the other enumerated powers, which must have been Chief Justice Taft's assumption
when he linked this case so closely with Hammer.
110 U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
111 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987).
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to withhold up to five percent of the otherwise allocable federal funds
for highway construction from states "in which the purchase or public
possession ... of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than
twenty-one years of age is lawful." 112 South Dakota's law allowed
19-year-olds to purchase 3.2% beer. Upholding the federal provision,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, held that even if the
twenty-first amendment prohibited Congress from directly regulating
the age of beer drinking, Congress could do so indirectly through the
use of its spending power." 3
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is unsatisfying. The Court noted
the many occasions on which Congress had been able to attach con-
ditions to the receipt of federal funds." 4 Where such conditions do
not involve any efforts by Congress tq expand its effective power,
however, these provisions are easily distinguishable." 5  Where the
conditions involve powers reserved to the states under the tenth
amendment, the Court has traditionally required that the federal gov-
ernment show a sufficiently compelling interest to override the state
interest. 116 The danger that Congress will leverage its broad spending
112 23 U.S.C. § 158(a)(i) (Supp. 1Il 1985). The five percent restriction was for fiscal year
1986. For succeeding years the figure was ten percent. See id. § 158(a)(2).
113 See 107 S. Ct. at 2796. Chief Justice Rehnquist then set out the rules determining the
scope of Congress' spending power: that its "exercise be in pursuit of 'the general welfare,'"
(although courts should defer to Congress' determinations of what expenditures promote the
general welfare); that the federal government give fair notfce to the state of conditions attached
to receipt of federal grants; and that such conditions not be "'unrelated to the federal interest
in particular national projects or programs.'" 107 S. Ct. at 2796 (quoting Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)). The first condition has been
rendered trivial by the present broad construction of the "general welfare." See supra note 3.
Nor is there any reason to give discretion to Congress in defining the scope of its own powers.
The notice requirement is trivial because statutes can be made clear, although individual statutes
may fall far short of the clarity required. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. i (ig8i) (holding that a grant of federal funds to state facilities for the
disabled was not conditioned on the state's willingness to upgrade facilities). In this case,
everything turns on the validity of the condition. All the other points are preliminary asides.
114 See 107 S. Ct. at 2796.
115 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (198o) (upholding against an equal pro-
tection challenge a requirement that recipients of federal contracting grants set aside a certain
portion of those grants for minority-owned subcontracting companies); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974) (holding that a school system is required under the 1964 Civil Rights Act to offer
remedial help to Chinese students who do not speak English as a condition to receipt of federal
assistance).
116 See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (I947). The applicable
statute there provided that:
[N]o officer or employee of any State or local agency whose principal employment is in
connection with any activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants
made by the United States or by any Federal agency shall ... take any active part in
political management or in political campaigns.
The Hatch Act ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939), amended by Ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940). The
Supreme Court, relying on the broad reading given the commerce power in United States v.
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powers to subvert the twenty-first amendment is as great as the danger
that it will leverage its power to subvert the tenth amendment, and
should be met with the same judicial response. The state, in its effort
to decide whether or not to accept the condition, has to decide whether
it values the loss in federal revenues more than it values its own
independence in setting the minimum age for liquor consumption. In
principle, if Congress has the power to reduce highway revenues to
the states by five or ten percent, there is no reason why it could not
exclude any state from participation in the program by cutting off its
revenues entirely. The power of discretion therefore allows the federal
government to redistribute revenues, raised by taxes across the nation,
from those states that wish to assert their independence under the
twenty-first amendment to those states that do not.
Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded in effect that the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions had to apply to the spending power when
he noted that:
[A] grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory
state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would
be an illegitimate exercise of the Congress' broad spending power.
But no such claim can be or is made here. Were South Dakota to
succumb to the blandishments offered by Congress and raise its drink-
ing age to 21, the State's action in so doing would not violate the
constitutional rights of anyone.1 17
His defense, however, misses the essential point, because the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions is not limited to the protection of indi-
vidual rights against encroachment by government power. So long as
the twenty-first amendment identifies structural limitations upon fed-
eral power, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should ensure
that these limitations as well are not overridden by the vast discre-
tionary power of the federal government over the distribution of its
general revenues. The need to control federal power is not limited to
cases of common law coercion, given the risks of strategic behavior
so evident in Dole. As with the Child Labor Tax Case, the relevant
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (194), sustained the statute on the ground that the tenth amendment
is a truism. See 330 U.S. at 143. The case is far harder if the tenth amendment is construed
as an effective limitation on federal power. This particular statute should be sustained against
the challenge of unconstitutional conditions because it is designed to protect the United States
against abuses by recipients of federal moneys. It is therefore parallel to a rule preventing
private parties from obstructing public highways. The case would be quite different, however,
if the statute provided that all state officials had to abide by this restriction if any state program
received federal moneys. Then the overreaching by the federal government would become the
greater abuse. This "relatedness" requirement as a limitation on the scope of conditions that
the federal government may impose also crops up in the police power cases, see infra pp. 63-
64, and the employment cases, see infra pp. 69-70.
117 107 S. Ct. at 2798.
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question is not the desirability of regulations the federal government
seeks indirectly to impose. It is rather the proper demarcation of the
division of powers between separate sovereigns.
V. PUBLIC ROADS AND HIGHWAYS
If the federal government has always had an" effective legal mo-
nopoly over the instrumentalities of interstate transportation, then
similarly state governments have long enjoyed a powerful local mo-
nopoly over public highways and roads. It should come as no sur-
prise, therefore, that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions also
emerged in cases where the state demanded the release of constitu-
tional rights as the price of access to public highways. Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission"8 shows the halting and inef-
fective development of the doctrine in the context of classic state
economic regulation. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing
Co.,119 decided this past Term, raises parallel issues in a first amend-
ment context, thus resulting in a more forceful application of the
doctrine. The framework of analysis is similar in the two areas, even
if the protected constitutional rights differ. The first inquiry is to
determine the extent of the government's monopoly power in its con-
trol of public highways. The second inquiry is to determine the extent
to which the conditions imposed upon entry or use are designed to
upset the competitive balance between rival users. The third inquiry,
which is the flip side of the second, is to determine whether the
restrictions in question are designed to control against opportunistic
behavior by individual citizens in their use of the common pool asset,
the public roads.
A. Economic Regulation and Frost Trucking
In 1917 the California Railroad Commission received the power
to regulate the rates and charges of the common carriers who used
California public highways. 120 A common carrier - one who carried
the goods of all comers over public highways for a fee - could gain
access to the public highways only after first obtaining a permit from
the Commission certifying that its business was for the "public con-
venience and necessity.' 2 1 In i919 the Commission's statutory powers
were extended to cover transportation companies that were not com-
mon carriers. 122 Frost Trucking, which had a private contract to
118 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
119 io8 S. Ct. 2138 (1988).
120 See Act of May io, 1917 § 3, 1917 Cal. Stat. 331.
121 Id. § 5, I917 Cal. Stat. 333.
122 See Act of May 13, 1919 § 2, i9ig Cal. Stat. 458.
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transport citrus fruit for a single supplier, fell into this last category,
but it refused to apply for the required permit and was then ordered
by the Commission to suspend its operations.' 2 3 The Commission's
decision was upheld by the California Supreme Court. Justice Suth-
erland wrote:
That court, while saying that the state was without power, by mere
legislative fiat or even by constitutional enactment, to transmute a
private carrier into a public carrier, declared that the state had the
power to grant or altogether withhold from its citizens the privilege
of using its public highways for the purpose of transacting businesses
thereon; and that, therefore, the legislature might grant the right on
such conditions as it saw fit to impose.124
In Justice Sutherland's words, the California court was willing to
allow private carriers access to public roads only if they dedicated
their property to the "quasi-public use of public transportation.'12 5
The stage was set for the familiar unconstitutional conditions ar-
gument. Justice Sutherland assumed arguendo that the state could
admit or exclude persons at will from the use of public highways.
Then, however, by analogy to the foreign corporation cases, he held
"that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment
of constitutional rights"'126 - in this instance the right of a private
carrier not to be compelled to assume the duties and burdens of a
common carrier against its will.127 So stated, the argument proceeds
at a very high level of abstraction and is subject to the standard
objections based upon the "greater and lesser power" theory that lay
at the root of Justice Holmes' general opposition to the doctrine,12 8
and to his dissenting opinion in this case. 129 If an individual values
his constitutional rights less than he does the privilege that the state
is offering, then why not allow the bargain to go forward? Persons
have a constitutional right to keep property, yet they surrender it all
the time in order to obtain alternative goods that they value more
highly. Why not here?
The proper analysis of the case begins with its historical context.
The initial problem is the now familiar one of the adequacy of "second-
best" response to government discretion. The doctrine of unconstitu-
tional conditions becomes necessary only after it is settled that a state
has the absolute right to exclude private firms from use of the high-
123 See 271 U.S. at 590.
124 271 U.S. at 591.
12s Id.
126 Id. at 594.
127 See id. at 593.
128 See supra notes IO & 14.
129 See 271 U.S. at 6oi (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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way. That conclusion was dictated by Buck v. Kuykendall,130 a
precedent established one year before Frost was decided. Buck had
invalidated, under a dormant commerce clause analysis, regulatory
restrictions upon interstate service between Seattle and Portland. 13 1
Nonetheless, this part of Buck did not apply to Frost, which concerned
purely intrastate movement (as the words were understood before
1937) on state highways, and was therefore beyond the scope of the
commerce power. Without the element of interstate commerce, Buck
gave the states unfettered discretion to deny common carriers access
to the highways:
The right to travel interstate by auto vehicle upon the public highways
may be a privilege or immunity of the citizens of the United States.
A citizen may have, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to
travel and transport his property upon them by auto vehicle. But he
has no right to make the highways his place of business by using them
as a common carrier for hire. Such use is a privilege which may be
granted or withheld by the State in its discretion, without violating
either the due process clause or the equal protection clause. The
highways belong to the State. It may make provision appropriate for
securing the safety and convenience of the public in the use of them. 132
The phrase "a privilege which may be granted or withheld by the
State in its discretion" recalls the assertion of state power over foreign
corporations justified by the Court in Paul v. Virginia. 13 3 So too does
the short shrift given to the privileges and immunities clause. The
bald conclusion that "the highways belong to the State" does not begin
to address the question of how their use should be allocated among
the various members of the public. Yet it is just that question that
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions must address. To allow
the state the power to exclude or admit at will from public highways
raises the problems of externalities and strategic bargaining with
130 267 U.S. 307 (1925).
131 Justice Brandeis' reasoning in Buck was cryptic. See id. at 324 ("The federal-aid legis-
lation is of significance not because of the aid given by the United States for the construction
of particular highways, but because those acts make clear the purpose of Congress that the state
shall be open to interstate commerce."). Nonetheless, the result was correct, for the alternative
opens up enormous potential for strategic behavior by the states, which would be able to prevent
all out-of-state common carriers from using any in-state road built without federal support. Had
Buck gone the other way, then, short of congressional intervention, interstate business would
be subject to all the intrigue and retaliation that surrounded the legislation at issue in Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) i, 4-5 (1824), and that finds expression today in the politics of
landing rights in international aviation. Buck and its companion case, Bush Co. v. Maloy, 267
U.S. 317 (1925), which held that states could not exclude interstate commerce even from roads
constructed solely with state funds, are thus uncelebrated but critical decisions that preserved
a unified national market after the coming of automotive transportation.
132 267 U.S. at 314 (citations omitted).
133 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); see supra p. 32.
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which the doctrine is concerned. Those whose entry is subject to
selective conditions are at a competitive disadvantage to their rivals,
while the bargaining range for use of the roads between the state and
any individual citizen is very broad. Political discretion over licenses
can only encourage the dissipation of valuable resources to achieve
partisan advantage. The same numerical illustrations presented in
discussing the foreign corporation cases apply without change in this
context. 134
The object of a sound highway system is to maximize the gains
that are attainable from use of the public roads. That goal is attain-
able only if the selective power of admission to the roads is curtailed
- an equal protection concern - and if the state revenues from the
highways are limited to its costs of running the system - a takings
or due process objective. What should be flatly prohibited is the
covert redistribution of wealth between private parties in the funding
and utilization of public roads by imposing unequal exactions for equal
benefits. These rules are hardly novel, even at the constitutional level,
for they found expression in the special assessment cases for funding
local improvements, including roads and sewers, that routinely came
before the Supreme Court under the due process clause between the
end of the Civil War and the beginning of World War 1. 135
Although the proper doctrinal rules here would deny the state the
absolute power to admit traffic to or exclude it from the public road,
Justice Brandeis' dictum in Buck set the stage for Justice Sutherland
in Frost to use the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as the next-
best alternative. To his great credit, Justice Sutherland recognized
the importance of market structure even in this context and accepted
the dominance of the competitive equilibrium as a constitutional prin-
ciple, despite the state's monopolistic control over the roads:
It is very clear that the act, as thus applied, is in no real sense a
regulation of the use of the public highways. It is regulation of the
134 See supra note 5o and accompanying text.
13S See Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special Assessments
in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201 (1983). I address this subject, within
the generalized eminent domain framework utilized here, in TAKINGS, cited above in note 28,
at 286-89.
These cases held that the due process clause imposed some limitations on the funding devices
that the state could use to finance local improvements, including local roads. In each case the
total sum to be raised by taxes was limited to the cost of building the road in question: excess
moneys could not be siphoned off into general revenues. The difficult question was finding the
right formula to match costs with benefits once redistribution was in principle ruled out of
bounds. Individualized (plot by plot) assessments of benefits were costly to make, and unreliable
to boot. Yet automatic rules - such as assessment by front footage - could be unreliable
because they missed large pockets of subjective gain in individual cases. In large measure this
choice between rival benefit rules asks which set of errors is more debilitating, so that the state
has some discretion in the choice of benefit formula as long as a consistent formula is used
throughout.
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business of those who are engaged in using them. Its primary purpose
evidently is to protect the business of those who are common carriers
in fact by controlling competitive conditions. Protection or conser-
vation of the highways is not involved. 136
Justice Sutherland therefore struck down the condition that the
state tried to attach to the use of the roads. California could exclude
Frost from the use of the highways altogether, but it could not con-
dition its entry upon the company's willingness to assume the burdens
of a common carrier. Here the right in question might have one of
two sources. First, the right to enter into ordinary contracts for the
carriage of goods could be regarded as a form of property protected
by the takings clause. Alternatively, the right protected could be
regarded as falling within the fourteenth amendment right to engage
"in the common occupations of the community." 137 The doctrine is of
broader scope in the first instance than it is in the second, but both
apply to the instant case. The effort to condition entry to the high-
ways on the sacrifice of the right to remain a private carrier imposed
a disproportionate burden on Frost, and would have worked an im-
plicit transfer to the common carriers with which it was in competi-
tion.
The decision in Frost gives some indication of the type of condi-
tions the state might be able legitimately to impose upon highway use.
The clue comes from Justice Sutherland's reference to the "protection
and conservation of the highways," and builds upon concerns about
externalities and strategic behavior. Thus, the state can impose taxes
and rules that are designed to promote the smooth flow of traffic, to
prevent accidents, to resolve tort actions, and to ensure that individ-
uals have to answer for their wrongs. These rules are necessary to
prevent the exploitation of a common pool resource by its users. To
be sure, these rules condition access to the roads upon the consent of
the users, but the consent is for conditions that are justified by the
need to curtail opportunistic behavior by the road users. 138 Similarly
136 271 U.S. 583, 591 (1926).
137 See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (,9,5) ("It requires no argument to show that
the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment to secure.").
138 Cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The statute at issue in Hess allowed out-of-
state individuals to be sued for accidents that they caused within the state.
Under the statute the implied consent is limited to proceedings growing out of accidents
or collisions on a highway in which the non-resident may be involved.... It makes no
hostile discrimination against non-residents but tends to put them on the same footing as
residents. Literal and precise equality in respect of this matter is not attainable; it is not
required.
Id. at 356. The case is an easy one, given the user exploitation that the statute seeks to curtail.
However, the opposite result would be required if users of the state's roads were required to
submit to the jurisdiction of the state's courts in any case brought by the state's residents.
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the state should be able to impose a system of weight restrictions (to
control wear and tear), or tolls (to alleviate congestion). These are
the kinds of conditions that would be imposed by the private owner
of a road for his own benefit and for that of his customers. Such
conditions closely parallel the incorporation rules on service of process
and capitalization. 139
It still remains to inquire how successful Justice Sutherland's in-
vocation of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions proved in con-
trolling abuses of the state's power to control public highways. In
order to answer that question, it is necessary to distinguish between
two sets of cases. The first class involves situations like Frost, in
which the state seeks to limit access to the system of public roads
through general economic regulation. The second involves the poten-
tial release of certain constitutional rights, such as the right to vote,
to speak, to practice one's religion, to resist unreasonable search and
seizures, and (perhaps) even to hold property without fear of confis-
cation.
On the economic issues, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
of Frost, in sharp distinction to the foreign taxation cases, has had
little favorable effect in practice. Initially, Justice Sutherland regarded
Frost as a kind of takings case (for a quasi-public use), because private
carriers were subject to the regulation thought appropriate to common
carriers. 140 But even as he applied the doctrine, he gutted its power.
Justice Sutherland allowed the possibility that private carriers should
themselves be "subject to regulations appropriate to that kind of car-
rier,' 141 without indicating what they might be or what ends they
might serve. It hardly seems worth the fuss to invoke the doctrine at
all if private carriers can be regulated by independent commissions
and forced to endure conditions and restrictions so onerous that they
cannot compete with common carriers.
139 See supra p. 29.
140 See 271 U.S. at 591.
141 Id. at 592. Today private carriers, called "contract carriers," are regulated in much the
same fashion as common carriers. They are, for example, subject to regulation on maximum
and minimum rates, see, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 350,-3800 (West 1975 & Supp. x988),
and to strict licensing requirements, see, e.g., id. § 3571.
The standard for obtaining a permit in California is no longer based on public convenience
and necessity, but upon a showing of financial responsibility satisfactory to the public utilities
board. Moreover, "[t]he commission may attach to the permit such terms and conditions as, in
its judgment, are required to assure protection to persons utilitizing the operations." Id. § 3572.
In practice Frost seems to have been read so narrowly as to have no practical effect on the
course of the process of regulation. One California court, for example, declared: "It is obvious
that the interests of the general public, as well as those of the trucking industry, are promoted
by the establishment of fair and uniform rates which tend to give stability to the industry, and
to protect operators against unfair and destructive competition." Orlinoff v. Campbell, 91 Cal.
App. 2d 382, 387, 205 P.2d 67, 70 (i949). The case then quoted from the California decision
in Frost, without referring to the Supreme Court case that reversed it.
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If this regulatory option remains, then the state will not respond
to the all-or-nothing requirement by choosing all, as it would in the
foreign incorporation cases. Local political considerations are such
that total exclusion of many potential commercial users of the highway
often will prevail. We need think only of the airport transportation
monopolies that are jealously protected by state regulations, or of
private buslines and jitneys that have routinely been kept off city
streets. 14 2 The power of state selection within classes of carriers and
between classes of carriers was hardly curtailed at all by Frost. The
right expression of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would be
far more restrictive: the state is under no duty to build public high-
ways, just as it is under no duty to charter corporations; if it does
build public highways, however, then all persons should have equal
access to them, and the state powers of regulation and taxation should
be directed to the sole end of preventing particular users from exter-
nalizing the costs of their own operations upon the other users of the
system. Frost provided a weak imitation of the desired rule, because
it did not attack head-on, under either a takings or public trust
rationale, the state's claim of absolute ownership of the highway.
Nonetheless, Frost created a valuable legacy in the second class
of cases, which involve the kinds of suspect classifications and fun-
damental rights that are now closely scrutinized under the footnote-
four rule of Carolene Products v. United States.143 In principle the
state could bargain for any number of ends. Justice Sutherland rec-
ognized that each person acting by himself would have a strong
incentive to sacrifice other protected rights in order to get the greater
short-term benefit of being able to use the roads. He thus invoked in
Frost earlier language from Western Union Telegraph- Co. v. Foster, 14 4
to the effect that a state could not use its control over public streets
to regulate the messages that telegraph companies wished to send.14 5
He also worried about the parade of horribles that might arise if the
state could use its power to:
impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional
rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional
right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a
surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the
142 See Eckert & Hilton, The Jitneys, I5 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1972); Pashigan, Consequences
and Causes of Public Ownership of Urban Transit Facilities, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1239 (2976).
143 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See generally Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L.
REV. 713 (1985) (dissecting the naive interest-group politics behind footnote four); Miller, The
True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 397 (giving the unhappy special interest
history of the actual restrictions on filled milk upheld by the Court).
144 247 U.S. 2o5 (1918).
145 See id. at 114.
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Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of
existence. 146
Justice Sutherland's concern is proper, even though his use of the
term "compel" obscures the difference between the state's bargaining
strategies and the state's outright use of force. The real danger is not
coercion, but a collective action problem, hinted at by the word
"manipulated." Voting rights, for example, may be of little value to
any given individual, who would surrender them gladly for a right to
do business on public highways. If many individuals did so, the
combined effect would be to ensure a structural tyranny and the loss
of many other liberties. State officials who push this deal are not
selling things that they own. They are selling "things" - for example,
access to roads - that belong to the public at large. Their success
may be aided by the classical prisoner's dilemma, in which many
unorganized users of the public highways find themselves. If all users
could contract in advance, none would release his right to vote. The
imposition of a rule that prevents the state from making certain
bargains limits the power of the dominant coalition or faction within
the state to engage in strategic threats to capture the private surplus
from the use of the public highways. Although public officials may
still act in breach of trust, they cannot obtain as much for their pains,
because they possess fewer credible threats against citizens. Once the
state cannot impose restrictions on fundamental rights upon those who
want to gain access to the highways, then, in this context at least, it
cannot impose them at all, for any such restrictions imposed directly
would fall before particular constitutional commands. It makes no
difference whether we talk about the state's threats to remove access
to the roads ("coercion") or its promises to grant access to them ("ben-
efit"). Whatever the nominal baseline, the strategic games are always
destructive of the social fabric. The potentially catastrophic holdout
problems of treating the state as the absolute owner of the public
highways are dramatically moderated even by a restricted doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.
B. Freedom of Speech and the Highways: Lakewood
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as generalized in Frost
involved access to public highways for economic uses. Frost was
decided when the Court still afforded moderately strong constitutional
protection of economic liberties, as shown by its willingness to probe
into the state's asserted police power justification. With the waning
of judicial concern with economic affairs, the regulatory issues raised
in Frost dropped out of later cases. At the same time, Carolene
146 271 U.S. at 594.
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Products and its progeny dictated a higher level of scrutiny for leg-
islation impinging upon fundamental rights or employing suspect clas-
sifications. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions migrated with
the flow, and thus became entwined with modern issues of religion,
speech, and equal protection.
The public highway cases were thus transformed into the "public
forum" cases, 147 and the renewed level of higher scrutiny once again
proceeded from a presumption of distrust of legislative and executive
behavior. Before this new orientation was adopted, there was some
judicial support, again voiced by Justice Holmes, for the categorical
position that the state owns the highway or park and therefore can
exclude speakers at will. 148 But this absolutist position quickly fell
when it was decided that state title to the public highways did not
allow it to bar the distribution of literature, or to subject it to any
special prior restrictions, license tax, or permits. 14 9 The end run
tolerated in the context of economic regulation would not be allowed
here.
This welcome retreat from the principle of absolute public own-
ership limits the need for the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,
but does not render it entirely unnecessary. There is often a capacity
limitation - if not for lonely leafleteers on public roads and streets,
then surely on public fairgrounds - that becomes critical as the
demands on public space rise. i s ° Someone has to decide who will
gain access and who will not. Given the level of scrutiny applied to
such decisions, the issue of unconstitutional conditions should have
been expected to reappear in the modern context of the public forum,
and it did, in last Term's decision in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer
Publishing Co. '51
Lakewood's ordinance gave the town mayor the discretion to
decide which newspaper companies would receive annual, nonassign-
147 See generally Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP.
CT. RFv. i; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 233.
148 While still on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, Justice Holmes stated:
For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or
public park is no more an infringment of the rights of a member of the public than for
the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary right
interferes, the legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place
by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the lesser step of
limiting the public use to certain purposes.
Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 51o, 51I, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895), aff'd, 167 U.S. 43
(1897).
149 See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946),
took the far more controversial step of applying a similar analysis to privately owned company
towns.
150 See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(i98i) (allowing the state to impose on Krishna groups the same time, place, and manner
restrictions applicable to all others at a state fair).
Is' io8 S. Ct. 2138 (1988).
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able permits to place its newsracks on public property. The decision
was to be made after considering a range of factors, including the
approval of the rack's design by the Architectural Board of Review,
the willingness of the permittee to obtain insurance that would hold
the city harmless for all liability arising from the use of the newsrack,
and "such other terms and conditions deemed necessary and desirable
by the Mayor.' 15 2 The issue of unconstitutional conditions arose when
it was urged that the City was under no obligation to allow any
newsracks at all on public streets, and could therefore make the right
to place racks on public roads subject to whatever conditions the City
wished to impose.
Lakewood differs from Frost in two ways. First, in this context
city ownership of the public streets gives government far less monop-
oly power than was involved in Frost. While the public roads are
the only available means of transportation, newspapers can be sold
by subscription or in stores. The government power therefore is
somewhat attenuated. Yet by the same token, it is by no means
trivial, especially because some papers (such as those distributed with-
out charge) rely heavily upon newsrack distributions. The scope of
government power, although not absolute, is still large enough to give
it substantial monopoly power. There is reason therefore to invoke
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Second, unlike the statute
in Frost, Lakewood's ordinance contained no explicit requirement that
the newspaper waive any constitutional right. It was not asked to
agree to mayoral censorship as a condition for placing its racks on the
public streets. Nonetheless, the wide level of discretion conferred
upon the mayor raised the possibility that he would seek to impose a
condition that would require the waiver of first amendment rights,
such as softening opposition to one of the mayor's pet projects. The
possibility that some papers might consent to this sub rosa condition
could induce others to follow suit. The power to select who shall stay
and who shall go made it possible for the mayor to prefer newspapers
that supported his policies and to deny permits to those that opposed
them, and the prospect of such mischievous behavior was far more
troubling than a simple rule totally banning newspaper racks from
the public street.' 5 3
152 LAKEWOOD, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES § goI.i8i (1984) (cited and quoted in Lake-
wood, io8 S. Ct. at 2142 n.2).
1S3 Cf. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating a city's ban on all forms of
picketing except those regarding a labor dispute). The case did not explicitly rest on the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, and indeed the Court attached little weight to the fact that the
Mosley's picketing took place on the public highways. Instead the Court undertook a combined
first amendment and equal protection analysis which attacked the ordinance because it distin-
guished among different types of speech by subject matter. See id. at 95-96. The subject
matter distinctions gave the state officials more discretion than the simple all-or-nothing ban on
picketing, but far less than that contemplated by Lakewood's statutory scheme. Mosley thus
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The sound first amendment limitations on discretion do not, how-
ever, answer all the questions of what newsracks, if any, must be
placed upon public property. Surely the first amendment does not
require that any newspaper company be allowed to place its racks on
public property at will, without paying any fee at all. Public streets
and roads are still a form of commons, and one risk associated with
the maintenance of any commons is its overexploitation by private
users who do not fully take into account the costs that their own
behavior imposes upon other members of the public. Strategic be-
havior by the mayor is only one form of abuse; excessive use by the
newspaper companies must be reckoned with as well, which is why
decisions preventing excessive noise and other similar nuisances have
survived to the present day, under the rule that allows for appropriate
"time, place and manner" restrictions. 154
Because of this dual hazard, there is surely some reason to allow
the City to restrict the number of newsracks on public property, and
perhaps even to confine them to certain locations within the town.
Lakewood did not pass, for example, on whether a total ban on
newsracks in residential areas would be constitutional. There is, of
course, the risk that restrictions on the locations and number of news-
racks could also be more severe than appropriate. Such a restriction
might be attacked in extreme cases - for example, if the ordinance
restricted all newsracks in order to punish one particular newspaper.
Yet a facial attack on such a statute is surely out of place; some
concrete evidence of official misconduct should be required. More
generally, there comes a point at which the capacity to control gov-
ernment abuse diminishes, while the gains from controlling that abuse
are small. Then it is time to quit, under the first amendment just
like anywhere else. The simple rule that the town can determine the
number and location of newsracks, but must allocate .them by some
nondiscretionary means goes a very long way toward controlling the
most obvious forms of abuse.
It is instructive to note that the first amendment principles appli-
cable in this case are drawn from those developed in connection with
the economic liberties cases. The concern with conditional admission
to the roads that animated Frost had to do with implicit redistribution
represents the hard intermediate case. The strongest argument for sustaining the Court's position
is that there is so little that can be offered to justify the ban. See generally Stone, Restrictions
of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI.
L. REv. 81 (1978) (exploring the relationship between subject-matter based and viewpoint-
neutral regulation of speech). Note that Mosley becomes an unconstitutional conditions case if
the use of the public road is conditioned on the willingness not to picket in nonlabor cases.
Similar issues arise in the veterans' exemption context. See infra pp. 77-79 (discussing Regan
v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983)).
154 See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (plurality opinion).
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of wealth among separate common carriers, and across different sec-
tors of the trucking business. The restrictions against excessive weight
and the like were routinely allowed in order to control against the
exploitation of a common resource by a single user. If that economic
model had applied, Lakewood would have come out the same way
even without resort to first amendment principles. Indeed under the
economic liberties framework, it would not be enough to guard against
the possibility of favoritism to firms within the class of newspapers.
It would also be necessary to worry about a reciprocal risk: whether
newspapers as a class received a subsidy from the rest of the public
at large in the form of below-market rents of public space. That
additional constraint would be very hard to administer because there
is no strong economic theory that determines the optimal level of
newsracks to be allowed on public property. The theory would, how-
ever, suggest that once the number of spaces was determined by
political means, their allocation to individual newspaper companies
would have to take place by bid, just as in the common carrier case.
Within the first amendment framework, the bid system seems clearly
acceptable. But now other systems may be allowed as well. A lottery
may not guarantee the most efficient use of public space, but it does
eliminate (ex ante) redistribution among newspapers. A system that
takes the total number of spaces and divides it by the number of
applicants does the same thing, but may give a boost to papers with
smaller circulations that a bidding system would not. The critical
point is that the first amendment analysis of highway use generally,
and the unconstitutional conditions analysis more concretely, proceed
on identical terms as the previous analysis of Frost. The demise of
economic liberties means in essence that we have to worry about only
one form of error, the imposition of undue restrictions, but can ignore
implicit subsidies to the newspaper companies. Government miscon-
duct probably has far greater impact in the context of road regulation
than it does in the context of speech. But whatever the Court's
shortcomings in its protection for economic liberties, Lakewood itself
is a welcome and correctly decided case.
VI. THE POLICE POWER
Skirmishes over the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions have
recently arisen in connection with the state police power, most notably
in Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.155 and Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission.'5 6 In order to set the stage for its
155 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
156 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). Nollan has generated an enormous amount of controversy. For
a more extended account of my views, see Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987
SuP. CT. REV. i, 31-44. See also The Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. Rzv. (forth-
coming x988).
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use in this context, it is necessary first to give some brief account of
the police power generally.' 5 7 The police power addresses the set of
justifications that the state must put forward in order to override any
of the substantive protections of the Constitution. Some recognition
of the police power justification seems to be necessary if we are to
make any sense of the Constitution at all. It is difficult to conceive
of a defense of private property so absolute that ownership of a
handgun allows its owner to kill or maim at will, or a defense of
freedom of speech so pure as to countenance securities fraud or per-
jury. One possible account of the police power therefore allows the
state to override explicit constitutional guarantees when necessary to
protect other persons from the threat or use of force or fraud. The
relevant restrictions are often prospective in application, like a ban
on the sale of firearms or the ban on printing a false prospectus.
Typically, the states and their subdivisions have a monopoly over the
use of the police power, creating a risk that exercise of this power
will go beyond its stated purpose, and will be used to cloak protec-
tionist efforts to raise the cost of entry of firms and individuals into
what would otherwise be competitive markets. The effort to sort out
appropriate police power measures from inappropriate ones typically
requires an analysis of the "fit" between the ends to be served and the
means to be used. The effective scope of the state power depends
heavily, therefore, on the applicable level of scrutiny. So long as the
perils of both overregulation and underregulation are about the same
level of magnitude, some "intermediate" level of scrutiny seems ap-
propriate.' 5 8 This analysis is perfectly general, and explains why in
practice limitations on the police power must arise from the property,
speech, contract, religion, and equal protection guarantees of the Con-
stitution.
Under current doctrine, the police power is typically afforded a
construction that covers far more than the suppression of force and
fraud, especially in land use cases, and, to a lesser extent, in com-
mercial speech cases. In essence, the state is allowed to regulate in
ways that are thought generally to advance the public good, and a
very low level of scrutiny is applied both to the ends sought and to
the connection between means and ends. In land use cases, the police
power was extended far beyond the nuisance control rationale at least
as early as Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. '5 9 Today, it has been broad-
ened still further to allow states to regulate levels of population
growth, to force towns to provide some minimum percentage of low-
157 For a longer discussion, see R. EPSTEIN, cited above in note 28, at 107-45.
5s8 See id. at 128-29. A need to take a closer look at the police power arises whenever
there is any fear of factional abuse. See generally Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Consti-
tution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. I689, 1723-27 (1984).
1s9 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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income housing, to set rents, or to pursue aesthetic ends. 160 Yet even
this broad construction of the police power does not give the state
ordinary ownership rights over the property that it may restrict or
regulate. Even today, the state could not pass a statute making it the
owner of all development rights in property, which it could then turn
around and sell for cash. But even subject to this important caveat,
the use of the relaxed, rational basis standard of review necessarily
increases the scope of government discretion, and thus opens the door
to the perils associated with government monopolies. As before, the
question arises whether the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can
control the risks of so expansive an account of government power.
We turn first to land use, and then to commercial speech.
A. Land Use
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission16' illustrates how the
generous contours of the police power in the land use context usher
in a discussion of unconstitutional conditions as a second-best mea-
sure. The Nollans owned a small, dilapidated beach house that they
wished to tear down and replace with a larger home. Under the
prevailing construction of the police power, the Court assumed, the
state could have prevented the construction of the new house abso-
lutely, in order to preserve the public's "viewing access" over the
Nollans' land from the public highways to the waterfront.162 The
Commission announced that it was prepared to grant the Nollans the
right to build on their land, and consequently the right to obstruct
that view, if the Nollans would surrender a lateral, beachfront ease-
ment over their land for the benefit of the public at large. If the
Nollans had accepted the deal, then the state would have gotten the
easement without having to buy it for cash. However, it was also
settled that this easement would have had to be purchased if taken
by the government in a separate transaction. 163 Similarly, it seems
clear that the Coastal Commission, having only limited powers, could
not have simply declared itself the owner of the development rights
over the Nollans' land solely to sell it back to them for cash.
Within these contours, the question raised in Nollan was whether
the state could force the Nollans to choose between their construction
permit and their lateral easement. Justice Brennan argued that it
could, resting his dissent on the model of the private bargain and
160 See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (198o) (holding that a zoning ordinance
restricting development of land to open space or low-density residential use is a valid exercise
of police power).
161 107 S. Ct. 314I (1987).
162 See id. at 3147.
163 See id. at 3145.
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implicit rejection of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 164 If the
state could ban construction of-the new house entirely, then it could
grant permission to construct on condition that the lateral easement
be deeded over to the state. 165 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
invoked (in all but name) the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
to hold that this particular bargain between the state and two of its
citizens was impermissible because the condition imposed - surrender
of the easement - was "unrelated" to the legitimate interest used by
the state to justify its actions - preserving the view. 166 The question
is who is right, and why.
One way to avoid the problem is to recognize that the scope of
the police power gives the state far too much discretion even when it
does not wish to bargain with citizens. Restrictions on height and
bulk are unrelated to the prevention of any ordinary, common law
nuisance, and can be obtained by neighbors (many of whom have
built for themselves the very type of structures that they are trying
to prevent others from building) only if they are able to purchase a
restrictive covenant. There seems no reason why the state should be
able to take for the public at large the same type of property interest
that neighbors must buy. If so, then Nollan need not even reach the
unconstitutional conditions question. The state cannot force a citizen
who owns two plots of land to choose which one to keep and which
to surrender to the state, for imposing such a choice amounts to taking
property without just compensation. The issue is no different when
the landowner is put to the choice of encumbering his land with a
restrictive covenant or a lateral easement. The choice the state puts
to-the citizen is no better than one which an uncommonly fastidious
gunman puts by allowing his victim the choice between his watch
and his wallet. Any sound delineation of property rights thus would
vindicate the Nollans before even reaching the unconstitutional con-
ditions question.
Once this first line of defense has been overcome, why the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions? Here its use is best explained by re-
164 Justice Brennan argued that:
The Coastal Commission, if it had so chosen, could have denied the Nollans' request for
a development permit, since the property would have remained economically viable
without the requested new development. Instead, the State sought to accommodate the
Nollans' desire for new development, on the condition that the development not diminish
the overall amount of public access to the coastline.
Id. at 3152 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). The clear implication is that the greater
power of preventing development altogether includes the lesser power of allowing development
subject to surrender of the demanded easement. Note, however, that Justice Brennan accepts
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the speech and religion contexts. See infra pp. 75-
76 (discussing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)); pp. 8o-86 (discussing Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
165 See 107 S. Ct. at 3152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166 See 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
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verting to the basic social purpose behind the takings clause: to ensure
that an interest in private property will pass into government hands
only if it is worth more to the government, as representative of the
public, than its market value in private hands.167 If the state has to
purchase the lateral easement, this purpose is satisfied, because public
officials have to raise the money to make the purchase. The protection
so afforded is imperfect, however, because there is always the risk
that one group (beach users) will be able to purchase the easement
with money raised by taxes imposed upon the public generally. While
the takings prohibition (unless extended to taxation) 68 does not stop
this particular form of political externality, it does at least ensure that
a separate constraint against resource misallocation is observed. Mak-
ing the payment requires an imperfect set of political institutions to
take into account the very large losses that the single owner will
suffer, losses that can be downplayed or ignored when payment is not
required.
These institutional constraints against misbehavior tend, however,
to break down if the state can link the fate of the lateral easement to
the issue of visual access, as the Coastal Commission tried to do. The
threat to impose development restrictions on the landowner does not
require any budget appropriation by either California or the local
municipality. If the losses that state regulation could inflict upon the
owner are (as seems probable) far greater to the owner than the loss
of a lateral easement, then there seems little prospect that the state's
offer will be declined. Landowners will sacrifice an interest worth
$iooo in order to preserve development rights that are worth a
hundred times as much.169 Once this sequence runs its course, there-
fore, all we know are the relative values that the landowner attaches
to his two separate interests. We do not know whether the value of
the lateral easement to the state is greater than its value to the owner,
because no accountable political party has been forced to make that
explicit judgment. One central allocative function of the eminent
domain clause is effectively bypassed by allowing the state to couple
the lateral easement with the construction permit.
In this context, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions limits
the abuse of government discretion by severing the denial of the
167 Ideally, the state should be required to pay not the market value, but the subjective
value that the individual attaches to the property. Because the latter is difficult to determine,
courts have moved to the market value standard. See, e.g., United States v. 546.54 Acres of
Land, 441 U.S. 506, 5i (1979). The argument in the text, however, does not depend on which
standard of private valuation is used.
168 See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 28, at 283-305.
169 The point is not one of idle speculation, for the Nollans were the only parties to fight
the Commission, while 43 other landowners had capitulated. See 107 S. Ct. at 3158 n.9
(Brennan, J. dissenting). The number would have been 44 if this constitutional challenge had
not appeared viable.
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construction permit from the taking of the lateral easement. This
course of action is not without its dangers. It is quite possible that
the easement will be purchased for cash (which is appropriate if the
compensation levels are rightly set, although they often are not when
severance damages are involved). It is also possible that the permit
would be denied outright, so that people like the Nollans would be
left worse off than they were when they could bargain away their
rights. But in this case the empirical guess is that the government,
as in the foreign incorporation cases,170 will choose not to exercise its
greater power. Imposing the building restrictions necessarily deprives
the community of the increased taxes generated by his new residence,
which probably will not increase the demands on public facilities by
the same amount. The groups who are interested in lateral access
may be far less interested in visual access, so that the coalition pres-
suring for visual access will disintegrate when the two issues are
separated. Chances seem good that the "public" at large would not
want this permit restriction in and of itself. The severance therefore
calls the bluff of the Coastal Commission by preventing it from par-
laying a threat of something that interest groups do not want into the
acquisition of something they do want - for free. The "relatedness"
requirement imposed by Justice Scalia thus has powerful functional
roots, for it narrows the size of the bargaining range and hence reduces
the state's ability to extract concessions from individual owners by
coordinating separate types of government initiatives.
The necessary prerequisite for undertaking this inquiry is that the
takings clause limits the permissible level of redistribution between
the public at large and landowners. Under the traditional rational
basis test, that concern is so weak that state power (including the
power to bargain) would remain unbridled. It is therefore no accident
that Justice Scalia's implicit invocation of the doctrine followed a more
general assertion that the deferential rational basis review does not
carry over from equal protection to takings cases. 17 1 Even within
Justice Scalia's formulation of the problem, the government's broad
discretion over the nature and type of height, square footage, and
exterior design regulations introduces various opportunites for abuse
that a more rigorous account of the police power would preclude.
But within very rough limits this invocation of unconstitutional con-
ditions does have bite. With Nollan in place, the state cannot insist
that the landowner deed over an easement in order to get an electrical
hook-up for his house. In a cautious second-best sense, Nollan is a
fit case for using the doctrine. But it is a far cry from the best
170 See supra PP. 35-38.
171 See 107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.3 (contesting Justice Brennan's advocacy of a rational basis
test).
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solution, which is a return of the police power to its traditional
confines.
B. Commercial Speech and the Morals Head of the Police Power
A similar police power problem can arise in the first amendment
context. In Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.,172
Puerto Rico wished to encourage tourists to come to Puerto Rico to
gamble. It did not make gambling illegal for local citizens, but it did
prevent any local advertisement of gambling on the island proper,
leaving Posadas, a Holiday Inn franchisee, free to advertise its gam-
bling facilities on the mainland. It was conceded that the control of
gambling fell within the traditional "morals" head of the police power
of the state, so that the state could have made gambling illegal had
it so chosen. In upholding the statute, Justice Rehnquist implicitly
rejected the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions when he argued
that Puerto Rico's plenary power to ban gambling itself gave it the
lesser power to license gambling, subject to the condition that the
licensee accept a ban on local advertisement 173 - itself a limitation
on a first amendment right. Do first amendment principles require
that such advertisements be tolerated, given the decision to allow the
gambling itself? Where the advertising was neither misleading nor
fraudulent, the canonical version of the constitutional inquiry is that
"the speech may be restricted only if the government's interest in
doing so is substantial, the restrictions directly advance the govern-
ment's asserted interest, and the restrictions are no more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest."1 74 Justice Rehnquist's defer-
ential exploration of these issues upheld the restrictions, which Justice
Brennan, who championed the greater/lesser logic in his Nollan dis-
sent, would have struck down. 175
For our purposes, the central question is whether the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, as applied in this context, effectively
checks government misbehavior. The picture is decidedly murky. In
one sense it does. The Puerto Rican policy is cynical: gambling has
terrible consequences for the social fabric, so Puerto Rico attempted
172 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
173 See id. at 346.
174 Id. at 340 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 566 (ig8o)).
175 See id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although he employed a high level of scrutiny,
Justice Brennan claimed that he would have struck down the law even under the Court's more
permissive standard. See id. at 350-51. For a spirited denunciation of Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for its application of low-level scrutiny, see Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism
Company: '"Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas Pitifd, 'Twas Wondrous Pitifd.", 1986
SUP. CT. REV. i.
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to externalize its costs by taking the money of tourists, who will take
their social and pyschological problems home with their other belong-
ings. The possible interests of other states, which cannot prevent
their citizens from gambling outside their borders, are not registered
in the local political calculus, and in all likelihood are of faint impor-
tance in the Congressional politics over Puerto Rico's status and pref-
erences. On the domestic front, the ban on casino gambling does not
extend to such noble pastimes as horse racing, cockfights, and the
Puerto Rican lottery.' 76 In essence this exercise of the police power
has a clearly anticompetitive component, for as Justice Brennan, writ-
ing in the spirit of a public choice economist, suggested, "it is surely
not far-fetched to suppose that the legislature chose to restrict casino
advertising not because of the 'evils' of casino gambling, but because
it preferred that Puerto Ricans spend their gambling dollars on the
Puerto Rico lottery"'177 - which, it might be added, tourists are not
very likely to play.
Posadas is extremely difficult to make sense of because the statute,
as applied to both Puerto Ricans and to visitors, can plausibly be
characterized either as a traditional exercise of the police power or as
an attempt by Puerto Rico to exploit those within its borders. The
unconstitutional conditions inquiry in Posadas is in a sense the op-
posite of the one in Nollan: should the Court require the bundling of
the two issues - casino gambling and casino advertising - in order
to forestall the political abuse that threatens commercial speech?
Perhaps it should. One advantage of the bundling is that the
advertising ban, permissible only if gambling itself is banned, is of no
consequence: who would advertise what he could not sell? This means
that governments and citizens would not become comfortable with
large bureaucracies whose sole function is to suppress or regulate
speech. Yet in another sense this linkage is very hard to sustain.
One reason to legalize gambling is simply damage control. It is better
that people not gamble, not only for their own personal character, but
also for the corrosive effect gambling has on family and business
obligations. Nonetheless, it is just too costly to try to control gambling
by criminal sanctions. Better therefore to legalize the "disfavored"
activity, which can then be taxed to keep participation within reason.
Disfavored activities, moreover, need not be treated like all other
business activities. Advertisement stimulates business, so it might be
proper for a state to decide that, while it should not ban gambling,
it should nonetheless moderate its growth by banning advertising.
Surely if the issue were the legalization of marijuana and other drugs,
a respectable argument could be made to allow their sale, subject to
176 See 478 U.S. at 342.
177 Id. at 353-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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a general tax and to prohibitions or restrictions on advertising, which,
because of advertising's public visibility, should be reasonably easy to
enforce. In effect we have adopted such a strategy with respect to
cigarettes, which are sold, heavily taxed, and subject to advertisement
restrictions, at least on television and radio. 178 Given the absence of
any coherent social attitude toward gambling (or toward drugs, alco-
hol, tobacco, or prostitution), courts should exercise some deference
to state restrictions on such activities, which fall within the traditional
"morals" head of the police power as it relates to both property and
speech.
Nonetheless there are reasons to doubt that the regulation at issue
in Posadas meets that test. The social disruptions of gambling, if
real, should be manifest in all its forms. When the state seeks to
divide markets - with local customers directed toward the state's
own lottery, and well-heeled out-of-state customers toward its posh
casinos - it looks as if the anticompetitive motives dominate the
protective motives. Forcing an all-or-nothing choice between banning
all advertisement or banning none allows the state to pursue its legit-
imate police power objectives without running the risk of rigging local
markets. If total bans are thought to be too damaging to the pock-
etbook, then it is still possible to have a rule that allows all forms of
gambling to use print, but not media advertising, or perhaps the
reverse. Perhaps the state should be able to disengage the decision to
allow gambling from its decision to ban its advertisement, but some
very powerful justification must be offered to show why different
forms of gambling should operate under different regulatory regimes.
Justice Rehnquist might have been correct in insisting that the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions is inapplicable to the connection be-
tween gambling and advertising. But the explicit discrimination be-
tween government-run and privately run gambling raises the prospect
of abuse that calls for a stronger use of unconstitutional conditions in
its equal protection guise.
There is a second element of Posadas that is still more disturbing.
Present law freely allows general economic regulation of all sorts and
descriptions. 179 Under Justice Rehnquist's logic, the power to ban an
activity implies the power to ban its advertisement. It follows, there-
fore, that first amendment protections afforded commercial speech can
be no greater than the meager protections given to economic liberties.
In order to provide adequate protection for speech, then, it becomes
necessary to build a Maginot line between the relaxed attitude toward
178 In my view, the justification for these restrictions should rest on the externalities these
activities impose on third parties.
179 See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Kurland, supra note 175,
at 13.
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economic liberties and the stricter scrutiny on matters of speech. The
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions again serves as a second-best
tool to limit the ominous implications of the modern economic liberties
cases. But this larger problem, and the horribles it suggests, would
disappear if we returned to the older cases on occupational freedom,
requiring the state to show a strong justification before banning any
ordinary commercial activity.' 80
Even if we do not take that hard line, it-is still possible to limit
Posadas, which should be understood not as an ordinary commercial
speech case, but as a police power morals case. Constitutionally, it
should be a close question whether gambling may be banned, and
hence a close case whether advertising of gambling can be banned,
even if the gambling is allowed. The difficulty of these questions thus
weakens the constitutional protection for gambling and its advertising
alike. But these substantive doubts do not eliminate the equal pro-
tection dimension of the case. It is still imperative that the state treat
all forms of any suspect activity such as gambling under the same
standard unless some powerful justification for differential treatment
can be demonstrated. By this logic, Posadas should stand only for
the proposition that constitutional protection of speech is at its lowest
ebb in the morals cases. It need not overrun the constitutional pro-
tection of commercial speech generally.
VII. EMPLOYMENT CASES
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can also be applied to
contracts of employment between the state and private individuals.
In this context, application of the doctrine should generally be re-
stricted. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is most impera-
tive when the risk of government abuse is greatest, and least attractive
when the risk of citizen abuse is greatest. If the state were to condition
employment on the willingness of an employee to contribute a portion
of his salary to the dominant political party, that condition would be
struck down because of the systematic distortion that it would work
upon the political process. The case is scarcely different from a direct
transfer of public funds into party coffers. The worker may be better
off with the job subject to the condition, but, as in the standard
monopoly case, additional social gains are obtainable if the job is
offered without the condition.
Fortunately, such extreme abuses of government power are rela-
tively infrequent, so that today unconstitutional conditions issues tend
to be raised with respect to restrictions relatively germane to the work
at hand: the terms and conditions of individual employment contracts.
180 See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
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The very statement of the doctrine suggests that most cases in this
area satisfy the "relatedness" requirement that Justice Scalia spelled
out in Nollan. Nonetheless, it is important to ask in each individual
case whether the restriction in question represents a strategic gambit
by the state, or whether it is designed to counter a parallel gambit by
the individual worker. In order to decide which form of opportunism
is dominant, a ready test is at hand: a court can simply ask whether
the kinds of restrictions that the government seeks to impose on its
own employees are similar to those that private firms in competitive
labor markets impose on employees engaged in similar activities. Per-
haps some positions in government are so unique that no private
analogue applies, but even in this context, the large number of gov-
ernment employers may help to create a competitive labor market. 181
For the general range of office workers, executives, policymakers, and
bureaucrats the connections are very close indeed. It is very hard to
create monopolies in labor markets without explicit government inter-
vention to block free entry. It follows therefore that the law should
find fewer occasions to invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
in the context of government employment than in other contexts, and
it does.
In Snepp v. United States,18' the Supreme Court held that the
United States could hold Snepp, a CIA agent, to the terms of an
employment contract in which he agreed, first, that he would "'not
... publish ... any information or material relating to the Agency,
its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or after
the term of [his] employment, without specific prior approval by the
Agency,"' and second, that he would not "'disclose any classified
information relating to the Agency without proper authorization."' 8 3
Snepp published his book without the contractually required clear-
ance, and the book may or may not have contained classified infor-
mation - an issue that the CIA had a strong incentive to keep out
of court. But wholly apart from the disclosures contained in the book,
there was an evident breach of contract, assuming that the state could
impose the contract condition consistent with the free speech clause.
The case thus raises again the question of unconstitutional conditions,
for the issue becomes whether the greater power not to hire at all
includes the lesser power to hire subject to this condition on publi-
cation. 184
181 This theme is developed in Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government
Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 27-31 (1983).
182 444 U.S. 507 (i98o). The analysis given here is similar to that provided in Easterbrook,
cited above in note 31, at 339-52.
183 444 U.S. at 507-08 (quoting Appeal to Petition for Certiorari at 58a-59a, Snepp (No. 78-
1871)).
184 See generally Easterbrook, supra note 31, at 349 (arguing against the Court's use of
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in Snepp).
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Why shouldn't it? Any breach of the system of prior clearances
creates the risk Qf improper disclosure, which can only undermine the
ability of the CIA to obtain needed information from sources that rely
on the review process for their protection. Thus the relatedness re-
quirement seems met. More generally, the operation of any govern-
ment agency requires the sharing of restricted information, which will
be inhibited if personnel can obtain information for one purpose only
to turn around and use it for another.18 5 The restriction in question
is no doubt similar to ones private employers impose upon employees
entrusted with sensitive information, and it is difficult to see how the
public is ill-served by ensuring the confidentiality of its intelligence
agents. Should the government through pre-publication review seek
to stifle political criticism of the agency that does not rest upon clas-
sified information, then the problem can be handled on a case-by-case
basis, by in camera hearings if necessary, without disturbing the basic
structure of the statute. As in the highway cases, one must worry
about abuse not only by the government, but also by parties doing
business with it. The bargain here does not seem to be a cloak for
any hidden government abuse, and it thus should be sustained, as the
Court held, absent some specific showing of misbehavior.186
Other cases reveal the same pattern. In Connick v. Myers, 8 7 the
plaintiff, an assistant district attorney in New Orleans, protested her
transfer to another division and circulated questionnaires inside the
office concerning office morale, the need for grievance committees,
and the alleged misconduct of her supervisors. She was then dismissed
185 This same concern explains why the Supreme Court was also correct not to apply the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984),
in which the Court held that parties able to obtain discovery of sensitive documents under the
Washington Superior Court Rules (identical to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) did not
have a first amendment right to disclose those documents to the public at large. In essence the
limited use imposed upon the discovery recognizes that there are powerful reasons to limit the
dissemination of information by protective orders, as provided for in rule 26(c). As elsewhere,
doctrines of unconstitutional conditions have to be sensitive to strategic behavior by private
parties as well as by government. The prospect of filing a weak lawsuit in order to obtain
documents for publication should not be dismissed in this age of high-stakes litigation. If the
information obtained in discovery is relevant to the case at hand, it can be introduced at trial,
where its dissemination can be assured. Note too that the party resisting the discovery has no
obvious manipulative strategy at its disposal, so that the law should work to control the behavior
of the party seeking discovery, which has all the discretion.
186 See 444 U.S. at 5og n.3. There is the further issue of damages. The Court imposed a
constructive trust and required Snepp to disgorge his full profits from the book. See id. at 515-
6. The remedy is probably excessive if looked at from the point of view of the harm to the
CIA in the individual case, but it has the desired institutional feature of ensuring compliance
with the government procedures in cases where damage remedies calculated on actual loss from
a given disclosure will not deter agents whose gain from publishing confidential information
exceeds the actual loss they cause the Agency.
187 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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for leading a "'mini-insurrection"' in the office.18 8 Here the question
is whether the first amendment allows limitations on speech about
office management. The government does not have anything like a
monopoly position over the district attorneys it employs, for both local
governments and private firms hire criminal lawyers. These condi-
tions are similar to those private firms impose on the protests that
their employees can make. As in Snepp, the need to control employ-
ees' abuse must be weighed against the need to control official abuse.
As long as the district attorney's office remains subject to external
scrutiny and criticism, including criticism from Myers after her dis-
missal, the normal rules of employment contracts should apply, as the
Court held.
In a more current vein, the issue of drug testing raises the question
whether the government can require persons to "waive" their fourth
amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures as a
condition of employment. Here the risks that prompt application of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine do not seem to apply. The
use of drugs is related to performance on the job, and private firms
that have to operate within competitive labor markets insist on similar
conditions. The conditions imposed do not seek to constrain private
practices and relations of employees that are unrelated to their em-
ployment. Nor do these cases involve the hypothetical danger of the
government using taxpayer money generally to pay people to release
their fourth amendment rights in general. That practice could not be
tolerated precisely because, under the guise of multiple, separate pri-
vate contracts, it would work a fundamental change in overall gov-
ernment structure.' 8 9 But the close connection between employment
and testing seems to preclude any system-wide loss. The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions has no obvious role to play in the context
of drug-testing.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions might also be invoked
in the employment context to protect procedural rights. Assume that
the government has offered an individual an at-will employment con-
tract which by design provides the employee with no procedural pro-
tections against government dismissal. The question is whether this
188 See id. at 141.
189 Taken to the limit, moreover, no cash compensation would be paid to any person in
society. If the government pays $zoo to each person to waive his fourth amendment rights, it
must raise those revenues from general taxes of an equal amount. Thus, what one person
receives in direct payment has already been lost in taxes. Once the cross-payments are netted
out, the compensation that is received is strictly in-kind. In exchange for the release of my
fourth amendment rights, you hereby agree to release your fourth amendment rights. It is not
clear that one person should regard the release of fourth amendment rights by others as a benefit
to him, given its tendency to increase government powers. Clearly, if some system-wide shift
is to be taken with search and seizures, an explicit amendment to the Constitution and not
covert transfers should be required.
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form of contract infringes the constitutional guarantee that no person
shall be deprived of property without due process of law. In an early
foray into the issue, Justice Rehnquist in Arnett v. Kennedy' 90 adopted
a view containing strong freedom-of-contract strains: "where the grant
of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations
of the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right,
a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the
sweet."' 19 1 In one sense this statement is surely too broad, for the
government is surely not in the position of an employer under a
contract at-will. If it is clear that the government cannot condition
its offers of employment on the willingness of workers to support one
political party or the other, then surely it cannot invoke those same
reasons when it decides to fire. In both cases, the random use of
power does not tend to distort or skew the political process in favor
of entrenched interests, but appointments or dismissals with political
(or religious) conditions attached will have just that impact. None-
theless, despite the many sustained attacks on this position, 192 Justice
Rehnquist's contractual logic is far stronger once cases involving for-
bidden motives are put aside. Arnett itself involved the most attrac-
tive facts for the dismissed employee, insofar as he was fired for
allegedly defaming the very government official who was supposed to
render an initial judgment on his case. Justice Rehnquist deliberately
sidestepped the thorny constitutional question whether some indepen-
dent party would be required to make the initial hearing determina-
tion. 193
Whatever the right result in cases of this sort, the basic logic of
Arnett seems unassailable. The government here hires workers in an
intensely competitive environment, which is why its own rules and
procedures do in fact contain fairly extensive procedural protections
for them, including the possibility of back-pay awards after an evi-
dentiary trial-type hearing on appeal. 194 Given the wide range of
possible employment opportunities outside the government, there is
little danger of state monopoly power in this context, but considerable
concern with substandard government service by lax, incompetent, or
dishonest employees. The decision to steer clear of constitutional
190 4x6 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion).
191 Id. at 153-54. Arnett is one of many cases that raise this issue. See, e.g., Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
192 See, e.g., Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE
PROCESS, NoMos, XVIII, at 126 (3. Pennock & 3. Chapman eds. 1977); Van Alstyne, supra
note 22, at 462-66. But see Williams, supra note x81, at 27.
193 See 416 U.S. at x5 n.21. The issue is difficult because the presence of bias could, but
need not, coincide with dismissal for the class of reasons prohibited to government officials.
194 See id. at 145-47. Because the plaintiff in Arnett chose not to participate in the hearing
process at all because of his objections to the initial proceeding, it is unclear whether the
procedural safeguards that the statute did contain could protect against abuse.
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entanglements in the employment area removes a host of thorny issues
from the judicial agenda, freeing the Court from having to determine
what kind of hearing is required and when it should be offered. There
are quite enough political pressures to turn government employment
into a civil service sinecure without the Court placing its own unsteady
thumb on the scales.
The sound logic of Arnett, of course, has been soundly repudiated
by the subsequent decision in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loud-
ermill.195 Loudermill, a security guard who had been dismissed from
his job on charges that he had dishonestly filled out his employment
application, challenged the constitutional adequacy of the city's pro-
cedures. His claim was sustained, 8 to i, with only Justice Rehnquist
dissenting.
Speaking through Justice White, the Court first noted that no one
disputed that Loudermill's contract created the necessary "property
right," because all state employees were allowed to retain their position
"during good behavior and efficient service. ' 19 6 Justice White then
concluded that the procedures necessary to protect this substantive
right could not be determined solely by the Ohio statute, but had to
be tested against constitutional requirements. He curtly rejected Jus-
tice Rehnquist's "bitter with the sweet" rationale:
The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that
certain substantive rights - life, liberty and property - cannot be
deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.
The categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule
otherwise the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Prop-
erty" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation
any more than can life or liberty. 197
Justice White's argument may capture the state of current doc-
trine, 198 but it misses the point. The reason why life and liberty are
not "defined by procedures" is that they are not, in any system of
limited government, acquired by grant from the state. Property, to
the extent that it is acquired by first possession or private purchase,
should stand in exactly the same position as life or liberty. Because
19' 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
196 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 124.34 (Anderson 1984). The statute in fact provided for a
review procedure under which grievances could be filed with the state personnel board of
review. The board could appoint a trial board to hold a hearing, from which appeals could be
taken to the State Court of Common Pleas. The statute did not provide for a pretermination
hearing.
197 470 U.S. at 541.
198 See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430-32 (1982) (holding that
state law defines "property" interests, whereas the Constitution defines applicable procedural
guarantees); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 48o, 488-90 (i98o) (holding that due process guarantees
attach to "liberty interests" created by the states).
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none is a grant from the state, ordinary procedural guarantees must
be met before any may be taken away. In this context, it is imperative
that the state not be allowed to "redefine" the private interest so as
to remove constitutional protections. But contracts for public em-
ployment do have their origins in transactions with government. So
long as private contracts can specify both the terms of employment
and the terms of their dismissal, public contracts should be able to
do the same, absent the threat of abuse of government monopoly
power. In this context, substance is not separate from procedure.
Both are part of a complex package of contractual benefits that an
employee receives in exchange for services rendered.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should not apply solely
because the attached condition is important, or because it is good
policy for the state to keep an employee on the job until the charges
against him are fully resolved, 199 or because dismissal will impose
some measure of hardship upon the worker °20 0 Nor does the validity
of the condition turn upon some effort to advance individual dign-
ity.2 0 1 The state does not need judicial oversight to make its own
prudential judgment whether it is riskier to keep workers suspected
of improper conduct on the job pending hearings, taking into account
the costs of hiring substitutes or training replacements. Likewise,
individual employees are capable of deciding whether procedural ben-
efits are more important than the wage and other benefits provided
by the job. Unconstitutional conditions doctrine should be invoked
only when there are structural concerns relating to monopoly power,
collective action problems, and externalities suggesting that individual
consent will generally be an insufficient check against systematic gov-
ernment misbehavior. Loudermill therefore is a case in which freedom
of contract should have prevailed.
VIII. GOVERNMENT BENEFITS
Each of the previous five Parts has examined the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions in connection with those types of govern-
ment action routinely undertaken by the traditional minimal state.
The New Deal has vastly expanded the catalogue of permissible gov-
ernment functions. As if to celebrate that development, Professor
Charles Reich, writing in 1964, spoke of the new role that government
had taken, not only in protecting traditional interests in contract and
199 See 470 U.S. at 543. The same theme is echoed in Justice Marshall's partial concurrence.
See id. at 549 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice
Marshall would have required a full-dress evidentiary hearing before any stopping of an em-
ployee's wages. See id. at 548.
200 See 470 U.S. at 544.
201 For an attempt to develop such a dignitary theory, see Mashaw, cited above in note 26.
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property, but also in creating various kinds of government "largess"
in the form of "money, benefits, services, contracts, franchises, and
licenses." 20 2 That increase in state power translates into an increase
in official discretion, which in turn expands the scope of the principle
of unconstitutional conditions. This Part traces that development in
five celebrated areas of government benefits. The first section dis-
cusses the use of tax exemptions conditioned on the content or subject
matter of speech. The second section addresses the connection be-
tween unemployment benefits and the constitutional guarantees under
the religion clauses. The third section examines the relation between
welfare benefits for medical services and the prohibition against use
of public funds for abortions - an issue with heavy religious over-
tones. The fourth section turns to the intersection of tax policy and
religious liberty, and asks the extent to which Congress can condition
tax-exempt charitable status on the willingness of private universities
to adhere to the commands of the antidiscrimination laws. The last
section returns to the issue with which this Foreword began, the
relationship between the food stamp program and the labor strikes
under the National Labor Relations Act. Throughout these cases it
becomes necessary to analyze in close detail the claim that the refusal
to provide some government benefit is tantamount to imposing a "fine"
or "penalty" that the government could not impose by direct action.
A. Tax Exemptions and Freedom of Speech
One way for the government to influence the pattern of private
activities is through the imposition of selective taxes. People are less
willing to engage in those activities that are taxed than in those that
are not. The flip side of this power is the provision of tax exemptions,
which have the reverse effect upon the pattern of activities. People
are more likely to engage in activities that are exempt from taxes than
in those that are not. The incentive effects of tax rules are evident
across the entire spectrum of economic activities, although they nor-
mally receive almost no constitutional examination under the prevail-
ing rational basis test. If direct regulation proceeds largely without
constitutional interference, then there is no reason to subject taxation
to any higher level of review. The situation is quite the opposite when
speech is affected. Here taxation and exemptions have the same effect
as they do in other contexts, and are subject to the same high levels
202 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964); see also id. ("Increasingly,
Americans live on government largess - allocated by government on its own terms, and held
by recipients subject to conditions which express 'the public interest.'"). Reich's category of
largess includes many of the traditional functions of government, such as licensure and regulation
of highways, along with their modern counterparts in the welfare state. In this Part the greater
emphasis is upon a subclass of the new property that is tied to the welfare state.
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of scrutiny imposed on direct regulations generally. What is true of
taxes is also true of exemptions.
Speiser v. Randall20 3 is an early manifestation of the problem, and
it shows how the conditions attached to a tax exemption can properly
be struck down on first amendment grounds. The California Consti-
tution provided that World War H1 veterans were entitled to property
tax exemptions only if they signed an oath stating that they did not
advocate the overthrow of the governments of the United States or
California by force or violence, or aid of hostile foreign states in time
of war.204 The state argued that it could give its "privilege" or
"bounty" to whomever it saw fit. 20 5 On this view, the exemption
would withstand constitutional challenge even if a statute that sought
to punish the same conduct by fine or imprisonment did not. Justice
Brennan characterized the statute as though it was tantamount to a
"fine," 20 6 and struck it down accordingly, for the want of the proper
procedural protections. 20 7 The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
is implicated because the benefit conferred by the exemption is con-
ditioned on the willingness of individual taxpayers to adhere to certain
political views. The selective tax exemption, no less than a selective
tax, necessarily results in a redistribution of wealth and political in-
fluence from those who are unwilling to sign the oath to those who
are. It may well be that the general property tax exemption for
veterans is proper,20 8 but redistribution on grounds of political belief
generally is not. Coercive tax burdens cannot be waived selectively
for those whose views conform to the dominant political position, any
more than additional taxes can be imposed on those whose views do
not. State gifts work as much of an illicit redistribution of wealth
and power as state fines.
The California Supreme Court recognized the point when it held
that the exemption could be denied only for speech or advocacy that
could be punished directly, thereby mooting the objection that the
State was punishing indirectly what it could not punish directly. But
203 357 U.S. 513 (i958).
204 The full oath read: "I do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United
States or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate
the support of a foreign government against the United States in event of hostilities." Id. at
515.
205 See id. at 518.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 520-29.
208 Cf. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding against first
amendment and equal protection challenges a statute that exempted from taxation charitable
contributions to support lobbying by veterans groups but not to support lobbying by other
groups); Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (holding that a statute giving preference
to veterans in awarding civil service jobs does not discriminate against women in violation of
the equal protection clause).
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once the statutory exemption received that construction, it was then
fair to ask whether the statute afforded the same procedural protec-
tions as an ordinary criminal trial, which it did not. Hence the statute
was rendered vulnerable to attacks on procedural due process grounds,
as Justice Brennan's opinion demonstrates. 20 9 Speiser involved exces-
sive reliance upon an unexplicated idea of fines or coercion.210 But
its result is correct when tested against a theory of unconstitutional
conditions designed to thwart the abuses arising from unchecked gov-
ernment discretion.
The question of tax exemptions came up in a somewhat more
difficult form in the recent case of Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland,211 a case decided in the 1986 Term. Here the statutory
structure was more complicated. Arkansas exempted from its general
sales tax the "[g]ross receipts or gross proceeds derived from the sale
of newspapers" and from certain types of magazines, including "reli-
gious, professional, trade and sports journals and/or publications
printed and published in this State." 212 The plaintiff's general-pur-
pose magazine fell into neither of these two categories, and hence had
to pay the tax.
Arkansas Writers' Project again raises the problem of unconstitu-
tional conditions because Arkansas did not have to give any publi-
cation an exemption. Thus, the sole issue was whether the state could
condition the exemption on the willingness of a magazine to publish
material of a particular subject matter. The statute would have been
a manifest violation of the first amendment if it had tied the exemption
to the adoption of any particular viewpoint, which it did not. None-
theless, the statute did single out certain types of publications for
benefits that other types of magazines were denied. By changing the
relative costs of producing various kinds of magazines, the statute in
effect brought about a mix of publications different from the one that
would have arisen under either a tax-free world or one with a uniform
tax on all types of publications. As a matter of marketplace econom-
ics, these distortions deviate from the competitive ideal, and could be
condemned on those grounds alone. But with the waning of economic
liberties as a constitutional doctrine, this argument can be directed
209 See 357 U.S. at 520-29.
210 See id. at 518 ("To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of
speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.").
211 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987).
212 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-1904(f), (0) (1947), quoted in 107 S. Ct. at 1724-25. This statute
seems unconstitutional in its explicit discrimination against out-of-state newspapers. The issue,
however, is more complicated, because it now seems that states may provide differential subsidies
for local firms, but not impose differential taxes. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach,
io8 S. Ct. 08o3 (1988) (disallowing a discriminatory tax while appearing to tolerate discrimi-
natory subsidies).
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only to the legislature, not to the courts. Indeed, Justice Scalia would
have upheld the tax because he regarded Arkansas Writers' Project as
an economic regulation case, 2 13 scarcely distinguishable from other
cases of selective exemption that have thus far survived constitutional
attack.2 14
Nonetheless, the evident connection between the exemption and
speech makes this clearly a first amendment case. In this context, it
is hard to demonstrate how any economic misallocation leads to an
unwanted distortion in the marketplace of ideas, especially one that
could be seized upon by political actors to advance their own interests.
Still, the Court was correct to strike the statute down because there
was so little to be said on its behalf. A uniform system of exemptions
could end all objection to the statute without requiring a detailed
analysis of its content, while still allowing the state to advance news-
papers and magazines as against other activities. In the unlikely event
that a uniform exemption created a budget shortfall, the state could
adopt a partial uniform exemption as necessary to meet its revenue
requirements. Finding the condition attached to the exemption un-
constitutional thus achieves the right result, even in a case that seems
to-present only limited opportunities for government abuse.
The same analysis yields different results in the earlier case of
Regan v. Taxation with Representation215 (TWR), in which a system
of charitable exemptions was challenged on the ground that it could
not be applied to moneys raised for lobbying activities. The taxpayer
in TWR was a political organization that attacked two provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code that failed to grant it tax-exempt status,
and that failed to grant deductions to its contributors. 2 16 The uncon-
stitutional conditions challenge came in two parts. The first was that
it was impermissible to attach any limitations restricting the ability of
otherwise exempt organizations to participate in lobbying. The second
213 See 107 S. Ct. at 1730 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214 Thus, Justice Scalia pointed out the special mail rates given to religious, educational,
scientific, philanthropic, agricultural, labor, veterans', and fraternal organizations. See id. at
i732. These classifications are broader than those involved in Arkansas Writers' Project, and
thus they probably would, and should, survive challenge.
215 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
216 The two provisions involved were § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) of the Internal Revenue
Code. Both provide tax-exempt status for various kinds of charitable organizations. The Court
specified two principal differences between organizations receiving § 5o1(c)(3) status and those
receiving § 5o1(c)(4) status:
Taxpayers who contribute to § 5o1(c)(3) organizations are permitted by § 17o(c)(2) to
deduct the amount of their contributions on their federal income tax returns, while
contributions to § 5o1(c)(4) organizations are not deductible. Section 5oi(c)(4) organiza-
tions, but not § 5o1(c)(3) organizations, are permitted to engage in substantial lobbying
to advance their exempt purposes.
461 U.S. at 543.
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part was that it was impermissible to permit veterans' organizations
to operate free of the restrictions made applicable to other political
groups.
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, rejected both chal-
lenges, relying heavily upon the norm of "broad discretion" in taxing
matters. 217 "This Court has never held that Congress must grant a
benefit such as TWR claims here to a person who wishes to exercise
a constitutional right. '2 18 But this account suppresses the equal pro-
tection component of the argument. The objection is not to the failure
to grant the subsidy, as such, but to granting the subsidy to charitable
organizations while denying it to lobbying organizations.
Properly formulated, the critical question is whether this broad
type of condition creates any distortion in the political process. It is
doubtful that it does, even when the statute is tested against the more
demanding first amendment standards of scrutiny. The religious, po-
litical, and educational activities exempted under the statute cover the
full range of activities without subject matter or viewpoint discrimi-
nation, and the ban on lobbying is imposed at the same high level of
generality. The differences in tax treatment may well induce some
moneys to go into, say, academic work that would otherwise go into
direct lobbying, but it is hard to see what political groups, if any,
would gain systematic advantAge from this effect. Here, unlike the
tax exemption situation posed by Arkansas Writers', there seems to
be a powerful government counterweight on the other side. One great
peril in political life today is that the broad discretion of federal and
state government over economic affairs increases the potential gains
to partisan activities, of which lobbying is only the most visible. Why
that conduct must be subsidized, even if charitable organizations are
subsidized, is therefore something of a mystery. The doctrine of un-
constitutional conditions should be invoked precisely when the con-
ditions attached to government action increase the risk of political
polarization, the opposite of the case when lobbying efforts proceed
without tax dollars. The distinction between lobbying and charitable
activities thus survives even a higher level of constitutional scrutiny.219
The standard of review becomes far more important on the second
question: whether veterans' organizations alone should receive pre-
ferred tax status for their lobbying activities. Justice Rehnquist, still
employing a degree of judicial deference, simply noted that all vet-
erans organizations qualified regardless of their views. 220 If veterans
217 Id. at 547.
218 Id. at 545.
219 It is therefore unnecessary to adopt Justice Blackmun's position. Justice Blackmun, using
a high level of scrutiny, allowed the denial of exemptions for lobbying organizations under
§ 5oI(c)(3), but only because of the ability of affiliate organizations to use tax-exempt funds to
lobby under § 5oI(c)(4). See id. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
220 See 461 U.S. at 548.
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groups only had disagreements among themselves on issues of no
concern to others, a tax subsidy to them might not affect the denial
of a parallel subsidy to other organizations. But although these groups
may differ among themselves on some issues, they must surely act in
concert on others, where they operate in direct competition with un-
subsidized lobbying groups. In these cases the differential tax treat-
ment does distort the outcome of the political process in ways that
the first amendment and the equal protection clause should preclude.
It appears therefore that Congress at least should be put to the all-
or-nothing choice of granting exemptions to all lobbying organizations
or to none.
I reach that conclusion with a fair bit of trepidation, lest Congress
take the bait and extend the tax benefit to all lobbying groups, in-
cluding the vast number that are totally unconcerned with veterans'
activities. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine again achieves
only a second-best goal. The grant of universal tax exemptions to
lobbying organizations subsidizes all special-interest groups at the ex-
pense of the general public, introducing yet another set of tax distor-
tions. There is a prisoner's dilemma game here, in which all persons
can be made better off if no lobbying group receives a tax subsidy.
Perhaps the proper response is to treat all tax subsidies of political
lobbying as beyond the power of Congress to grant, in order to control
not only tax distortions between lobbying groups, but tax distortions
between lobbying and socially productive activities. 221 Lobbying may
well be a protected constitutional right, 222 but in a system of limited
government it is not one that is either deserving of or entitled to a
political subsidy.
B. The Religion Cases
Unemployment compensation programs typically limit their bene-
fits to people who are unemployed through no fault of their own and
remain available for work. One question is whether the state can
deny these benefits to people who will not work because the only jobs
available require them to violate their religious beliefs. Can the state
refuse to provide unemployment benefits to persons unwilling to take
these jobs? The current answer is no. The major decision was Sher-
bert v. Verner,223 which was followed in the I980 Term by Thomas
221 It would of course be irresponsible for the Court to take such an extreme step in any
case where veterans' organizations did not have a chance to present their side of the argument.
Indeed the best justification for Regan is prudential: the Court did not want to resolve the
various difficult issues that would have arisen if the veterans' tax exemption had been found
unjustifiable.
222 See, e.g., Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
138 (ig6i) ("The right of petition is one of the freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights.").
223 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,224
and in the 1986 Term by Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commis-
sion.225
Sherbert illustrates the basic pattern in all these cases. Mrs. Sher-
bert, a Seventh-Day Adventist, was dismissed from her job because
she refused to work on Saturday, in conflict with her religious con-
victions. The state system of unemployment compensation restricted
payments to persons who were unable to work through no fault of
their own.226 The state employment board decided that Mrs. Sherbert
had quit for personal reasons, and that jobs were "available" to her
within the region. Accordingly her claim for compensation was de-
nied. 22 7 The Supreme Court was then forced to decide whether the
refusal of the state to pay her benefits constituted a limitation on the
free exercise of religion, or, alternatively, whether the decision to pay
unemployment compensation would be a de facto establishment of
religion. The case raised an unconstitutional conditions question be-
cause it had been settled both that a state need not have any system
of unemployment compensation at all and that any government system
of unemployment compensation is unquestionably constitutional, at
least since Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 228 which per-
mitted redistributive policies aimed at promoting the "common good."
Sherbert v. Verner brings to a head the tension between the religion
clauses in the Bill of Rights on the one hand and one common form
of "new property" on the other. In a world of limited government,
each of the two religion clauses operates within a relatively self-defined
sphere. The free exercise clause guarantees that the government can-
not interfere with the "negative liberties" of the citizen with respect
to religious practices. It cannot prohibit religious worship, and it
cannot fine, license, tax, or punish religious practices in any way.
The obligation of the state is to leave people alone. The establishment
clause governs the other side of the line, prohibiting the state from
going into the business of religion. Certainly it cannot support one
religion to the exclusion of the others. In the modern view, neither
can it give aid to all religions equally, if nonreligious groups are
excluded. 229 In a world of limited state and federal power, the pres-
sures on each of the religion clauses is tolerably small, and the pos-
sibility of their collision reduced, being limited primarily to cases in
224 450 U.S. 707 (i98i).
225 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
226 See 374 U.S. at 400-01.
227 See id. at 401.
218 301 U.S. 495 (1937). For my criticisms of that decision, see R. EPSTEIN, cited above in
note 28, at 309-12.
229 See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. i, 15-16 (1947).
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which the government is forced to reconcile the religious interests of
its employees with the requirements of public service.23 0
The situation becomes far more difficult once the government goes
beyond its role as an enforcer of private rights to create and administer
a system of positive welfare rights. The greater scope of government
action necessarily makes it easier for the state to offend either or both
of the religion clauses. Moreover, as long as the government remains
in the business of managing all phases of the economy, a simple line
that requires government "nonfeasance" in certain areas or a "strict
separation" between the state and religion becomes indefensible. Some
more sophisticated test to distinguish among government actions is
needed. In 196i Professor Kurland proposed the following standard:
[T]he thesis proposed here as the proper construction of the religion
clauses of the first amendment is that the freedom and separation
clauses should be read as a single precept that government cannot
utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because these
clauses prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a
benefit or to impose a burden. 23'
Reduced to a single catchword, "neutrality" becomes the guiding prin-
ciple in religion cases.
In Sherbert no Justice was able to give a satisfactory account of
the clash between the religion clauses and the unemployment benefit
programs. The Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, recognized
that the state did not seek to impose "criminal sanctions, '232 but held
in essence that the elimination of the unemployment benefits was a
form of coercion:
Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility
for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the
pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling
forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of
230 See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (upholding a military regulation
barring the use of religious headgear).
231 Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (296i);
see also Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 426, 429 (1953)
(noting the tension between the two clauses "where the state takes over the ordering of the lives
of groups of citizens, as in the armed forces, in prisons, and in institutions to which delinquent
or dependent children are committed. Here the effect of strict separation would be seriously to
limit the religious freedom of the citizens concerned."). For a more modern treatment of the
same issue, see McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 146
(1986).
... 374 U.S. at 403.
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burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed
against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Nor may the South Carolina court's construction of the statute be
saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment
compensation benefits are not appellant's "right" but merely a "privi-
lege." It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion
and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing conditions
upon a benefit or privilege. 233
Thus the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions surfaced to fill the
void in Mrs. Sherbert's case. It is clear that the state need not provide
any benefits at all. The "fine" becomes a measure of relative depri-
vation: if the government chooses to provide those benefits at all, it
cannot condition them upon the willingness of people to work in ways
that contravene their religious beliefs.
Justice Stewart's concurrence shows that Justice Brennan's "fine"
analogy is far from dispositive. In Justice Stewart's view, any effort
to apply the free exercise clause to these facts would conflict with the
court's own establishment clause jurisprudence:
If the appellant's refusal to work on Saturdays were based on indol-
ence, or on a compulsive desire to watch the Saturday television
programs, no one would say that South Carolina could not hold that
she was not "available for work" within the meaning of its statute.
That being so, the Establishment Clause as construed by this Court
not only permits but affirmatively requires South Carolina equally to
deny the appellant's claim for unemployment compensation when her
refusal to work on Saturdays is based upon her religious creed....
[T]he Establishment Clause forbids the "financial support of govern-
ment" to be "placed behind a particular religious belief.1234
In this passage, Justice Stewart treats the unemployment program
as a subsidy to religion because people who do not work on Saturday
for religious reasons obtain a benefit that other non-Saturday workers
do not receive. Justice Brennan finds a penalty by comparing the
claimant to other persons who actively seek work but cannot find it,
while Justice Stewart identifies a subsidy by looking to the universe
of persons who do not seek work on Saturdays. Justice Brennan's
"penalty" suggests free exercise difficulties in upholding the statute as
applied, while Justice Stewart's "subsidy" suggests establishment
clause difficulties in striking it down. The neutrality principle could
233 Id. at 404 (footnote omitted).
234 Id. at 414-15 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 431 (1962)). Justice Stewart concurred in the Court's result because he thought that "the
Court's mechanistic concept of the Establishment Clause is historically unsound and constitu-
tionally wrong." Id. at 415. His concurrence reflects his treatment of the free exercise clause
as the dominant member of the partnership, see id. at 415-16; Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 6W6 (I96I) (Stewart, J., dissenting), a view that makes Sherbert a relatively easy case.
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be invoked to support both positions or neither. Clearly something
has to give. What?
It is necessary again to return to fundamentals. Notwithstanding
their differences, Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart share two prem-
ises. Both start from the assumption that the unemployment compen-
sation programs are constitutionally sound, for otherwise the uncon-
stitutional conditions issue could never arise. Both then explore the
limitations that the state might place upon receipt of the benefit.
While they disagree about the proper analysis in Sherbert, neither
Justice would tolerate a program that provided public unemployment
compensation programs only to those who agreed to practice Judaism
or Christianity, or only to those who agreed not to observe one of
those faiths. They thus agree on the vital issue. They both reject the
now familiar argument that because the state need not establish an
unemployment compensation program at all, it can therefore choose
the objects of its affections, for such selection confers too much power
on the state. Thus the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is not
a point of contention between the two Justices. It is in fact their
second common premise.
The question arises, however, as to its scope. Here Carmichael's
acceptance of redistribution through employment compensation is im-
portant because it marks a clear break from Frost, whose imperfect
efforts to preserve competition had an explicitly antiredistributive bias.
Once general takings and public trust arguments are no longer suffi-
cient to forestall any form of covert redistribution between A and B,
then additional pressure is placed upon the religion clauses to forbid
redistribution both from or to religion. Within this framework, I
believe that the idea of neutrality can now be usefully reformulated
into its more precise economic analogue: the government cannot en-
gage in activities that either penalize or subsidize the practice of
religion. Judicial scrutiny is high, for whether the government pro-
gram is sustained or struck down, there is a substantial risk of con-
stitutional error.235 This test is more stringent than that found in the
235 For a further discussion of the same point, see McConnell & Posner, Neutrality Toward
Religion: An Economic Approach, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming 1989). Once this refor-
mulation is made, it no longer follows that Kurland's test, see supra note 231 and accompanying
text, is the best way to eliminate subsidies in either direction. There is always the risk that
formally neutral rules will have powerfully disparate effects - for example, a rule that all
soldiers must eat standard army rations, regardless of their religious dietary restrictions. It may
well be possible to introduce explicitly religious distinctions into the law in ways that benefit
both religious and nonreligious people, by a practice of "accommodation," which allows religious
people to take certain types of employment, as long as they bear the additional costs that their
religious practices impose on the system at large. In effect there may be deviations from a
strictly neutral (or separationist) baseline that improve the welfare of all concerned, as in
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 5o3 (1986). For a general discussion of the relationship
between neutrality and accommodation, see McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP.
CT. REV. I.
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speech area, where only restrictions that burden private speech are
suspect, while those that subsidize it are not. 236 In contrast, every
form of error in the religious context is subject to constitutional scru-
tiny, for to avoid the perils of free exercise may be to land in the
thicket of establishment, and vice versa. The question of subsidy or
penalty then requires the selection of the right baseline, but that in
turn is possible only after careful treatment of the insurance and
funding issues in Sherbert.
This approach allows us to go beyond the metaphor of the "fine"
that appealed to Justice Brennan. The state does not take Mrs.
Sherbert's money when she quits work. It refuses to pay her "its"
money. Therein lies the rub. The state is not a person, but a complex
network of arrangements among people, of which only some are vol-
untary. As with public highways and foreign taxation, the state does
not spend its own money. It spends money that it raises from private
individuals, including this plaintiff. To make the analysis tractable,
assume that all the funds to the unemployment system are collected
from a tax imposed directly or indirectly on the workers and the firm.
Assume further that random redistributions of wealth between, say,
plumbers and pipefitters, are permitted under Carmichael. Divide the
world now into two classes of people, those who might quit jobs for
religious reasons and those who would not. The question that the
religion clauses ask is whether there is an implicit redistribution of
wealth across those two classes - either way. If the redistribution
runs from religious persons to nonreligious persons, then we have a
free exercise clause violation. If it runs in the opposite direction, then
we have an establishment clause violation. Which is it?
At first blush, the argument seems to be that there is an implicit
subsidy conferred upon Mrs. Sherbert, and hence an establishment
clause violation. She is entitled to recover for all the normal cases of
unemployment specified in the statute, plus one additional type of
case: not working because of religious conflict. If she pays the same
premium as everyone else, but receives more extensive insurance cov-
erage in exchange, then she looks like the net recipient of a forbidden
state subsidy.
This argument, however, is wrong, or at least incomplete. The
proper insurance inquiry is whether Mrs. Sherbert is, other things
equal, in the same risk classification as other people within the state.
Thus, suppose it could be shown that people with religious beliefs
have steadier work habits and therefore quit jobs far less frequently
than those whose work habits are inferior in part because they are
236 The case of government-sponsored speech is far more difficult, because it requires taking
into account the roles of political leaders, program officers, and ordinary employees. The exact
contours of this problem are beyond the scope of this Foreword. See generally M. YUDOF,
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983); Shiffrin, supra note 22.
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not anchored in religious beliefs. If Mrs. Sherbert is denied benefits,
then she is forced to subsidize nonreligious workers. Indeed, even
after she is allowed to obtain coverage when she refuses to work on
Saturdays, it remains unclear.whether that subsidy is fully reversed.
It could be that the additional coverage afforded her is quite negligi-
ble,237 given her other personal characteristics, so that on balance she
contributes far more to the unemployment fund than her expected
payout from it. Alternatively, it may well be that the coverage for
her refusal to work on the Sabbath gives her a better than expected
deal from the fund. If one considers the religious benefit in isolation,
then it looks as though there is an establishment clause violation. If
one considers that benefit in the context of the entire program, then
(combining effects) the outcome is unclear. It may well be that the
plan is skewed against Seventh-Day Adventists. The only way to find
out is to check the collections for and payments from the fund. Justice
Stewart's establishment clause view is more defensible on the view
that each item of coverage should be considered in isolation. Justice
Brennan's is more defensible on the aggregate view. The problem
simply could not arise if all premiums paid to any state unemployment
compensation system reflected the risk of each covered worker accu-
rately, for then any elements of systematic redistribution already
would have been squeezed out of the system.
What should be done when, as is now the law, one form of
redistribution (between or within occupational groups) is allowed while
another form of redistribution (between religious classes) is prohibited?
The simple solution would be to create two separate risk pools at the
outset.2 38 But how? One possibility is that individuals who want to
have coverage against Sabbath layoffs can pay an additional premium
with respect to that risk. The insurance should be viable because
they can still be required to conduct a search for other employment.
And they will be able to escape the terrible dilemma that Justice
Brennan described, of having to choose between economic welfare
and their religious beliefs. The small extra premium to cover this
second class of risk can be imposed only upon those workers who
think it important to get it, and the economic biases otherwise built
into the system can continue apace. 239
237 The Court noted that of the [50 Seventh-Day Adventists in Spartanburg only two were
unable to find non-Saturday employment. See 374 U.S. at 399 n.2.
238 This approach was implicitly rejected in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), in
which the Amish were required to contribute to the social security system, with its separate
funding, despite a free exercise claim that any payment to or receipt of benefit from the system
violated their religious beliefs. For a further discussion of Lee, see pp. 87-89 below.
239 Another possibility is to place all such workers in a separate risk pool, with their own
insurance premiums. This prospect is far more radical, and it might well result in a radical
revision of premium payments for workers in both classes. There would still be some redistri-
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This system of separate charges costs money, if only to administer
the proper "pass-throughs" to individual employees. With modern
actuarial and payroll techniques the costs should be small, but the
cost of setting and collecting the premium might still exceed the
premium itself, if that too is small. Even private insurance markets
do not have perfect calibration of risk groups, because the costs
involved in separating them are too high. If that situation exists, we
are forced to decide which distortion, Justice Brennan's on the decision
frontier, or Justice Stewart's on the equalization of covered events,
appears the more serious. Justice Brennan's conclusion seems to be
correct. The amount of redistribution from a failure to subdivide this
risk pool is small, given the infrequency of unemployment payments
necessitated by a recipient's religious beliefs. On the other hand, the
ex post dilemma of religious people - who are forced to participate
in this system against their will in the first place - seems palpable.
Where some imperfection must be tolerated, better to choose the
smaller, as Justice Brennan did.
Even if it were feasible to charge Sabbatarians separate premiums
for religious layoffs, or even to place them in their own separate risk
group, one problem would remain. Suppose a worker takes a job
when she has no religious convictions; she then acquires religious
convictions only to be dismissed promptly because she will not work
on Saturday. Does this case differ in any degree from Sherbert? The
Supreme Court in Hobbie, following its earlier decision in Thomas,
held that this new circumstance was immaterial. Justice Brennan's
opinion is perfectly conclusory: "The First Amendment protects the
free exercise rights of employees who adopt religious beliefs or convert
from one faith to another after they are hired. The timing of Hobbie's
conversion is immaterial to our determination that her free exercise
rights have been burdened .... ",240
From an insurance point of view, however, the difference between
the two cases is critical. In a world in which conversions are random,
it may make more sense to allow unemployment compensation benefits
to people who convert after they were hired. If, when employment
was undertaken, all persons had an equal chance of converting, then
there would be no redistribution ex ante. In contrast, the redistri-
bution problem in Sherbert arose precisely because the risk of Sabbath
employment was known before employment had begun, when the
separate premium could have been collected. Still, Hobbie is prob-
lematic. Allowing the benefits may not work a redistribution across
members of the nonreligious pool, but it will necessarily work a
redistribution from nonreligious people (who pay into the system) to
bution within each class on nonreligious grounds, but the total level of residual redistribution
would probably be far smaller than it is under the present program.
240 1o7 S. Ct. 1046, 1s5 (1987) (footnote omitted).
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religious people (the only ones who collect) in the way the establish-
ment clause prohibits. One way to solve that problem is to have the
premium that covers this case paid for by persons who have signed
up for the additional religious coverage, for now there will be redis-
tribution across employees (which is allowed) but not across religions
(which is prohibited).
Admittedly, this approach to interpreting the religion clauses
quickly becomes very technical, and it may seem odd that resolving
particular religion clause cases should turn on the fine points of in-
surance contracting as applied to unemployment compensation or so-
cial security benefits. But this conclusion is really inescapable. To-
gether the religion clauses function to prohibit redistribution, in either
direction, between religious and nonreligious persons. Skewed insur-
ance contracts and massive welfare systems offer almost unlimited
opportunities for implicit redistribution, which must be policed if both
clauses are to be given their full effect. In the days of limited gov-
ernment action, the somewhat stricter separation of religious and
government activities reduced the possibilities of redistribution. Now
with the pooling of resources through government ventures, combat-
ting redistribution on religious lines is far more difficult, for the ben-
efits and burdens to both groups must be both identified and mea-
sured. Even so, with the major normative premise set by the religion
clauses, the rest is economic technique, for which a knowledge of
insurance contracts and plans is indispensable. The simpler rhetoric
of freedom, fines, and coercion must be replaced with a closer analysis
of whether this state system of forced contribution and disbursal works
implicit transfers along religious lines.
This way of construing the religion clauses suggests that the Court
made a serious mistake in United States v. Lee.241 In Lee, the ap-
pellee, a member of the Old Order Amish, refused to file the appro-
priate social security returns or to withhold social security payments
from his employees' paychecks. His argument, not contested, was
that the Amish religion requires its followers to look after their own
elderly and sick and considers it sinful either to pay any funds into,
or to receive any benefits out of, the social security system. The
statute is thus a more massive infringement on religious liberty than
the unemployment statute in Sherbert because the social security tax
means that the Amish can hire workers, and remain in business, only
if they are prepared to violate their religious beliefs.
The entire case for the statute therefore turns on the strength of
the government interest in the social security system. The traditional
requirement calls for the state to demonstrate an "overriding govern-
mental interest,1242 but no reader of Lee can escape the impression
241 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
242 See id. at 257-58.
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that the Court applied this ostensibly rigorous standard in a very
relaxed fashion. The Court was content to quote a congressional
report to the effect that mandatory participation was "indispensable"
and that the social security system would collapse if participation were
made "voluntary."243 Its argument, however, is woefully weak in this
context.
First, the concern with a voluntary social security system rests
upon the obvious conclusion that younger workers (among others) will
abandon a system in which the present value of their contributions is
greater than the present value of their expected receipts. If everyone
did this, the system would collapse, leaving the federal government
unable to pay off benefits to present and future recipients without
resorting to general taxation. But even if the Amish could opt out of
the system as a group on religious grounds, all persons whose religious
beliefs were not affronted would remain. The massive amounts of
redistribution within the social security system could continue apace,
without making the Amish be part of it. Indeed it is unclear whether
the system would be stronger or weaker unless some detailed account-
ing were made to determine whether the Amish as a group were net
payors or recipients. (Because of their refusal to accept the money to
which they are entitled, they are at present clearly net contributors to
the system.)
To be sure, the case would be different if the Amish wanted the
benefit of the social security system without having to bear any of its
costs.244 A religious belief that it is blessed to receive but sinful to
pay need not be funded by those who disagree. Similarly, the Amish
claim would be suspect if some Amish opted into the system while
others did not. But there is no hint of any selective participation
designed to wring dollars from the system. Indeed, all self-employed
Amish are already out of the system by virtue of a specific statutory
exemption from Congress.2 45 Because the benefits received under
social security are all separable, this issue is sharply distinguishable
from the hypothetical cases put by the Court, in which tax funds are
used to purchase public goods, such as defense and public order, 246
243 See id. at 258.
244 Lee is thus distinguishable from Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), in which two
applicants for welfare benefits claimed that their religious beliefs prevented them from having
their two-year-old daughter's social security number used in processing their claims. That free
exercise claim was rightly rejected. The applicants in Roy were seeking the benefits of the
system without assuming its burdens, which in this instance were designed to prevent fraud.
In Lee, the Amish made no effort to capture the sweet without the bitter.
24s See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1982). The Court in Lee refused to reach the question whether
the free exercise clause compels this exemption, or whether the establishment clause forbids it.
See 455 U.S. at 26o n.xi.
246 See 455 U.S. at 260 ("If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if
a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities,
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from which the Amish benefit whether they contribute or not. By
contrast, there is no free-rider problem in Lee at all.
In sum, the Amish's case regarding social security is compelling
because as a group they are willing to disaffirm both the benefits and
the burdens of the social security system. The analysis of Sherbert
showed that the best way to fend off both establishment clause and
free exercise claims is to adopt a set of rules whereby religious groups
neither receive a net subsidy nor suffer a net tax from participation
in collective financing plans. In Lee, it was possible to guarantee that
result by having a complete separation between social security and
the Amish system of self-help for their own elderly. Why the Court
should have found any overriding governmental interest in preventing
this arrangement remains a mystery.
C. Medicaid Benefits and Abortions
The Medicaid program established by the Social Security Act in
1965 is generally designed to provide medical benefits for needy per-
sons.247 Since 1976 the Hyde Amendment to the statute has provided,
subject to narrow exceptions, that Medicaid benefits could not be used
to reimburse otherwise eligible women for the costs of obtaining abor-
tions, 248 which had become constitutionally protected by the Court's
1973 decision in Roe v. Wade.249 The Hyde Amendment was spurred
on by the widespread opposition to Roe, and represented an undis-
guised legislative effort to limit Roe's impact by changing the rules
for funding medical care. Roe manifestly prohibits any explicit fines
or penalties to be placed upon a woman's right to have an abortion.
such exemptions would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage
of the income tax.').
247 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343, 343 (1965) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
248 The amendment provides that:
[N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions
except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to
term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest
when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or
public health service ....
Joint Resolution of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (I979); see
also Joint Resolution of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 204, 96 Stat. 1830, 1894 (1982)
(providing that appropriated funds can be spent on abortions only when the mother's life is
endangered).
249 410 U.S. 113 (i973). For the record I should note that I view Roe as incorrect largely
for the reasons that I set out in 1973. See Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REv. 159. The literature on Roe of course continues
to be produced at a fever pitch, but I do not wish to reargue any of the merits here. Instead
the material that follows assumes that Roe is rightly decided and only asks about its implications
for the abortion funding cases insofar as they depend upon the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions.
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The Hyde Amendment sidesteps the obvious by offering the indigent
woman a clear financial inducement to carry the fetus to term.
The constitutional challenge to the Hyde Amendment, rejected in
Harris v. McRae,2 50 presents the issue of unconstitutional conditions
in yet another guise. The greater power is that the state can decide
to have no Medicaid program at all, as was the case before 1965.
The lesser power is that the state can exclude certain procedures -
abortions - from coverage under the program. The question is
whether, once Congress decides to commit itself to a Medicaid pro-
gram, it must also commit itself to the funding of abortions. If one
treats the state, as the Court did, like a private person, then the case
becomes easy - too easy: there is no "coercion" in the form of either
force or fraud. Those women who want to get an abortion can still
do so, even if they do not receive the "subsidy" from the state. Those
who now think that the provision of external benefits makes bearing
a child worthwhile have their opportunities expanded, not contracted.
While their choices may be shifted, as a group they are better off
because they have received options that previously they had been
denied; so too are the fetuses that survive. The fact that the public
at large has to bear the costs of running a medicare system remains
beyond constitutional scrutiny, given the explicit constitutional ap-
proval of redistributing income and wealth to improve the health of
the public at large.
The hurdle faced by the dissenters is to show that the special
powers of the state present prospects of illicit behavior sufficient to
displace this simple model of the socially useful bargain. In his dissent
Justice Brennan in effect relied upon two familiar strands of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine: Frost25 and Sherbert.252 Harris
is critically different from both cases, however.
In Frost, the unique power of the state lay in its ability to exclude
everyone from the public highways, instrumentalities of commerce for
which there are no clear substitutes - arguably no substitutes at all.
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine was used, albeit ineffectively,
to constrain that substantial monopoly power. But there is no mo-
nopoly in the abortion market, for Roe in effect established a rule of
free entry that ensures that indigent women, like all others, can receive
abortions at a competitive price. The only pull the Hyde Amendment
gives the state over the Medicaid recipient is its ability to withhold
funds for an otherwise readily available abortion. The cost of an
abortion, moreover, is relatively low, at least in comparison with
250 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
2S1 See id. at 336-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). I do not discuss the dissents of Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens because they do not expressly address the unconstitutional
conditions aspect of the case.
252 See id. at 334-36.
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aggressive neonatal care, and there is nothing to prevent other private
individuals or charitable organizations from making up the shortfall,
and doing so in today's world with an implicit tax subsidy. We are
far removed from a world in which private charity would have to
construct an entire rival highway system in order to escape the
clutches of the state monopoly.
Sherbert poses the much closer challenge, for it too involved the
provision of state financial benefits without the powerful monopolistic
structure of the state. Read in one sense, Sherbert treats the differ-
ential benefits between what one gets if she is willing to work on the
Sabbath and what she gets if she is not as though it were a "fine."
Analogously in Harris, the failure to provide medical payments for
abortions also could be regarded as a "fine," bringing the case within
the general prohibition of Roe, insofar as the state will pay in full for
the alternative medical procedures.
Yet the differences are also critical. Sherbert was decided within
an extraordinarily strict constitutional framework, where the free ex-
ercise and the establishment clauses worked as powerful pincers to
constrain government action. The full analysis of Sherbert showed
the weakness of the "fine" metaphor and required that one take into
account both the incentive effects and the insurance consequences of
the unemployment compensation system. That same analysis should
be brought to bear here, where it points, cautiously but clearly, against
the case for invalidation.
Start with the problem of differential incentives. The winning
argument in Sherbert was that the promise of unemployment benefits
induced the applicant to behave in a manner that necessarily violated
her religious convictions. The right to an abortion may be subject to
constitutional protection, but having an abortion is not a religious or
moral obligation. The state may have given the woman an incentive
to do what she would otherwise not choose to do. But it has not
forced her to sacrifice religious scruples in order to retain financial
benefits, as happened in Sherbert. Can the two choices be regarded
as the same?
The answer, if at all, must come from what we think of as the
constitutional status of the woman's choice to the abortion. It is here
that the counterargument gains strength. Justice Brennan correctly
insisted that Roe does more than just decriminalize abortion. Rather,
Roe works a double transformation at a single leap: abortions move
from the status of criminal acts into "fundamental rights," which are
as strongly protected as religious beliefs. "It would belabor the ob-
vious to expound at any great length on the illegitimacy of a state
policy that interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights through
the selective bestowal of governmental favors." 25 3
253 Id. at 334.
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This elevation of the abortion right must go down very hard with
foes of abortion who believe both that the Constitution does not
prevent abortions from being criminalized and that those who perform
abortions should be punished criminally. These beliefs are critical to
the funding side of the analysis, which was ignored by Justice Bren-
nan, who silently assumed that government money is like manna from
heaven: no individual has to pay for it. But once we pierce the
government veil, it becomes necessary to examine what correlative
duties that this expanded fundamental right of abortion may properly
impose upon the opponents of Roe.
On this side of the issue, we must confront the free exercise of
religion. Suppose that a special tax to fund Medicaid abortions were
placed upon only those individuals who opposed abortions for religious
reasons. In principle, these people should be entitled to object to the
tax on much the same ground that union members can object to dues
payments that are used to support political programs and candidates
to whom they are personally opposed.25 4 The free exercise of religion,
like the free exercise of speech, 255 can be limited as much by direct
taxation as it can by prohibitions.
Recalling the analysis of Sherbert (and the intellectual bankruptcy
of Lee), one can see the overwhelming free exercise objection against
taxing religious people to pay for abortions. These people, whether
few or many, are forced to fund programs that they oppose on religious
grounds. The right to escape this coercion seems as "fundamental" as
the woman's right to have the abortion in the first place: to put the
claim in the baldest way possible, who wants to be coerced into paying
for the murder of unborn children? Thus the flip side of the "fun-
damental right" claim is far more powerful in McRae than the parallel
establishment clause argument in Sherbert, for no one thinks that the
modest subsidy, if any, to individuals like Mrs. Sherbert affronts the
core religious beliefs of the persons who are made to pay it. Pushed
to the limit, this free exercise argument would make it unconstitutional
for the government to use public funds to fund abortions. Thus the
unconstitutional conditions argument suggests that the Hyde Amend-
ment is unconstitutional, given Roe, while the free exercise argument
suggests that it is constitutionally mandated. Neither argument allows
a middle ground.
Are there also, however, religious grounds on which to oppose the
Amendment? The argument, here under the establishment clause,
seems to turn on motive, and no one can deny the importance of
254 See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, xo8 S. Ct. 2641 (1988); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
255 For examples of taxes found to violate the free speech clause, see Minneapolis Star and
Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983), and Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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motive in establishment clause cases.2 56 Many of those who oppose
the funding of abortions do so on religious grounds. When they turn
their preferences into law, they have established, at least in part, their
religious beliefs under the Medicaid statutes. This argument, how-
ever, seems more strained in this context than does its free exercise
alternative. If the foes of abortion were able to exclude both abortion
funding and all pregnancy and neonatal care from Medicaid solely for
religious reasons, would federal funding of abortion (and other preg-
nancy and neonatal care) then be required because of the motive
behind its opposition, even with the entire issue of differential incen-
tives no longer in the case?
The funding issue thus reveals a house divided. Some substantial
fraction of taxpayers objects to abortions on religious grounds. Other
taxpayers strongly support abortion funding for indigent women, and
counter the free exercise claim with an establishment claim of their
own. The obvious lesson is that it is troublesome to use extensive
government power to force collective decisions in the teeth of these
wide and wholly irreconcilable divergences of opinions: any such de-
cision leaves a minority, or perhaps a majority, deeply disaffected
with the collective outcome. The deep moral and political divisions
over abortion cannot be papered over simply by writing, as Justice
Brennan did, solely about the differential incentives the Hyde Amend-
ment places on Medicaid recipients.
One problematic line of escape, analogizing to the proper treatment
of unemployment benefits in Sherbert,25 7 would segregate contribu-
tions to the Medicaid program. The state could determine in advance
its budget requirements for Medicaid abortions, and then allow indi-
vidual taxpayers to decide whether or not they wished their moneys
spent on abortions. It could further insist that only those opposed to
abortions on religious grounds may refuse to contribute to the fund.
If the budget target were met without the contributions of those
opposed to abortions, then the program could go forward. If not,
then the program would have to cease, or operate on a reduced basis.
The suggestion presents some serious internal difficulties of its
own. It would be difficult to determine who refused to contribute out
of sincere religious conviction and who simply wanted others to bear
that portion of their social burden. Free-riding could thus distort
collective choice. On the other side, if the abortions were so funded,
then something would have to be done with the tax revenues from
those people opposed to the program on religious grounds. If these
moneys were simply put into general revenues, then nothing would
2S6 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56 (1985) (discussing the permissible degree
to which a statute can be motivated by a religious purpose).
257 See supra pp. 79-86.
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really have changed at all. If any substantial fraction of the popula-
tion supported abortions, then all federal programs, whether for abor-
tions or anything else, would be funded exactly as if no one were
opposed to abortions for religious reasons. Perhaps money is too
fungible for such a separation to work. Even if these difficulties could
be addressed, one problem would remain: what is to be said to people
who are opposed to their government paying for something that they
find morally reprehensible?
In the end, therefore, it seems quite difficult to protect the free
exercise rights of opponents of abortion under a system that involves
any affirmative government support of abortions. In this context, the
funding of abortions through charitable contributions has at least the
modest advantage of keeping the government from the middle of the
abortion battle. Yet charitable deductions still make religious people
bear part of the costs of the abortions, in effect, to which it can be
said only that the current tax system uses charitable deductions that
allow religious people to fund their institutions and practices at the
expense of nonreligious ones. The only way to avoid these problems
is to get the government out of both medicine and religion, which,
although the only principled answer, is unlikely to be done in the near
future. Until that day, however, the unconstitutional conditions ques-
tion in Harris is far closer than the one in Sherbert, and far more
divisive. The claim of indigent women to be free of financial incen-
tives not to abort cannot be ignored. But it is not as important as a
state policy offering a financial inducement to have an abortion in-
consistent with her religious beliefs - which would be the precise
Sherbert analogue. On the other side, the use of public moneys to
support abortions taxes, and therefore coerces, other individuals to
support practices that are against their religious convictions. As with
Sherbert, none of these problems could arise in a constitutional order
that imposed restrictions upon redistribution through taxation and
state welfare benefits. Once that redistribution becomes part and
parcel of the system as we know it, the proper strategy should be to
choose the lesser of two evils, a very hard call here. On that uneasy
note, the unconstitutional conditions challenge to the Hyde Amend-
ment should fail - but perhaps only by a bare 5-4 vote.
D. Tax Exemptions, Free Exercise, and the
Antidiscrimination Principle
The most recent free exercise tax-exemption case, Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States,258 is at sharp variance with Sherbert and
Hobbie, but all too harmonious with Lee. In Bob Jones, the consti-
tutional issue was whether Bob Jones University should be able to
'5s 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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keep its charitable tax exemption, even though it had adopted, for
genuine religious beliefs, a ban against interracial dating and marriage
for its students. 25 9 For the Court, the case was easy. It started with
the premise that "there can no longer be any doubt that racial dis-
crimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of
elementary justice, '260 and cited its decision in Brown v. Board of
Education261 to show its opposition to any system of state-sponsored
segregation. Set against this background, the free-exercise objection
to the statute under the religion clauses received short shrift, given
that "the Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in erad-
icating racial discrimination in education." 262 The Court concluded
that "[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact
on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent
those schools from observing their religious tenets."263
The decision in Bob Jones has generally received a warm re-
sponse, 264 but is nonetheless clearly incorrect, once the problem of
unconstitutional conditions is forthrightly considered. The initial in-
quiry is whether the state could decide that its "compelling interest"
in eradicating racial segregation in education is sufficiently strong to
allow the state to impose a direct fine or criminal punishment on the
school for imposing those conditions on its students. The answer, I
take it, is no. The free exercise clause of the first ariendment does
not pertain only to the liturgy but to the full range of religious activ-
ities, of which schooling is most definitely a part.265 Indeed, if Bob
Jones is correct, then the government could claim that it has a "com-
pelling state interest" to condition tax exemptions to religious institu-
tions on their adherence to title VII prohibitions against gender dis-
crimination, as practiced by Roman Catholics and Orthodox Jews, in
the selection of religious leaders. 266 Even if it is assumed that the
259 See id. at 58o-8i, 602-03. Also at issue in the case was whether the university's
discriminatory practices disqualified it from tax exempt status under the "public policy" doctrine,
a question that the Court answered affirmatively. See id. at 592-96.
260 Id. at 592.
261 See id. at 593 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
262 Id. at 604.
263 Id. at 603-04.
264 See, e.g., Selig, The Reagan Justice Department and Civil Rights: What Went Wrong,
1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 785, 817-21; see also Freed & Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy:
Bob Jones University v. United States, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. I, 1-2 (noting the various editorials
and columns of the New York Times and the Washington Post denouncing the University and
the Reagan Administration position). Freed and Polsby attack Bob Jones for its analysis of the
"public policy" doctrine in the field of tax exemptions. See id. at 50-71.
265 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
266 The tension between title VII and the religion clauses did surface in Corporation of
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 207 S. Ct. 2862 (1987), in which the Court held that the exemption
from title VII for religious organizations, see 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-i (2982), did not offend the
establishment clause. The Court did not ask the harder question whether the exemption was
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denial of a tax benefit does not operate like a "fine," there still remains
the question whether the government can deliver its economic benefits
in ways that favor one religious set of beliefs over another, given its
obligation not to use its coercive powers to advance or retard reli-
gion. 267 Under Bob Jones, the University and its supporters are forced
to bankroll in part the subsidies provided for other institutions, with-
out receiving any parallel subsidy of their 'own, thereby skewing the
relative power of the two sets of institutions from what it would be
in the tax-free world. The use of selective grants on matters of
religious belief shows government power at its most dangerous. In
this context it becomes idle to say that the greater power of withhold-
ing tax exemptions includes the lesser power to condition an exemption
on the sacrifice of the prospective recipient's own religious convictions.
As is usually the case, the setting of conditions on government grants
is the result of powerful political pressures against which the Bill of
Rights was designed to guard. Bob Jones University may be unfash-
ionable and perverse in its religious beliefs and practices, but it is
entitled to the same level of constitutional protection as everyone else.
E. Food Stamps
We are at last in a position to reconsider the paradox of unconsti-
tutional conditions as it applies to the case with which this Foreword
began: Lyng v. International Union, UAW. 2 68 In Lyng, it will be
recalled, the union argued that the legislative decision to exclude
striking workers from the food stamp program constituted an imper-
missible "burden" upon their first amendment rights of association,
while the disparate treatment between these striking workers and
other workers eligible for food stamps constituted an impermissible
classification that offended equal protection guarantees.269 Stated oth-
erwise, the union's claim is that the state uses impermissible "coercion"
when it denies a benefit to striking workers that it grants to others.
The rival position is that the state has chosen to "subsidize" certain
kinds of workers, and is not duty-bound to extend that subsidy to
workers who have chosen to strike. The case thus raises the uncon-
stitutional conditions question whether the greater power - to elim-
inate the entire food stamp program - entails the lesser power - to
exclude striking workers from the receipt of this set of government
benefits.
required by the free exercise clause, to which I would answer in the affirmative. If that
conclusion is correct, then Bob Jones must be clearly wrong. If the state cannot coerce com-
pliance with the antidiscrimination norm against religious organizations by the use of force,
then it cannot discriminate against them in the receipt of tax benefits.
267 For a parallel discussion of the more difficult case of Sherbert, see pp. 79-86 above.
268 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988).
269 See supra p. 6.
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As before, the plaintiff's claim can be evaluated only if this leg-
islative decision is placed within its larger constitutional context. The
initial point of departure involves the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). The statute itself represents a conscious program to displace
market mechanisms with a system of collective bargaining, under
which the majority of workers within a given bargaining unit are able
to require their employer to negotiate with them in good faith. The
central feature of this statute is that it explicitly repudiates the com-
petitive norm and substitutes in its place a monopolistic structure
whereby the employer is required to negotiate with the workers as a
group. Ironically, the major historical opposition to the NLRA was
that its duty to bargain in good faith violated the employer's right to
freedom of association, by denying him the right to do business with
whomever he saw fit. The inevitable consequence of the present labor
statutes is to block free entry and exit, and thereby to increase the
role of strategic behavior, given the attendant expansion in the size
of the bargaining range. Hard, protracted negotiations over the di-
vision of the gains from trade become the rule, with strikes resulting
from breakdowns in negotiations that both create private losses for
the parties and inffict extensive social costs on third parties. In my
opinion, the pre-i937 law on the subject was sound: the NLRA should
have been struck down on both commerce clause and takings
grounds, 270 in which case the entire issue in Lyng quickly disappears.
However, for present purposes, my views are quite irrelevant. The
important point is that the explicit rejection of a strong system of
property rights made possible a level of government discretion that
had not previously existed. The question then becomes whether the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions can sensibly cabin the use of
that power.
Probably not, at least in this case. The doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions was used in the contexts just considered to forestall redis-
tribution of wealth along forbidden dimensions. In the foreign incor-
poration cases and the early highway cases, the competitive ideal
forbidding economic redistribution by government still held sway. In
the religion and speech cases, the marketplace of ideas is more than
an idle economic image, as redistribution along political or religious
lines continues to be prohibited even though economic redistributions
are allowed. However, once redistribution of wealth and power is
tolerated under the rational basis test in all relevant dimensions, then
there is no forbidden use of government power to which the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions could respond. The search for some
270 On application of the commerce clause, see Epstein, cited above in note 2; on application
of the takings clause, see R. EPSTEIN, cited above in note 28, at 279-82, and Epstein, A
Common Law of Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. X357
(r983).
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fundamental right or freedom falls short on both the question of
economic liberties, given the NLRA, and of welfare benefits, given
the food stamp program. The intersection between two programs over
which Congress has an acknowledged broad discretion does not yield
any principle under which the discretion over the whole is less than
the discretion over the parts.
Start with the legacy of the NLRA. The chief significance of the
constitutional decisions in this area was the repudiation of the system
of private property and competitive markets as the baseline against
which permissible legislative enactments were measured. 27 1 Without
accepting that baseline, the shift from competitive markets to cartel
arrangements cannot be regarded as a "penalty" or a "taking" from
employers made subject to the new restrictions. By the same token,
the legal structure of the original Wagner Act 272 was held constitu-
tionally permissible, although not constitutionally required. As long
as union members have no "fundamental right" to the protection of
labor statutes, then the current statutory framework, however well-
established, does not establish any new definitive constitutional base-
line against which subsequent legislative decisions must be tested.
One immediate result was that the Taft-Hartley Act, 273 which pro-
hibited a category of union unfair labor practices, could not be re-
garded as a penalty or a taking from workers that must be subjected
to any form of heightened constitutional scrutiny. Any number of
structural permutations have equal constitutional dignity. There is no
impediment against oscillating back and forth between different eco-
nomic orders, just as there is none against the repeal of Taft-Hartley
in its entirety. In response, it might be suggested that the collective
interest of the workers presents a fundamental claim of associational
freedom that requires continuation of the system of collective bargain-
ing. Yet under present law it is impossible to see how that might be
done without repudiating the modern understanding that the state's
police power trumps all economic liberties. Unions are large and
complex organizations, making it implausible to claim that their mem-
bers enjoy an "intimate" right of association such as that found in
marriage and perhaps certain other highly personal forms of associa-
tion. 2 74 The function and structure of unions are driven by the same
271 Cf. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 880-83 (1987) (attributing the
decline of Lochner to the rejection of common law baselines of private property and free
contract).
272 National Labor Relations (Wagner-Connery) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (x935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ i5I-166 (1982)).
273 See Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 8, 6i Stat. 136, 140 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (I982)).
274 Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 6o9, 62o (2984) (noting that "[a]s a general
matter, only those relationships" that are "distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness,
a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from
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economic considerations that govern ordinary business firms. In ad-
dition, unions themselves are not organizations formed by unanimous
consent, but they have the power to bind individual dissenters by
their decisions. Even if economic liberties were protected, freedom of
association for some would not make it onto the list.
The new constitutional order thus comes to us bereft of the old
common law baseline, and without a new baseline to replace it. Given
this legal void, it is quite impossible to say that a certain reform
introduces either a subsidy or a penalty that needs to be constitution-
ally justified. Rather, it is just a change among the class of equally
permissible permutations. Once all baselines are extinguished, the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has nothing on which to anchor
itself, for there remains no dimension along which strategic behavior
or the redistribution of wealth is forbidden. If the state can limit the
power of unions under the Taft-Hartley Act,275 then it can also do so
under the food stamp program. Neither side in Lyng mastered the
appropriate constitutional discourse. The Court was wrong to de-
scribe the food stamp program as a "subsidy."276 By the same token,
the dissent improperly called the exclusion of striking workers from
the program a "penalty. '277 Strictly speaking, both sides are wrong
because the statutory changes, in the present constitutional setting,
are neither.
The two errors are not, however, of equal magnitude. Justice
White, writing for the Court, need not have shown that the provision
of food stamps to striking workers is a subsidy in order to sustain the
statute's constitutionality. Rather, the btarden was on Justice Marshall
in dissent to show that the withholding of the food stamps is a
forbidden "penalty" - that is, that it works some redistribution of
income or wealth along some forbidden dimension. The obliteration
of all constitutional landmarks in the labor relations area therefore
does no damage to Justice White's majority position, but is fatal to
Justice Marshall's dissent.
Justice Marshall tried to escape this problem by arguing that the
mirage of government "neutrality" cannot possibly be used to uphold
the statute. 278 After all, employers themselves receive many benefits
from the welfare state that are in no way conditioned upon their
behavior in labor disputes. To hit union workers with an exclusion
from this program fits poorly with the maintenance of government
others in critical aspects of the relationship" qualify as intimate associations protected by the
first amendment).
275 Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 8, 61 Stat. 136, 14o (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982)).
276 See Io8 S. Ct. at Igo.
277 See id. at 1I98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
278 See id. at 1197-98.
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benefits on the other side. But the argument about "neutrality" fares
no better in this context than the argument about either penalty or
subsidy. The complete response to Justice Marshall's point is that in
the present constitutional world of labor relations, Congress could
exclude employers from a wide variety of economic benefits, whether
or not they were enmeshed in a labor dispute, without fear of over-
stepping constitutional limitations. In this case, for example, the
statute places heavy pressure on employers not to lock out workers,
who would then be able to receive their food stamp benefits, but
surely no one would say that this provision is unconstitutional because
it "coerces" employers (who have long been forced to surrender their
freedom of association) to abandon their rights not to do business with
the union. The conscious, systematic elimination of all recognizable
baselines makes the idea of "neutrality," powerful in a common law
world as an argument against the NLRA, as empty as that of "penalty"
and "subsidy." Again this absence of constitutional principle presents
no obstacle to the party that wants to sustain the statute. It is fatal
only to the party, be it management or labor, that wants to strike it
down.
One must reach the same conclusion starting at the opposite pole
with the food stamp program. Here too we have a system of in-kind
benefits provided to recipients by the public at large. Yet there is a
long line of Supreme Court cases holding that poverty is not a suspect
classification, 279 and that the state is under no duty to redistribute
wealth from rich to poor. Again there is no right to which the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions may be anchored. The decision to ex-
clude striking workers from the program is based upon the sensible
notion that the removal of payments to striking workers reduces the
incidence of strikes. In turn, reducing the incidence of strikes is an
end the state could pursue directly (as, for example, by repealing the
collective bargaining rules), so it becomes one that the state may
pursue by indirection as well. Looked at in retrospect, the exclusion
of striking workers from the food stamp program may well treat
persons with equal need differently, but it is hardly an instance of
failing to treat "like cases alike," as Justice Marshall suggested. 280
There is still the question of incentives to be considered, and here
Congress has decided that it is willing to suffer some inequality after
the fact in order to reduce the frequency and severity of strikes. The
weak rational basis test offers no reason to control the power of such
state discretion, on which the entire unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine rests.
279 See, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 1o8 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1988) (citing Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-23 (ig8o), and Ortwein v. Schwab, 40 U.S. 656, 66o (1973)).
280 See Lyng, io8 S. Ct. at 1194 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The same conclusion follows when the matter is considered from
the point of view of its funding. Here there is no way to match the
taxes paid by striking workers with the level of food stamp benefits
that they are entitled to receive. It is quite possible that, even if they
cannot recover benefits while on strike, they receive a net benefit from
the system, because they are still covered for the same contingencies
as all other recipients. 281 If so, then some other parties must be net
losers, but they are not allowed to complain either, even if they are
shareholders whose tax dollars are being used to support the workers
striking against their businesses. Who wins and loses is all quite
impossible to determine anyway. There is no tracing mechanism to
allow us to decide which set of benefits were funded by which per-
son.282 More fundamentally, there is no normative criterion to render
any forms of redistribution impermissible. Without fundamental right
or suspect classification, we remain mired in a constitutional waste-
land.
The case is thus a far cry from Sherbert. Outside the context of
the establishment clause, there exists no general requirement that
persons not be taxed for benefits they do not receive. Nor does Lyng
involve a state-imposed choice between the receipt of a government
benefit and the waiver of constitutionally protected rights. Without
the food stamp program, the workers know that they will have to
281 It would be a closer question if the statute purported to deny striking workers all food
stamp benefits in perpetuity. That statute could no longer be justified on the ground that the
government should not provide payments to workers locked in economic conflicts with their
employers, but it might be justified (in a rational basis world) as an effort to reduce the number
of strikes under the labor statute. This special exclusion of striking workers is far more difficult
to sustain in a world without collective bargaining, where the question of strikes would be
controlled by the common law of property, contract, and tort. But even in this case it would
be important to distinguish between a world in which common law rules prevailed by legislative
grace and one in which they prevailed by constitutional mandate. In the former, rational basis
world, the statute would probably prove acceptable. But with any stricter scrutiny, the perpetual
restriction would fall (assuming that the food stamp program itself would not fall).
282 The existence of such a mechanism can influence the outcome of cases. Ohio Bureau of
Employment Services v. Hodery, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), involved a statute providing that workers
for an employer whose business was shut down as part of a labor dispute other than a lockout
were not entitled to receive unemployment compensation, even if they were nonunion workers
who had not participated in the dispute itself. See id. at 47,-77. The Supreme Court unani-
mously upheld the statute under rational basis review. It noted that each employer's contribution
to the unemployment compensation fund was otherwise triggered by the number of its employees
who received benefits. That basic structure, if unaltered, would have allowed the union to
inflict heavy costs upon the employer if its strike forced the employer to close down its nonunion
divisions. Such a union strategy would clearly influence the settlement of the strike. The
funding imbalance was avoided by denying compensation to the innocent workers laid off. The
same competitive balance could have been achieved if the nonunion workers received ordinary
compensation from general revenues, not from the employer. But the rational basis test only
required a good reason to avoid the payments by the employer; it did not require the adoption
of an ideal compensation program that also protected innocent employees.
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fend for themselves. After the passage of the food stamp program
with this exception, they still have to fend for themselves. Basically
they face the same costs and benefits from striking with the statute
as they did striking before the food stamp programs were first intro-
duced. At most the statute works a tiny change in the incentives
faced by union workers who might delay striking, in order to induce
the employer to lock them out first. 28 3 The dominant feature of this
case is that the unions have lost in a struggle over political power,
and the broad gulf between power and entitlement cannot be crossed
when judicial deference is the order of the day.
IX. CONCLUSION
The analysis of Lyng has brought us full circle in the analysis of
unconstitutional conditions. It may now be useful to summarize where
that journey has led. Initially it is useful to distinguish between the
use of the doctrine as a matter of general legal theory and its use in
connection with particular constitutional provisions. As a matter of
theory, competitive markets and government power are often polar
opposites. Within competitive markets, new entry is an effective
check against private excesses. Accordingly, private contracts gener-
ally both advance the interests of the parties and make a positive
contribution to the total welfare of the social system at large. Within
this competitive setting, the emphasis of the law is rightly on trans-
actional justice: whether particular contracts have been tainted by
coercion, duress, fraud, or incompetence.
These transactional elements retain their importance whenever the
government enters the market as an ordinary contracting party. But
the traditional norms prohibiting coercion and duress are insufficient
to police the legal monopoly that government exercises over certain
critical domains. As a matter of general theory, the emphasis must
shift from transactional to institutional justice, at which point three
problems become paramount: monopoly, collective action dilemmas,
and externalities. When the government uses only its monopoly of
force to achieve its ends, classic constitutional questions arise under
particular constitutional provisions. But when the government uses
its power to contract or grant, then the issue of unconstitutional
conditions proper is raised.
First, government monopoly power creates a broad range of bar-
gaining outcomes that will allow the state and any individual to be
better off than they were before the bargain. The costs of achieving
some bargaining outcome, however, can dissipate a large portion of
the achievable social gains. Limits on the types of gains that the state
283 Similarly, employers have a small incentive to delay a lockout in order to induce a strike.
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can hope to extract by bargaining with its citizens can limit the social
losses associated with strategic behavior. In general, if the govern-
ment can cover the costs of running the instrumentalities that it
controls, it should not be allowed to hold out for any portion of the
general surplus. The imposition of a condition on a grant is often an
attempt to shift some portion of that surplus from some persons or
interest groups to others. The factional politics it encourages and the
social losses that it imposes are good reasons to incorporate protections
against such abuse at a constitutional level.
Second, government regulation and taxation are means to effect
implicit transfers of wealth between individuals. The bargain that is
made with one citizen may have the effect of freezing other citizens
out of the market or setting them at a competitive disadvantage. That
is the lesson learned from both the corporate charter and the highway
franchise cases. A firm cannot escape these external costs simply by
reducing the prices it charges for goods and services. A legal rule
that requires the government to make available to everyone on equal
terms the privileges afforded to a few - for example, incorporation,
or access to roads - largely controls this problem. The power to
select confers greater powers on government officials than a rule that
requires consistent treatment between rivals for government favors.
At a normative level, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions rep-
resents the sound limitation on public discretion.
Another part of the inquiry is not normative, but positive. How
well do the cases conform to this model of unconstitutional conditions?
In one sense they do not, because the language of externalities and
strategic behavior is not drawn from Supreme Court cases. The
Justices have worked more by hunch and intuition than by systematic
theory. But the question is less one of words, and more one of judicial
behavior. In this regard, the answer depends heavily on the extent
to which the Supreme Court proceeds from the distrust of government
power. In the pre-1937 period of the doctrine, there were clear hints
that the preservation of a competitive system was an appropriate
judicial function. The foreign incorporation cases and the regulation
of highway cases both reflected that concern. Nonetheless, these pre-
1937 cases showed at best an inconsistent and halting devotion to
general principles of economic liberties. 28 4 Accordingly, unconstitu-
tional conditions arguments were pressed forward with only modest
vigor. In the foreign corporation cases, they achieved long-term ben-
eficial outcomes, but in the highway cases they were easily circum-
vented.
284 See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546-48 (1923) (listing four exceptions
to the general principle of freedom of contract, most of which have little to do with the standard
accounts of market failure).
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In the post-I937 era, concern with economic liberties and compet-
itive markets has been stripped of its normative constitutional au-
thority. It is not surprising, therefore, that the doctrine of unconsti-
tutional conditions has but weak application in these areas.
Nonetheless, the far greater weight that has been attached to speech
and religion has been matched by an increasing resort to unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine. The Court seems alert to the dangers that
arise when governments externalize costs through regulation and tax-
ation, and attempt to bargain strategically with individual citizens.
Within specified subject matter areas, the emergent doctrine thus takes
on the same contours that would have been imposed if the Court had
continued to protect economic liberties and private property. Various
forms of implicit transfers across religious or political groups are
looked upon with deep suspicion, and controlled with a fair measure
of sophistication and success. The efforts by the government to "lever"
its monopoly advantage into protected areas are stoutly resisted.
But the court will not generalize to all areas of government activ-
ity. In order to account for its caution, we are thus brought back to
the fundamental distinction that has dominated so much of constitu-
tional law since the 1937 revolution. Why is the protection of eco-
nomic liberties and property interests less a function of the judiciary
than the protection of speech, religion, and other selected fundamental
rights? To that question I think there is no satisfactory reply, because
the same forms of government failure can pervade both areas. The
object of government is to maximize the cooperative surplus of human
activities in all domains, and the object of the Court is to help ensure
effective government. The Court therefore should not sanction abuses
of the political process, whether they offend speech, liberty, or prop-
erty. Instead, a presumption of distrust should attach to all govern-
ment action. That presumption should allow the Court to organize
its thinking on unconstitutional conditions in particular and constitu-
tional law in general around one proposition: where the Court rou-
tinely allows strategic behavior and implicit wealth transfers by gov-
ernment, there constitutionalism ends.
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